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Reflections on the Quarter

In Search of NATO Unity

ADMINISTRATION spokesmen have acclaimed the test ban agreement as a first step that might make possible other steps leading to disarmament and a peaceful world. Yet, since we cannot read clearly Soviet intentions, we must focus our attention upon Soviet capabilities. These capabilities are as formidable as they have ever been; most certainly, they have not been diminished by the Soviet exploits in space, by the acquisition of a military base in the Caribbean, and by a recent series of nuclear tests in the atmosphere more numerous and more powerful in megatonnage than ours.

There is not one shred of evidence that can be adduced in favor of reducing the strength of NATO, for thinning out its forces in Europe, and for revising downward the requirements of NATO forces for modern armaments, including all kinds of nuclear weapons. The Soviets have consistently sought to destroy NATO. This abiding effort cannot be explained by mere fear of a resurgent Germany. It is unlikely that the Soviets are frightened of twelve German conventional divisions deployed in a country too small to develop any nuclear posture of its own. Although Soviet spokesmen have, in private conversations with Westerners, especially visiting scientists, hinted at their fear of Germany and China, while avowing friendly sentiments for the American people, this tactic may form part of communist strategy for splitting the Western Alliance.

Perhaps at no time since the founding of NATO has the need been greater than it is now for strengthening the Alliance's effectives and armament, and for adjusting its command structure to novel technological developments. If we are to believe official communiqués, all members of the NATO Council, including France, are agreed that NATO needs strengthening. We find it relatively easy to arrive at a consensus on the hardware items needed for improving the military posture of the Alliance, if not always on who is to pay for the procurement. It is on the political-strategic intangibles that views diverge.

At the heart of the discord are the questions of 1) the strategy which should govern the deployment of the allied forces; 2) the extent to which the individual allies should share in planning the overall strategy of the Alliance; and 3), most importantly, the degree to which the European allies should participate in the making of strategic decisions.

These disagreements have crystallized in the painful controversy over who should decide upon the use of the nuclear, the ultimate weapons. Until France raised the issue, the situation was simple. The United States held the monopoly of the Alliance's nuclear weaponry

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and hence could alone decide as to whether, when and where nuclear devices would be employed in the defense of the Western Alliance.

Three developments have altered this once so simple situation: first, the growing strength and sophistication of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and delivery systems; second, the growth of the West European economy and the concomitant recovery of European self-confidence; and third, the launching of the French program for the development of a national *force de dissuasion*.

It is these developments which have culminated in the current and thus far unresolved crisis of NATO. The crisis revolves upon the clash of two arguments. The first, which is widely believed to be the one which informs United States policy, runs as follows: The United States is, by a wide margin, the strongest member of the Western Alliance; the United States is also a world power concerned with matters beyond the scope of the Western Alliance. Only the United States possesses an integrated nuclear deterrent which equals or exceeds Soviet nuclear capabilities.

The second argument, advanced in flat opposition to the first by General de Gaulle and tacitly supported by many West Europeans content to let General de Gaulle be their spokesman, can be summed up thus: It is questionable what kind of Soviet challenge to Western Europe the United States would consider a *casus belli atomici*. It is not certain that the United States will retaliate against *any* Soviet challenge to Western Europe with nuclear weapons, for American nuclear retaliation against a Soviet thrust in Europe would draw Soviet nuclear fire upon the Continental United States. Hence Europe must rely upon indigenous nuclear power in order to deter a Soviet attack upon herself, nuclear or conventional.

In his tour through southern France in September, President de Gaulle reaffirmed his intention to create an independent nuclear force and his unwillingness to have France play a subsidiary role within the Atlantic Alliance. Speaking at Belley, he declared: "Even if we are its [United States] allies for the equilibrium of the world, we do not want it to direct us or even become our protector."

Yet De Gaulle did not envisage France's departure from the Atlantic Alliance. In his press conference of July 29, De Gaulle admitted that the Alliance was for Europe an "elementary necessity." France, in time of war, would "unfailingly be on the side of the United States." Foreign Minister Couve de Murville's visit to Washington in October had as its objective to resolve differences between U.S. and French approaches to the defense of the North Atlantic area. Hence the issues which divide NATO members are related not to fundamentals but rather to the appropriate organization for achieving common objectives.

Each side argues from a set of logical premises and, most importantly, from the realities of its

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respective geographical - strategic environment. If both sides have hold of the truth, or at least of part of the truth, it should be possible to reconcile their respective positions, far apart from one another as they now might seem. Certain compromise solutions have been suggested.

One of these proposals seeks to circumvent the thorny problem of the making of the nuclear decision by a) cutting in the NATO allies of the United States on the planning of nuclear strategy, and b) improving NATO's organizational structure for political deliberation.

Another proposal envisages that a European Community, including Britain, would pool its nuclear resources and field its own collective deterrent. Conceivably, the negotiations for Britain's admission to the EEC might not have ended in failure if the British had indicated a willingness to participate with France in the building of a European nuclear force. Michel Habib-Deloncle, France's Deputy Foreign Minister, speaking to the Assembly of the Council of Europe on September 23, suggested that Britain and France might collaborate in the development of European nuclear capabilities. A European deterrent would not be so formidable as that of the United States, but large enough nevertheless to be effective politically and militarily. Once Europe had gained her nuclear independence, she would be able to negotiate with the United States as an equal (or potentially equal) partner.

The Nassau Agreement and the breakdown of the Brussels talks make it unlikely that Britain will or can contribute her nuclear might to an all-European pool. By the terms of the Test Ban Treaty, Britain is prohibited only from assisting another power in the explosion of a nuclear device in the atmosphere, outer space, or underwater. Britain could still provide a country such as France with nuclear data which might conceivably make unnecessary further French testing. But having signed the Test Ban Treaty, the British are unlikely to divulge their nuclear secrets to another NATO country, even on terms which do not violate the letter of the agreement.

The prospects for a solution to NATO's nuclear problems have not brightened. Nor has the Administration's attempt to deal with the problem of nuclear sharing by creating a multilateral Polaris surface fleet been attended by conspicuous success. The United States has offered to provide a guided-missile destroyer to an international crew to demonstrate the feasibility of the multinational surface fleet. The British have expressed reservations about such a project. The German position remains ambiguous. Although committed to participate in the multilateral force under the aegis of NATO, Chancellor Adenauer, early in October, expressed the view that Germany could take part in both the proposed NATO and the French nuclear forces.

The plan is likely to encounter numerous difficulties even if such a fleet is placed in service. Sur-

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face missile ships may prove vulnerable to surveillance from Soviet satellites and aircraft. Moreover, such a fleet could be destroyed by submarines or by medium-range ballistic missiles. If the missile ships were disguised as merchant vessels, questions of international law might arise. If the missile ships were not to protect themselves by masquerading as commercial vessels, they might require air and seaborne escorts. Therefore, the cost of such a system might prove in excess of that of mobile- or fixed-site systems on land.

The United States has tried to counterbalance the attractiveness to Germany of the French plans for Europe by various means. One such effort, apparently made without the prior approval of the French, was a plan to allow the Federal Republic to use U.S. supply bases in France. This action was aimed at tying German forces more securely to NATO and at forestalling further French-German agreements. Such a policy is fraught with dangers. It is unlikely to deter the Bonn government from cooperation in military, political and economic affairs with France. Furthermore, the French undoubtedly resent U.S. efforts to detach West Germany from her partnership with Paris by making available to the Federal Republic facilities which France has granted to the U.S. under NATO. Such a proposal does not contribute to the development of harmony within the Alliance.

Thus, unless Washington and Paris are able to arrive at some mutually satisfactory solution to their differences, the possibility grows of a French-German nuclear agreement. The Administration's proposals for a multilateral force do not answer the objections of Europeans who aspire to a greater voice in the formulation of Alliance strategy. The idea of a multilateral force may seem to many Europeans an American effort to divert them from the development of nuclear capabilities over which they themselves retain control.

Since a perfect solution to NATO's key problem is beyond our reach, we must seek to make progress by the piecemeal approach. Yet partial solutions — the only ones we are likely to find — must be inspired by an all-inclusive concept: do we, the peoples of NATO, really want an Atlantic Community? And if we do, then which are the principles which must guide our endeavors? Without some abrogation of national sovereignty, the Atlantic Community will remain a geographical expression.

The principal weight of the task falls upon the shoulders of the United States. For the strong, it goes against the grain to yield even a shred of their freedom of action. Yet the readiness of our European friends to share in the burdens of the Alliance, especially the financial ones, and to match our contribution to international economic development, will go a long way to restore that climate of mutual confidence which prevailed at the birth of the Alliance and at many a critical moment, such as the

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Korean War, the several Berlin crises and the October 1962 showdown on Cuba.

The Test Ban Treaty

On August 5, representatives of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union signed an agreement banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater. Subsequently, after several weeks of testimony and deliberation, the Foreign Relations Committee recommended that the Senate "give its advice and consent to ratification" of the Test Ban Treaty. On September 24, the Senate approved the treaty without reservation.

At first glance, the treaty seems to represent the fulfillment of nearly five years of diplomatic efforts on the part of the United States to take a first step toward bringing the arms problem which confronts mankind under some sort of reliable international control. It seems to provide for a reciprocal damping of military technological competition between the Soviet Union and the United States in an equitable manner, without posing unacceptable risks to the security of the United States and of the many countries which depend upon our responsible exercise of power for the preservation of their freedom. The treaty appears to hold out to all peoples the hope that their offspring will be able to escape the dangers of a radioactive environment. Such at least have been the expectations voiced by Administration spokesmen on behalf of the Test Ban Treaty.

The Soviets, too, it is suggested, find it to their interest to slow the arms race. It is said that they are under pressure to raise the domestic standard of living and to ensure an adequate growth rate for the Soviet economy; that they caught a glimpse of the prospect of a thermonuclear inferno last October and decided that continued efforts to overtake the United States militarily are both futile and dangerous; that they wish to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them. All of these explanations carry a certain amount of plausibility.

There would seem to be a certain inconsistency in logic, however, in the position taken by Administration officials in their defense of the Test Ban Treaty. Secretary of State Rusk warned against any premature thought that the Soviets have abandoned their long-sought objective of international hegemony. On August 12, Rusk pointed out that we have no basis yet for assuming a fundamental change in Soviet objectives. One day later, Secretary of Defense McNamara presented a picture of U.S. strategic superiority in the realm of nuclear military technology. He argued persuasively that the Test Ban Treaty then under consideration would retard Soviet progress, and would enable the United States to retain its margin of superiority.

In other words, we are told on the one hand that the Soviets would still like very much to prevail over the West if possible. Yet on the other hand we are informed,

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in effect, that the Soviet leaders, by subscribing to this treaty, are voluntarily relegating themselves to a position of permanent or at least prolonged inferiority in respect to strategic nuclear capabilities. The latter attitude is out of keeping with the character of the Soviet leaders as we have come to know them over the years. The estimate of the current and future military situation presented by our officials may be quite different from that which underlay the Soviet decision to conclude the treaty. This decision could be due to several factors, none of which is known to us.

The Soviets may have concluded, for example, that the continuation of testing and further development of nuclear weapons will not increase the security of the Soviet Union or its selective military advantage over the United States. It is conceivable that the Soviet leaders do not find their alleged military inferiority at all uncomfortable. It is generally conceded that the treaty would preserve Soviet superiority in very large yield weapons which Soviet military experts consider important. Furthermore, the Soviet leaders, who place great emphasis upon air and missile defense, are making a determined and expensive effort to forge ahead in this area. They do not hold, as do some of our officials, that "defense is provocative." Instead, they consider a vigorous defense program to be an essential element of their military posture.

In his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Secretary of Defense himself conceded that there are still gains to be made from atmospheric testing. McNamara admitted that uncertainties exist with regard to missile defense and the hardening of sites, that the Soviets have conducted tests in these fields, whereas we have not. Moreover, the United States has not tested an ICBM equipped with a nuclear warhead. Nor have we conducted nuclear detonations to determine the ability of a Polaris-carrying submarine to withstand an underwater nuclear blast in its vicinity or to retain command, control and communications capabilities in a radioactive environment. Finally, we have not duplicated the Soviet feat of firing a missile which destroyed two incoming ballistic missiles.

McNamara asserted that the Soviet Union "has not explored by *full-scale* high altitude tests the vulnerability of re-entry vehicles to blast." The U.S., however, has not explored this aspect of defense in *any* tests. McNamara did not mention the reported missile installation near Leningrad which may be the first operational site in a projected Soviet anti-ICBM system. At the present time, the United States does not expect to deploy operational anti-missile systems until the period 1967-70.

The Soviets undoubtedly realize that they can hardly expect to defeat the United States, provided this country does not relax its efforts to retain its existing measure of military superiority. The communists may have reasoned that they must take measures to delay U.S. technological advance and to

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reduce U.S. arms production, while at the same time continuing or even accelerating the development of their own technology and military power. Therefore, we cannot blandly discount the possibility that the Soviets, in signing the same kind of partial test ban agreement which they categorically rejected one year ago, in August 1962, may now hope to employ the test ban as a means of reducing substantially during the next five years the strategic superiority which the United States is conceded to possess at the present time. In short, if Administration officials are correct in their assessment that Soviet intentions have not changed, Soviet strategy must aim ultimately at defeating, or otherwise neutralizing or eliminating, the United States.

Problems may arise with respect to several of the treaty's provisions. For example, some of the experts who were requested to submit statements to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked whether the banning of all nuclear explosions in any of the three environments constituted, in effect, an agreement prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in combat. Although both President Kennedy and Secretary of State Rusk gave assurances that the treaty would not prevent the United States from invoking its nuclear armory in wartime, the wording of the Moscow Agreement lends itself to a contrary interpretation.

Of perhaps greater consequence, however, is the provision contained in Article IV which pertains to the right of withdrawal. Since this treaty is founded upon the principle of national sovereignty and contains no provisions for effective international control, it is sensible for each signatory to reserve to itself the right of abrogation without a breach of international law, "if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country."

However, Article IV states that the withdrawing Party "shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance." To be sure, Secretary Rusk furnished one helpful clarification of this sentence when he said: "If the Soviet Union were to test in violation of the treaty, the fundamental obligation that is the consideration for our adherence would disappear. In that case the United States could, if it chose, consider itself released from its reciprocal obligation and could resume testing without delay." The Secretary's clarification eliminates one difficulty. But another problem remains, namely, one in which the United States may find it necessary, in the interests of its own security, to resume testing first.

Let us suppose that the Soviets have made more progress than the United States in acquiring operational knowledge of AICBM (anti-ICBM) systems before the treaty goes into effect. Let us suppose further that after the treaty goes into effect, the Soviets start producing AICBM's in substantial quantities, deploying them around their cities (as they have already done in the case of Leningrad), and training crews in their use. At

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first U.S. policymakers, relying upon the current estimate of our overwhelming strategic superiority, would probably deprecate Soviet efforts in the anti-missile field. Moreover, the Soviets themselves would probably play down the importance of the AICBM until after they had made considerable headway. But after two or three years, U.S. defense experts might conclude that the Soviets were substantially reducing the American margin of superiority. To be sure, no one can predict with certainty what the relative military positions of the Soviets and ourselves might be three years from now. Nevertheless, there is a conceivable set of circumstances in which U.S. policymakers may decide that the United States, in prudence, must speed up its own anti-missile program by conducting tests.

If the United States should determine that Soviet weapons development, based presumably on the results of pre-treaty tests, posed risks to the security of our nation, this would constitute an "extraordinary event related to the subject matter of the treaty" and would, under the wording of Article IV, justify an act of withdrawal by the United States, regardless of the fact that the Soviets had not violated the treaty. But once the United States has made an authoritative determination that the supreme national interest has been placed in jeopardy, a question arises as to why three months should elapse before tests would be resumed. Where national security interests are at stake, the time lapse between the decision and the testing should be limited solely by the state of our technological preparations. If, as we have been assured, the government expects to sustain a readiness for immediate resumption, then it should resume testing as quickly as possible.

The test ban agreement raises still another question: the manner in which official determination is to be made that "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty" necessitate the unilateral resumption of nuclear testing aboveground. Such a question, of course, touches upon the delicate constitutional relationships between the Congress and the Executive as well as the division of responsibility within the Executive itself. For example, will all of the intelligence-gathering agencies of the government have equal responsibility or will certain ones be given special responsibilities in the policing of the treaty? What if, say, a year after the United States has ratified the treaty, the Atomic Energy Commission issues a communiqué, as it did on June 30 last, stating that it has "inconclusive evidence" that the Soviet Union has conducted a low-yield weapons test in the atmosphere. Let us then suppose that another Executive agency announces that there is no reason to believe that the Soviets have violated the treaty. Will the Atomic Energy Commission be required to submit quarterly reports of its monitoring activities to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of the Congress and to report immediately any positive indication of a suspicious

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event, or is it possible that all intelligence-gathering agencies, including the AEC, would be instructed not to precipitate public debate on these matters by issuing any statements or reports outside Executive channels? Efforts might be undertaken to determine to what extent either the Senate or the entire Congress may be able to exercise a "watchdog" function in the policing of this treaty.

One of the most serious implications of the treaty is the precedent which it sets for future arms control or disarmament agreements with the Soviet Union. This agreement is quite different from the one which our diplomats tried so hard to obtain at Geneva. In the Geneva talks, the central issue was international inspection, and on this issue the Soviets and the United States were not able to reach any final agreement. Hence there is no way of knowing whether the Soviets today are one inch closer to accepting the principle of international inspection in practice than they were seventeen years ago, when they turned down the Baruch Plan.

American analysts have always argued that it would be much safer for the United States to conclude armaments agreements with the Soviets if the latter could be induced gradually to give up their neurotic secrecy complex and to begin opening up their closed society. The U.S. government was anxious, therefore, to use the test ban agreement to establish such a precedent. But now the United States has signed a test ban agreement which may set exactly the opposite kind of precedent. Yet no one can hold that the *Soviets* have talked us into a bad agreement in this respect. The *United States itself* proposed a nationally inspected ban on atmospheric tests in April 1959, and a nationally inspected three-environment agreement in 1962. We have departed from international inspection in the Test Ban Treaty, except for a ritual mention of this principle in the preamble.

Not a few of those who have favored the ratification of the test ban agreement have suggested its utility as a means of reducing the probability of a spread in nuclear capabilities to nations not now possessing them. Specifically, it is alleged that the Soviets are now barred from assisting the Chinese communists in the development of nuclear weapons. Yet if the Sino-Soviet breach cannot be closed, the Soviets in all likelihood will not wish to provide their estranged brethren with modern weapons of mass destruction, whether or not there exists a test ban agreement. Furthermore, the treaty does not prevent a signatory from assisting another power in the detonation of an underground nuclear explosion. Nor does the treaty prohibit the passing of scientific data, or even nuclear weapons themselves, to a signatory's ally. Conceivably, the Soviets (or the United States) could provide such assistance to another power without violating the Test Ban Treaty. Therefore, if testing is no longer crucial in the development of an elementary a-

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tomic capability, it is doubtful that the treaty will fulfill at least one of the expectations of many of its supporters.

The conclusion of the treaty represents a symbolic act which formalizes a condition that has obtained for many months, namely, a voluntary moratorium upon nuclear testing. Hence the agreement endows an existing situation with moral-legal sanction. The treaty does not, unfortunately, bear upon the substantive issues which divide the United States and the Soviet Union: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam. So long as such problems remain unresolved, the claims staked out for the treaty by its makers will appear, in view of the treaty's modest substantive content, exorbitant. Until the Soviets have effected a fundamental change in their objectives, it behooves the United States to accept the necessity for vigilance and preparedness in a competitive struggle of long duration.

Misgivings in Germany

It is a sign of the times and of an apprehensive world that the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty in Moscow, which seemed at first glance to mark the fulfillment of five years of assiduous diplomatic efforts on the part of the United States, should suddenly increase the sense of insecurity within the most exposed NATO state, viz., the Federal Republic of Germany. The West Germans, after all, had known for a long time that the United States and Britain were anxious to put an end to those forms of testing which posed hazards to human health. Since 1958, they had been able to follow the course of the Geneva test ban talks, and they had not protested against the idea of a treaty while it was in the negotiating stage. Why then, asked some indignant Americans and Britons, should Chancellor Adenauer get his back up after the treaty was initialed?

Yet the Chancellor seems to have had reason—or, at least, some fairly plausible reasons—on his side when he signified his concern over the first fruit of "relaxed tensions." First of all, although the treaty as finally concluded bore strong resemblance to the three-environment ban proposed by the Kennedy Administration in August 1962, the Moscow Agreement could not exactly be called a product of the Geneva negotiations. The prolonged Geneva discussions had been based on formal proposals and counterproposals which pertained exclusively to the provisions of the test ban treaty. The positions of the negotiating governments were published in their official texts and were available for inspection by all NATO partners. The chancelleries of Western Europe were thoroughly familiar with the issues and arguments, especially those relating to international inspection, which seemed central to East-West arms negotiations. From the context of the Geneva exchanges, the statesmen and the diplomats of Europe had derived a specific set of political expectations.

The Moscow Agreement, however, seemed to come out of a dif-

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ferent stable. It contained no international inspection provisions. The clinching sessions were held in Moscow, not in Geneva, and the final text of the agreement was prepared by principals who had previously taken no part whatsoever in the Geneva talks. Europeans were not oblivious of the fact that the U.S. delegation included no professional military adviser, and that the Kennedy Administration was entering a test ban pact against the reported opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Even more disconcerting was the knowledge that the United States had condescended to undertake the Moscow talks in an atmosphere rife with official speculation concerning a nonaggression pact as part of a package deal. Indeed, the communiqué which accompanied the treaty contained an unprecedented promise by the United States and Britain to consult with their allies concerning the question of a nonaggression agreement "with the purpose of achieving agreement satisfactory to all participants." At Moscow, unlike Geneva, the test ban was definitely connected with the possibility of working out a general European understanding between NATO and the Warsaw Pact states. Potentially, this was a political development of the greatest moment. Nevertheless, of all the fifteen NATO members, only the United States and Britain were fully aware of what was going on.

Premier Khrushchev managed to create the impression, not entirely unfounded, that he had established a special, direct channel of communication with Washington and London across the heads of the NATO allies on the Continent. Although the U.S. government was cooperating in the establishment of a Soviet-American "hot-line" to minimize the risks of misinterpretation between the two superpowers in time of crisis, Washington seemed considerably less interested in creating facilities which would permit the rapid transmission to its allies of intelligence and the making of inter-allied decisions that might someday prove crucial to the defense of Western Europe. For the last two years, many thoughtful Europeans have felt uneasy over the fact that the United States, in creating the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has institutionalized its planning for an East-West arms accommodation without making a comparable effort to bring NATO as a whole into the act. Apart from the usual open line to the British, the United States has acquired a reputation for informing its European allies after the event rather than consulting them before.

The West Germans were aware that a treaty was being drafted in Moscow. But having no way of knowing what other subjects were under review, they were beset by all sorts of suspicions and fears that a deal was being struck at their expense. Apparently, the Bonn government had not been informed in advance that the East German regime would be considered an eligible signatory state. It was surprised to learn this fact

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by way of a press dispatch, which can hardly be called a channel of intimate inter-allied communication. Secretary of State Rusk, following a hurried visit to Bonn just a few days before defending the treaty in the Foreign Relations Committee room, managed to persuade the Federal Republic that it should overcome its misgivings and adhere to the treaty. But the damage had been done: One of our major allies refused officially to sign the agreement until after receiving assurances that its vital interests would not thereby be jeopardized. To top it off, the unhappy diplomatic lapse coincided with a poorly timed announcement that the United States was about to reduce its garrison in West Berlin by 10 per cent. These developments greatly disturbed the Germans, particularly since they followed so closely President Kennedy's visit in June, during which he sought to convince the German people that the pledged word of the American people was still perfectly trustworthy.

Presumably the Secretary of State gave Bonn the same assurance which he later gave before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, viz., that when the Soviets notified the United States of East German adherence, the United States would not accept the notification. In this way, he said, "we not only assure that no implication of recognition may arise, but we reserve our right to object if later the East German regime should seek to assert privileges under the treaty, such as voting or participating in a conference called under Article II." Within a few days, both the United States and Britain did actually reject the Soviet notification. They acknowledged, however, that East Germany is committed to abide by the terms of the treaty.

Under international law, the criteria for determining whether a political entity is competent to sign an international treaty are similar to, but not identical with, the criteria for determining eligibility for diplomatic recognition. As President Kennedy pointed out, tacit acquiescence by the Western Powers in East Germany's signature on a multilateral treaty is not equivalent to tacit recognition of the East German regime. Indeed, diplomatic procedure, custom and law prescribe that recognition is a matter of intent. Since the United States has no such intent, the President's position was, from a strictly legal standpoint, unassailable. Nevertheless, many West Germans could not help feeling that both the Soviets and Ulbricht had been handed a slice of political bargaining power which they had not previously possessed. If, at some future time, the USSR should express itself willing to *discuss* the possibility of amending the treaty to encompass underground tests, provided that all the signatory states be present at the conference, the United States will be able, legally speaking, to interpose an objection. Yet, it may find it politically difficult to do so. Under those circumstances, anyone opposed to granting diplomatic re-

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spectability to the East German communist government will be considered a saboteur both of the test ban and of peace. The German Democratic Republic has already boasted officially that, by signing the Moscow Treaty, it "has added new weight to its proposals for an agreement of common sense and goodwill between the two German states"—and that means, since the Federal Republic has never accepted the "two states" thesis, a reunification agreement along the lines envisaged by the Kremlin.

It is regrettable that a major ally of the United States should be so disturbed by a diplomatic development for which the United States and Britain had been preparing for five years. Toward the end, events moved too rapidly, and the Test Ban Treaty suddenly became enmeshed with broader political and strategic issue affecting the whole Alliance. Within a matter of weeks, the atmosphere of the Atlantic Community was filled with speculation, both official and unofficial, not only about a nonaggression pact but also about partial disengagement, the establishment of a denuclearized zone, and an exchange of inspectors at key points in East and West Germany. Small wonder that many Europeans were beset by doubts.

Since joining NATO in 1955, West Germany has been a loyal ally. Chancellor Adenauer's government has steadfastly championed closer military integration and closer political unity within the entire Alliance. In recent years, Bonn has consolidated its links with France without weakening its ties to the Untied States, Britain or NATO as a whole. The Chancellor has sought carefully to avoid having to make a choice between France and Britain over EEC questions, or between France and the United States over NATO questions. His ability to remain on good terms with three major allies was unmatched among the statesmen of the four. Not a few Western observers marveled at his performance, and wondered how long after his departure from the office of Federal Chancellor the young democracy of the Federal Republic would be able to play such a demanding international role. One of the major tasks of U.S. diplomacy will be to help the new leadership of West Germany to steer carefully through the rapids ahead. The United States can ill afford, in negotiating "second steps" with the Soviets, to generate the kind of misunderstanding which grew out of the last hasty round of talks in Moscow.

Studies in Recalcitrance: Peking and Bucharest

Reports emanating from behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains in recent months have given evidence of continuing tensions among communist countries. The Chinese and Soviet communist parties exchanged letters of mutual denunciation, and each issued statements condemning policies espoused by the other. Even Rumania was alleged to have disapproved of Soviet plans which would have confined

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her contribution to the economic development of the communist bloc to petroleum and agricultural produce.

The Sino-Soviet talks held in Moscow in July failed to resolve the outstanding differences between the two leading communist powers. Before the end of the Moscow discussions, each side had adopted an uncompromising stance on all major points at issue. After the signing of the Test Ban Treaty the Chinese communists, in a statement issued on July 31, accused the Soviets, and Chairman Khrushchev in particular, of forming an anti-Chinese alliance with the "American imperialists" and of "allying with the forces of war [the West] to oppose the forces of peace [the communist bloc]."

In rejecting these "absurd" allegations, the Soviets denied that in signing the Test Ban Treaty they had "betrayed" the interests of the countries of the communist world. They dismissed as "absolutely untenable" Chinese attempts to portray the treaty as a measure that would weaken the security of the communist camp, and compared the Chinese communist leaders to "the worst of the capitalist extremists" by declaring that the Chinese stand on the treaty was tantamount to "actual connivance with those who advocate world thermonuclear war." The Soviet Union reiterated the view that communists should strive to defeat "capitalism" not through thermonuclear war, but through the use of other methods. In effect, the Soviets answered not only their Chinese critics, but also those in the West who saw the Test Ban Treaty as a means to preserve U.S. nuclear superiority and to prepare the way for "second steps" to end the Cold War.

On August 15, Peking disclosed that the Soviet Union had agreed in October 1957 to help Communist China develop her own nuclear capabilities by supplying an atomic bomb, together with technical data for its manufacture in China. However, the Chinese communists asserted that the Soviets had abrogated the agreement two years later, just before Premier Khrushchev's visit to President Eisenhower in September 1959. The Chinese apparently ignored Soviet advice that China remain under the umbrella of Soviet nuclear might and concentrate her energies upon more immediate and pressing domestic economic problems.

In another statement, issued on September 6, the Chinese affirmed their intention, with or without Soviet assistance, to produce nuclear weapons. This statement provides the first comprehensive communist account of the origins and development of the Sino-Soviet conflict. According to the Chinese communists, the conflict began early in 1956, when Chairman Khrushchev, in his famous address to the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Union, enunciated the doctrine that wars between communist and capitalist states were no longer inevitable. Furthermore, the Chinese communist leaders, as early as 1956, allegedly demanded

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that Khrushchev and his followers acknowledge their own errors committed during Stalin's time instead of attributing all misdeeds of this era to Stalin himself.

The Chinese communist statement accused the Soviet Union of having violated the Chinese-Soviet Treaty of Friendship signed in 1950 and of having supported an "anti-Party group" (led by Marshal P'eng Teh-huai) in China against Chairman Mao. The Chinese asserted that in 1959 the Soviets had "put forward unreasonable demands designed to bring China under Soviet military control," and noted that after the Chinese communist rejection of the Soviet demand, Moscow had abrogated the atomic agreement. The nature of the Soviet demand was not specified, but the implication appears to be that the Soviet Union refused to give Peking nuclear weapons unless Moscow retained control of them.

The September 6 statement added a new dimension to Sino-Soviet tensions by accusing the Soviet Union of provocations along the Chinese-Soviet border, including "subversive activities" in Sinkiang in which Chinese citizens (Moslems) were encouraged to seek refuge in the Soviet Union. This charge went beyond the Chinese communist statement of March 8, 1963, which had warned Moscow that China did not recognize the validity of three major Russian-Chinese treaties drawn up in the nineteenth century to define the frontier separating the two powers.

In reply to these Chinese charges, the Soviet Union published on September 21, a 15,000-word document. It expressed resentment against Chinese attacks upon Premier Khrushchev and declared that the "Chinese Communist Party has gone outside the framework of comradely discussion and is now openly conducting a political struggle against the Soviet Communist Party and other Marxist-Leninist parties." As a result, the Soviet statement continued, the leadership of the Soviet Union, together with that of other members of the communist bloc, had rallied to Khrushchev's defense. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union declared its willingness "to use every opportunity" to try to overcome differences between the two countries. But the Soviet statement warned that "it would be a grave mistake for the Chinese leaders to interpret our goodwill wrongly. If they intend to go on with their hostile actions against the Soviet Union . . . they must clearly realize that the most absolute rebuff by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and by all the Soviet people awaits them." The Soviets were prepared to mend their differences with the Chinese, but they were not willing to concede to their comrades in Peking a position of primacy in the communist movement.

The Soviet Union attempted also to refute Chinese communist charges concerning border violations. According to the Soviet statement, the Chinese communists themselves had attempted "to ap-

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propriate individual sections of Soviet territory" and had committed 5,000 border violations in 1962 alone. Moreover, the Chinese were accused of having refused to enter into negotiations in the frontier dispute with India. Conceivably, the Soviet statement was designed to denigrate the Chinese communists in the eyes of Asians and Africans. In fact, the Soviet Union placed considerable emphasis upon the cease-fire recommendations of Afro-Asian countries following the Chinese communist invasion of India in the fall of 1962. Finally, the Soviet Union defended Moscow's assistance to India and rejected Chinese communist charges that India was fighting China with Soviet weapons. These developments of the last quarter provide further evidence that the two communist giants remain far apart regarding the proper strategy for advancing the cause of world communism.

If we can believe other reports coming from behind the Iron Curtain, China is not the only communist state which is dissatisfied with Kremlin policy. Apparently communist leaders in Bucharest are not in agreement with Moscow's plan to have Rumania specialize in agriculture and in the export of primary products to other members of COMECON while leaving industrial development to other satellites. When Rumania published excerpts of a Chinese letter denouncing the Soviet Union, the circulation of which had been prohibited in the Soviet Union, and when, several days later, Rumanian President Gheorghiu-Dej failed to appear at the communist gathering on June 30 to honor Walter Ulbricht on his birthday in Berlin, Rumania created an impression of defiance and independence. Many experts in the West viewed Rumania's actions as additional evidence that the once monolithic structure of the communist world was breaking up.

Although the COMECON sessions are held in secret and no minutes of its discussions are published, some news of its proceedings has occasionally appeared in the Western press. At times there have been disagreements among communist parties. For example, in 1957, when Khrushchev tried to encourage specialization by instituting a supranational planning authority to direct the "socialist division of labor" for the satellites, the COMECON debate ended in deadlock and the matter was referred to the Conference of Communist Party Leaders. Since then, after virtually every council session, news of a lack of unanimity has appeared in the Western press. This suggests that whatever progress COMECON has made in planning and coordination has been made on a pragmatic basis following some discussion—and even compromise. Such deliberation, however, does not contravene the communist notion of democratic centralism whereby debate may take place before the final formulation of policy.

Rumania's alleged dispute with the Soviet Union in COMECON therefore sets no precedent. Never-

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theless, this debate occurred under suspicious circumstances. Rumania's complaint appears to have been circulated deliberately among Western diplomats and journalists in Bucharest. This conflict seems to have been arranged for Western consumption only; news media in Rumania have not taken notice of the argument. Even Western news media seem to be confused as to the exact time when the dispute took place.

The unusual amount of publicity which the communists have given to the Soviet Union's order to Rumania to specialize in agriculture suggests that the differences between Bucharest and Moscow may have been contrived. It is Bulgaria that has long been assigned the agricultural role in communist bloc economic planning. Rumania was given the task of providing oil refinery installations, drilling equipment and light machinery, in addition to its already highly developed oil and natural gas industries for which it is particularly well endowed with natural resources. Her major export industries produce sea and river vessels, diesel locomotives, internal combustion engines, tractors and other agricultural machinery, and electric motors in considerable quantities. Furthermore, in 1961, Rumania had an annual steel production capacity of over two million tons.

Thus, Rumania is already well advanced along the path toward industrialization. Rumania is dependent, however, upon imports from Western Europe for nearly half of the material and equipment for her program of industrialization. And communist planners apparently have confronted some serious difficulties in carrying out Rumania's industrialization program. At the heart of these problems may be the development of an iron and steel complex in which the Soviet Union has agreed to invest some $200 million. It now appears that the Soviets' promised aid will be deferred. Moscow, perhaps because of its foreign aid commitments to Afro-Asian countries and Cuba, the slow-down in the rate of Soviet economic growth, and continued heavy allocations of Soviet productive capacity to military hardware, has had to curtail assistance to East European satellites to such an extent that no new projects are scheduled for 1964.

Given the economic difficulties confronting the planned socialist economies of the bloc nations, it is not surprising that President Gheorghiu-Dej should be driven—or asked—to "complain" of Moscow's economic plans for Rumania and announce that he is prepared to pay in hard currency for necessary imports. Rumania has not been denounced in the Soviet press. Khrushchev is even reported to have alluded to Rumania's "independence" twice during his visit to Yugoslavia, although he did not mention Rumania by name. A Soviet delegation which recently visited Rumania spoke in glowing terms of its industrial development. And Rumania's support of the Kremlin in the Sino-Soviet

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conflict continues to be unequivocal.

In the light of these facts, the purpose of Rumania's "dispute" with the Soviet Union may have been to obtain Western assistance for Rumanian industrial development—in short, to seek Western aid to extricate communist planners from another economic predicament of their own making. If the West, seeking to reduce tensions by increasing trade, responds to this overture, it will not only contribute to the economic strength of Rumania and the Soviet bloc but it will also enable the Soviets to continue to divert their economic resources to the task of burying their benefactors.

The major dispute between Moscow and Peking and the minor argument between Moscow and Bucharest are only the most recent examples of disputes within and between communist parties. Despite continuous in-fighting, communism as a political system has expanded its base of operations across much of the surface of the globe. Western policies which attempt to exacerbate tensions among communists have seldom been successful. Yet Western policymakers and opinion molders persist in the notion that divisions within the communist movement redound automatically to the benefit of the West, or that somehow, through a judicious combination of actions, communists can be separated from erstwhile comrades.

Frictions within the communist movement are not the product of Western manipulation. Nor are they likely to be influenced by the direct actions of noncommunist powers, for the objectives of communist parties, even in opposition to one another, have remained unaltered. Disputes within the communist world are related not to ends but to means. The debate, in the case of China and the Soviet Union, concerns the appropriate methods to be employed in achieving a common objective: the destruction of the West. Similarly, if there is a disagreement between Rumania and the Soviet Union, it focuses upon the proper part for Rumania in the plans of COMECON for the economic development of Eastern Europe. The debate does not refer to the right of Rumania to leave the communist bloc or to substitute another form of government for the existing regime.

The West should draw far more comfort from its own efforts to consolidate its policies and strengthen its positions than from the bickerings of the communists on how best to destroy us.

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UNTANGLING AN ALLIANCE

by S. F. Giffin

IF ANYTHING in world politics is plainer than the mutual distaste felt by the Soviet and the Chinese communists, it is the abysmal breakdown of communications within the Western Alliance. And the consequences of a continued breakdown could be historically as significant as any that may flow from the rift in Sino-Soviet relations.

Even if not allowed to worsen, the situation within NATO is already serious enough that major surgery may be required if the alliance is to survive. If so, the patient will never be the same. It is the purpose of this article to sort out what seem to be the salient elements of the debacle in order to suggest possibilities that may lie ahead.

I

There should be no surprise that the respective roles of Western Europe and the United States in defense of the Atlantic Community urgently require recasting. The surprise is only the delay on the part of the U.S. in coming to grips with the problem—that is, seriously coming to grips with it. U.S. policy still seems to labor under the reassuring but potentially pernicious notion that the current convulsions in NATO reflect at best the caprices of a single political personality, and at worst the "normal" and fleeting growing pains of an alliance. The causes, however, go much deeper than that. They derive from fundamental changes in the nature and rationale of the alliance and its enveloping global-strategic environment.

NATO was formed in 1949 as a military alliance to counter a threat from the Soviet Union—the evident intent of Stalin to use the Red Army, at maximum, in a thrust to the English Channel or, at a minimum, to cast an ominous shadow within which the Kremlin's fifth columns could bid for political control of most of the Continent. Western Europe lay exhausted from World War II, wholly dependent upon the strength of the United States in blocking Soviet designs. And the United States possessed a monopoly of atomic weapons.

Each of these key factors has changed drastically. Where once reigned a wide consensus within NATO on the nature of the threat, today there is none. Western Europe has waxed economically strong enough to think of itself as a third force, and even

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potentially as a first force. The Soviet Union not only shattered the American nuclear monopoly, but now has vaulted into superpower status, rivaling that of the United States.

The shift of these three factors permits President de Gaulle to look upon NATO with unveiled disdain. It has been said of De Gaulle that he is inspired by the idea of historic grandeur, is frequently prophetic in his visions of the future, and is generally detestable in the present. Nevertheless, De Gaulle is not the solitary serpent in a NATO Eden. France began working toward its own nuclear striking force under the Fourth Republic. It is probable that no successor to De Gaulle will abandon a venture into which so much of France's treasure and prestige has already been invested. Although De Gaulle's ulterior motives may be strictly his own, his desire for indigenous military strength and his impatience with U.S. tutelage only symptomize attitudes that traverse wide stretches of West European elite opinion. In the words of his compatriots, he has reason on his side, and that reason stems in some considerable part from the abiding American tendency to treat NATO partners as client states.

The curious thing about this tendency is that it is displayed by some among those members of the American Establishment whose "Grand Design" is to arrive at a working partnership-of-equals between Western Europe and the United States. This design can hardly be achieved if, before there emerges anything approaching a unified Western Europe with which to deal on a basis of equality, the principal components of so happy a creation have been provoked, as unequals, into lasting bitterness toward the United States.

For some time now the European partners within NATO have been asking questions—not always the right ones—and the United States has only sometimes responded with answers—not always the right ones. They say: When the Soviets threaten the United States with nuclear missiles, can we believe that American cities will stand hostage for our security? We say: You can—and here is a force of Polaris-equipped surface ships which you can help to operate, but which we will control, to prove it. We say: You Europeans should provide additional conventional forces in order to assure flexibility for NATO responses to aggression in Europe. They say: Are you trying to arrange that Western Europe will again be the battlefield? When they ask to participate with us in strategy deliberations affecting interests beyond Europe, we answer indifferently or not at all.

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II

Dealing with the form and not with the substance of the NATO malaise, in fact, has produced distrust all around. The need is to get down to cases. If this is to happen, all parties must understand two fundamental propositions.

The first of these propositions is: *Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can share with allies ultimate authority over the nuclear power for which each is responsible.*

This point is patently of first importance. Within the Western Alliance, it means that no ally or combination of allies can outvote the United States in order to launch a general nuclear exchange, and no workable agreement can provide for the contrary. This "undiluted responsibility" principle is reminiscent of a debate in Lincoln's cabinet over a question which the President finally put to a vote. On counting the ballots, Lincoln found himself much in the minority. "Gentlemen," he said, "the vote is eleven against, and one for. The proposal is carried."

The responsibility for triggering a thermonuclear war which could largely destroy civilization cannot be exercised against the judgment of those who alone possess the power. Both superpowers will doubtless listen gratefully to allies who argue, in a situation of crisis, that measures short of general war will be enough. In taking steps that may aggravate a serious crisis situation, they can consult allies up to the point of decision. At the fateful moment, however, the final authority over American or Soviet nuclear power can hardly be vested in a committee, whether of allies or even of national citizens. If there were not otherwise reason enough, the enormous speed of modern nuclear striking power, entailing the contingency that decisions may have to be made on virtually a reflexive basis, should make the fact amply plain.

But there is also the question of national self-preservation. A time-honored axiom of diplomacy holds that a strong power cannot permit a weaker ally to determine its policy. Nuclear war has made this axiom ironclad. Just as allies suspect—correctly—that the superpower will not commit suicide in order to rally to their side in every possible circumstance, so the superpower can feel suspicious of allies who insist upon a blank-check nuclear guarantee to back their every action. The superpowers must look to a time, not too remote, when nuclear warfare between them will almost assuredly destroy both, regardless of the consequences for others. Others (including allies of either super-

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power) might conceivably escape—or think they might escape—with less than disastrous consequences. These allies therefore could conceivably provide counsel that would be irresponsible from the standpoint of the superpower. Accordingly, the superpower could not bind itself to accept such counsel in every situation, especially one approaching nuclear *extremis*. The prototype least invidious to Western minds is that of a Communist China demanding with increasing irritation that the Soviet Union press the United States to the point of nuclear war, which China then might expect to survive.

Decisions covering the use of peripheral segments of American nuclear power may well prove sharable—for example, the decision to use small tactical nuclear weapons in Europe if the necessity for such a decision ever has to be faced. The American proposal for the deployment of strategic weapons on a NATO fleet of surface vessels, however, as has been pointed out, does not admit of full decision-sharing. Rather, the idea seemed to stop, as it were, with a French chef in the galley, a German engineer in the boiler room and an American quartermaster at the wheel. (The Soviets, it should be noted, are conspicuously less cooperative with *their* allies.)

Our second fundamental proposition is a corollary of the first: *Other powers must accept the lead of the United States or of the Soviet Union in the ultimate security sense we have been talking about, or else accept that their independence of policy and action cannot be guaranteed by U.S. or Soviet nuclear power.*

If either superpower commits itself unreservedly to the defense of an ally, it will be in violation of our first proposition. The understanding has to be that the ally either will take no initiative which holds the risk of involving the superpowers in a general nuclear war; or the ally, if it takes such initiative, must do so with the clear understanding that it will brave the consequences alone. Allied actions in this category obviously do not include those required for defense against a stark and direct threat to national survival. They do include gambits like those of France and Britain with respect to Suez in 1956 and of Communist China with respect to the Formosa Straits in 1958. These actions quite evidently held great risks in the eyes of the superpowers, and hence not only failed to receive their support, but actually evoked their instant and active opposition.

The latitude for independent military forays enjoyed by the ally of a superpower is, in fact, exceedingly limited, and likely

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to narrow even further with the liquidation of awkward colonial entanglements. Portuguese military action against rebels in Angola raises little more than *pro forma* protests from the Soviet Union and is viewed with mixed feelings by the United States. A Portuguese invasion of the Congo could be quite another matter: both superpowers might move at once, although not in concert, to end it.

But Portugal is not a nuclear power, and has little prospect of becoming one. Would a third, fourth or Nth nuclear power be treated any differently? It is an incomplete and misleading answer to say that the U.S. treatment of Britain in the Suez affair of 1956 differed little from the treatment of Portugal hypothesized above. The United Kingdom, despite its possession of nuclear air power, had accepted *de facto* the American lead in what we have called the ultimate sense. There was no question in anyone's mind of an independent British *nuclear* initiative.

There was also no question of an independent French nuclear initiative during the Suez affair, but perhaps only because France had not yet gained nuclear credentials. France, like Communist China, evidently has no present intention of accepting, as an Nth country, superpower leads in security matters of any real interest to herself. And it is clear that even so small a number as the fifty strategic nuclear weapons now contemplated for the *force de frappe* will provide a threat which will have to be taken seriously by any adversary. The attempted move by the Soviet Union of a comparable number of nuclear missiles into Cuba demonstrated how seriously the United States considers such a threat, as the French Foreign Office official, François de Rose, notes in defending the concept of a *force de frappe*.[1] Because of Castro's obviously unbalanced personality, the missile build-up in Cuba would unquestionably have been regarded yet more nervously by Americans had it been labeled as a Cuban force under the control of the Cuban dictator. But if—to pursue a fantasy for illustrative purposes—the force had been effectively deployed under Castro in Cuba, and if Castro had then foolishly employed this force on his own initiative against the southeastern United States, we might confidently assume that the Soviet Union would have lifted not a finger to revenge a subsequent demise of Cuba under American attack.

The moral is that the use an independent Nth country can

[1]"Atlantic Relationships and Nuclear Problems," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1963, pp. 479-490.

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make of its strategic nuclear capability will be at least as sharply circumscribed as the use the United States or the Soviet Union can make of their vastly greater capabilities. Within limits, such a capability may provide the Nth country a deterrent shield. Such a capability, however, is not likely to serve the Nth country as a bludgeon to be wielded for advantage. If it is used to attack a superpower, national immolation will be the consequence. Use against a second-rung power, too, can invite superpower retaliation—especially if the victim enjoys superpower protection. The invitation is all the more likely to be accepted because the Nth country will already have expended all or part of its nuclear deterrent.

Clearly, the independent Nth country—France, say, or Communist China—will have to be treated with special respect by other countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union. The interesting point is that the Nth country will have to be treated with even greater respect by other countries if it is *not* independent, but allied to a superpower, despite the reservation described above. The superpower's nuclear guarantee will in such a case be added to the Nth country's own promise of national, last-ditch nuclear retaliation against attack.

III

The proposition that an Nth country cannot be guaranteed by U.S. or Soviet nuclear power, if pursuing independence of policy and action, carries the implication that an Nth country in other circumstances *can* be guaranteed. And of course it can, when the superpower has agreed in advance on the challenges to its own as well as to the ally's vital interests that will invoke general war. This, broadly, is the U.S. nuclear guarantee which today acts as Western Europe's bulwark against Soviet attack.

But—to emphasize our proposition—no guarantee exists to assure an Nth country like France that it can rely upon U.S. willingness to put American cities on the nuclear block in behalf of some *independent* maneuver, e.g. a French effort to solidify the Franco-German Pact by pressing Germany's irredentist interests beyond the Elbe River. In this connection, even sophisticated French thinking displays a marked ambivalence. Thus, François de Rose can assume that Soviet pre-emptive action against an infant *force de frappe* "would appear to be a deliberate act of aggression that the United States commitments toward

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their allies would forbid."[2] Yet in the same article he is able to postulate other (and quite unspecified) threats to Western Europe grave enough to call for nuclear reaction by the French, but in the face of which the United States, despite its substantial hostage forces in Europe, could and would stand aside!

French ambivalence toward U.S. nuclear power probably reflects a desire for the best of two worlds: France envisages a nuclear force that will be protected by the larger U.S. nuclear umbrella at the same time that it can be brandished as an instrument of national (or local European) policy. This expectation seems to be based not so much on the notion of an abiding and transcending U.S.-French mutuality of interests and objectives, as on a belief in the interlocked nature of modern nuclear conflict. Through French arguments shines the premise that once the nuclear trigger is pulled, at whatever level, the entire worldwide complex will automatically spring into action. This "fat-in-the-fire" notion requires that in the event French nuclear bombers attack the Soviet Union the United States would have no choice but to launch its own Strategic Air Command against the Soviets.

But is this assumption valid? Must the superpowers become willy-nilly entangled in global nuclear warfare if an ally uses nuclear weapons? Surely, the superpowers can display the wit to avoid becoming helpless victims of their own nuclear stockpiles. They are already taking measures that should allow them to guard against such a possibility. In particular, both the United States and the Soviet Union are placing their long-range nuclear missiles in postures—underground, dispersed and in submarines—that should permit them to ride out an attack, and thus remove the compulsion to lash out blindly at the first indication of nuclear strikes. It should be possible, therefore, for either superpower to discover whether a nuclear attack against it was truly a massive blow, such as presumably would be struck by the other superpower, or the modest, if painful, jab of an Nth country. In the latter event, it ought to be relatively easy to determine the identity of the attacking state, which would then truly have to be regarded as an enemy of both superpowers. In addition, inasmuch as the superpowers have already agreed on one joint measure—the "hot line" between Washington and Moscow—designed as a delay fuse for moments of intense crisis, perhaps they could agree on another measure of benefit to both. This would

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 488.

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be surveillance over all Nth powers, designed to guarantee the superpowers, at least, awareness of missile firings emanating from the territory of states other than their own.[3]

It would be a gratuitous insult to France to suggest that its government could have in mind the kind of irresponsible nuclear mischief which might be ascribed to a Castro government in Cuba. A fairer assumption is that France envisages a deterrent mission for its *force de frappe* (which in fact is beginning to carry the less offensive name *force de dissuasion*), and that if the French look to the support of the U.S. nuclear sword in an ultimate situation, they see this as an enhancement of their own future deterrent threat. The reason that France has embarked on her nuclear effort is probably exactly that given by Alain Peyrefitte, the French Minister of Information, speaking in Paris last June.[4] His thesis: France accepts President Kennedy's commitment to risk American cities for the defense of France, but it would be unwise to assume that the commitment cannot change under a successor to Kennedy. Suppose American policy should alter ten years hence. In such an event, France would be left defenseless unless possessed of her own nuclear striking power. Inasmuch as the build-up of an effective nuclear striking force requires a number of years, France must press the development of such a force now.

As a self-fulfilling prophecy this French view leaves little to be desired. To the extent that France expects the U.S. eventually to roll up the nuclear canopy which now covers Europe and demonstrates this with an independent nuclear build-up, to that extent will it prod U.S. policy precisely in this direction. Nevertheless, we must accept the potency of the French apprehension. Indeed, if the shoe were on an American foot, Americans would probably feel the same way.

IV

As suggested earlier, in articulating the "logic" of the unfolding nuclear equation and its likely import for Europe, De Gaulle

[3]They could agree on another significant measure of joint benefit, also, suggested by the preceding argument of this paper. This would be the public statement that neither would come to the assistance of any nation making first use of nuclear weapons. This would put all Nth and potential Nth countries on notice that the two superpowers intend to engage in nuclear warfare, if at all, only on their own initiative. Such an announcement would be of universal benefit in spelling out the actual situation, and could powerfully inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons. It could be made by the President, incidentally, without incurring the necessity for formal Senate consent.

[4]*New York Times,* June 28, 1963.

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speaks for a large part of the Continent. We must face up to the fact that no amount of "multilateral" gimmickry can turn the clock back to the comfortable (for us) years of U.S. monopoly in nuclear weapons and decision-making within the alliance. There will come to exist in Western Europe at least one nuclear striking force largely independent of the striking force possessed by the United States. This force is going to be a French force—or it is going to be a force deployed by a unified Western Europe. In the latter case, advantage could redound to the West and the United States. In the former case, a solution could conceivably be found which would temper the disadvantages to the United States. The problem in either case, certain to be a very thorny one, will be to reharness France to a cooperative Western venture.

Without France, there can be no NATO. At best, there can be only a rump alliance. France comprises the essential forward communication zone connecting North America and the British Isles with the line across which NATO and the Warsaw Pact face each other. It provides the only militarily sensible access to West Germany for the allies of West Germany, assuming that the kind of war requiring a zone of communication is envisaged (and from the military standpoint, at least, no other kind of war remotely justifies past NATO efforts in Europe).

France continues to provide access and transit rights that permit a maintenance of the current American deployment in Western Europe. However, this is about all that France is now contributing to the military posture of NATO, and little argument should be needed to support the thesis that President de Gaulle has in mind a limited life for U.S. access to facilities in France. Quite probably he means either to impose his idea of a three-power directorate (United States, France and Britain) on NATO or to terminate U.S. access rights as soon as the *force de dissuasion* begins to display some credible muscle. Meanwhile, limited American activities in France will presumably be tolerated as a form of comprehensive insurance.

If this is true, and inasmuch as the first operational Mirage IV nuclear bombers are now becoming available to France, time is short in which to avert disaster. We have seen that the United States cannot agree to directorate control over its strategic nuclear power. If France will accept no other arrangement, the result must be a dissolution of NATO.

The dissolution of NATO would not be a disaster if the alliance

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no longer faced a threat and hence had outlived its *raison d'être*. Within NATO, under the direction of Secretary-General Dirk U. Stikker, a comprehensive strategic review is reportedly now at about the halfway point. Work on the Stikker Report must surely have commenced with a re-evaluation of the threat facing NATO, on which there has lately been no agreement.

Most West Europeans, judging by their refusal to meet demands for conventional forces of more than modest size, do not now regard the threat of overland attack from the East as an immediate one. But many fear the possibility that an increased reliance on a buffer of conventional forces on Western Europe's Central Front will offer the Soviets an acceptable alternative to a general nuclear war which they believe (with considerable reason) the Soviets do not want. Apparently, U.S. estimates of the Soviet threat to Europe continue to embrace the likelihood of massive thrusts by armor and infantry with the support of tactical air power.

The one certainty is that a threat remains, even if it is now no more than latent. The Soviet record is one of stopping only when stopped. A successor to Khrushchev could readily prove to be a disciple of Stalin and Mao; in another year, so might Khrushchev. And certainly it cannot be expected that a self-sustaining peace will be possible for Europe while Germany remains split.

Regardless of how greatly the current communist threat to NATO differs from the Soviet threat of fourteen years ago which NATO was created to avert, it ought to be possible for the allies to narrow greatly, if not to eliminate, the obvious gap in their several estimates of the threat now facing them.

The possibility exists that France, after reviewing, if not participating in, this threat-assessment, will conclude that the only real perils for NATO are also the only real perils for France. If this is the case, France may also be able to conclude that its own nuclear striking forces could be integrated, at least so far as the selection and assignment of targets was concerned, with other nuclear forces of the NATO alliance. The relationship of the French *force de dissuasion* to NATO and to the U.S. nuclear deterrent force would then resemble that of the British nuclear force. France, like Britain, would continue to retain its separate small national nuclear deterrent against any possibility that the Soviet Union should lack faith in the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent, or that the United States should withdraw from NATO commitments. The United States, for its part, should

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be able to agree on fuller consultation with NATO allies, not only for NATO regional affairs but also on security questions arising elsewhere in the world.

If former Secretary of State Dean Acheson is correct in assessing De Gaulle as a man who can be moved by the pressure of circumstances, but not by argument, even a conciliatory American approach of this type will fail to prevent a French withdrawal from NATO in De Gaulle's own time. Although anyone who attempts to interpret De Gaulle's design does so at his own risk, the French President has made reasonably plain his goal of a loose confederation of European national states, with France (in concert with a slightly subordinate Germany) providing the sinews of political leadership and the muscles of military power.

However, the other members of NATO in Continental Europe can hardly be expected to rush to De Gaulle's banner. If they have been restive in accepting the U.S. as their nuclear linebacker, they are virtually certain to regard France, with a small and vulnerable nuclear striking force, as unacceptable in this role.

A second possibility, therefore, is that, as a result of French obstinacy, NATO may be effectively dissolved, and replaced by either a rump Atlantic Alliance or several separate security pacts: the Mediterranean, for example, might be treated apart from northern Europe. This would doubtless signal a serious setback —perhaps even a death blow—to the Common Market. It would rend the new rapport between France and Germany. Conceivably, this very prospect could prove so frightening to the French that it might provide the kind of compelling circumstance to which, as Dean Acheson suggests, De Gaulle is alone accustomed to adapting. Yet this hope is a frail one when weighed against the apparent tenacity of the De Gaulle policy course and, even if achieved, might not prove to be a very happy or enduring solution.

V

There is yet a third, and perhaps most desirable possibility: namely, that Western Europe will move toward a political union so close that a regional nuclear deterrent force could come under centralized West European control. Although the idea of a partnership between an independent North America and an equally independent Unified Europe at times rubs uncomfortably against the "Atlantic Community" ideal, certainly the political union of Europe has been an avowed goal of American policy for a num-

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ber of years. The central issue of control over nuclear weapons within NATO may provide a powerful lever toward accomplishing this goal. If so, American support and encouragement should be afforded in developing an effective and well-protected regional nuclear deterrent that might permit Western Europe eventually to become a third superpower.

Admittedly, the idea of European integration is probably even more of a bête noire in De Gaulle's eyes than the prospect of political fragmentation of Continental Europe. Yet, again accepting Dean Acheson's assessment of the French President, this alternative offers the most promising hope for the future of the Western Alliance. In fully embracing the concept of a United States-United Europe partnership-of-equals, and endowing the concept with a clear-cut military rationale and impetus, the United States would be moving with the prevalent current of European attitudes. Even if De Gaulle were to turn a deaf ear to such prescriptions, if advanced only by the United States, he would have little choice but to accommodate to a powerful and united opinion force in the very Continental countries which he is attempting to recruit for his own design.

It should be noted in this connection that considerable leverage exists, in the British nuclear force, toward the inclusion of the United Kingdom in a unified Western Europe. The addition of British nuclear weapons to a European nuclear arsenal would provide a short-cut toward a real deterrent capability. Moreover, this would substantially eliminate the need for further atmospheric testing, because of the advanced state of British warheads. U.S. help might best be extended, on a reimbursable basis, by making it possible for the regional force of a United Europe to acquire Polaris-equipped submarines in adequate numbers. As another form of important support, the United States could continue its present valid nuclear guarantee of Western Europe's security during that period of vulnerability when the West European regional deterrent was yet in the process of building.

There is no question that the scheme would call for agonizing introspection of policy not only in the halls of the Palais Bourbon, but also in the council chambers of all Western governments. A key reason why many American proponents of Atlantic Community have tended to look askance at the American-European partnership model—even as a step toward the eventual goal of a close integration of the Atlantic peoples—has been the fear that any such scheme would lead to the removal of what is deemed

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the main cohesive factor of the Western Alliance: the American military presence in Europe. There is no mistaking that such removal would be a consequence of the course outlined above. After a United Europe, with American assistance, fashions its own nuclear sword and becomes master of its own shield of conventional forces, there would be no need for anything beyond perhaps a purely symbolic cooperating American military presence north of the Pyrenees.

Assuming that the United States will break camp only after Western Europe has satisfactorily ordered its own security, which in any case will require years of effort, would this be so unfortunate? A guiding American rationale for the Western Alliance has been the concept that only by marshaling fully the resources of the Western core of the Free World can we shoulder effectively the staggering burden of global problems: the containment and eventual defeat of communism, the peaceful devolution of colonial systems and the satisfaction of needs for assistance in awakening areas of the world. A genuine partnership not only would generate in Western Europe that level of effort which comes with full responsibility (and which has been found wanting in the past) but it would also release American energy and resources for urgent tasks elsewhere on the globe. For example, the unfolding trend of events in Asia portends a U.S. effort in that area which may approach in magnitude that which we have expended in postwar Europe.

The idea of encouraging the development of a third superpower will grate on the sensitivities of those in the United States who see in the proliferation of nuclear armaments the main peril to global peace and stability. But a degree of proliferation is already with us. Short of general and complete disarmament (and doubtfully even then), we cannot put the nuclear genie back into the bottle. The remaining choice is between leaving him to his own dangerous devices or making him as responsible as circumstance and leverage permit.

So fundamental a change-in-course for U.S. policy would bring in its wake problems and tasks which will challenge the most brilliant minds of statesmanship. Yet, the alternatives are more painful, if not disastrous. We must recognize that events have progressed beyond the effective range of old prescriptions or *ad hoc* remedies. U.S. policy needs new goals in keeping with the evolving logic of military, economic and political circumstance.

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ZONAL ARMS LIMITATION IN EUROPE*

by James E. Dougherty

NOTHING better illustrates the complex relationship between disarmament or arms control planning and international political problems than the disengagement debate which has flared periodically since 1955. The arms dilemma is difficult enough to deal with at the rarefied level of scientific-technological considerations and quantitative analysis. But the rearrangement of armaments is much more than a mere numbers game. When arms control planning becomes intermixed with the dynamics of politics—the clash of governmental policy goals, the programs of political parties jockeying for control of offices, the personal ideals, ambitions and limitations of statesmen and lesser politicians, the interests of special groups, the connivings of propagandists, the sensationalism of the press and the emotional attitude of publics—then it becomes an almost insoluble puzzle. Disengagement, under most of the forms which have hitherto been suggested, amounts to partial disarmament—disarmament on the geographical installment plan. It is usually proffered as a beginning step, calculated to lead to something broader at a later date, after it has wrought its beneficent effect by facilitating the subsidence of tensions. But even the beginning step is a Gordian knot before which policymakers stand baffled.

This should not be taken to mean that the United States and its European allies can never reach any agreement with the Soviet Union and its East European bloc partners on some form of zonal arms limitation. It is at least intellectually admissible that a plan could be devised which would, in the view of both sides, be symmetrical in its potential strategic-political consequences, and involve a sufficiently fair balance of assets, liabilities and risks to make it acceptable to the Warsaw Pact group and the Atlantic Alliance. Certainly no plan has any chance of succeeding if one side thinks that it entails a net concession of advantages to the other side. But each side perceives its military security problem as well as its long-range political objectives in such unique and incompatible ways that up to now neither party has been capable of proposing a plan which the other

*This article is based on a chapter of the author's forthcoming book, *Arms and American Policy*, scheduled to be completed in early 1964.

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could be expected to take seriously. Perhaps with the passage of many years, the thinking of the communist bloc and the Western Alliance with respect to political and military stability in Europe will converge sufficiently to make possible a modest experiment in zonal arms limitation. The obstacles to such a development, however, should not be underestimated. They are still extremely formidable, and no resolution is yet in sight. Political tensions which are rooted in fifty years of history cannot be cleared away within a short time.

I

Europe, we must not forget, has been divided to its intellectual, political and spiritual depths during recent decades. It might be comforting to some—but grossly inaccurate—to think that the cleavage was most profound and the tensions most acute when the Bolshevik Revolution was crudely new, and that since the early 1920's there has been a rectilinear decline of differences and a corresponding improvement in understanding between the Soviet Union and Western Europe. Such an interpretation does not conform at all to historic reality. Actually, Western intellectuals were most attracted both to communism and to the Soviet socialist experiment during the late 1920's and early 1930's, before the Moscow Trials of 1936-37. After the years of Soviet-Western wartime cooperation, there was a sharp increase in Western-Soviet tension, attributable primarily to the Soviet military occupation and political take-over of Eastern Europe, the Czechoslovakian coup, the communist civil war in Greece, communist support for the guerrilla movements in Indochina and Malaya, communist aggression in Korea, and the Soviet policy of using West European communist parties as instruments for the subversion of constitutional governments as well as the sabotage of European recovery and defense efforts.

Most of these events, to be sure, have passed into history. But what has been written on the historical record has been written. As George F. Kennan has pointed out, when Premier Khrushchev sets forth the proposition that the Soviet Union has always been on the side of peaceful coexistence, he is really calling upon the West "to forget the long and sinister history of the relationship between Moscow and the foreign Communist Parties in the Stalin era," and he insults the intelligence of Western man by blandly turning the facts of history upside

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down.[1] It is sheer nonsense to suggest, as some writers do, that the Soviets and the Western nations must share equally the blame for the Cold War. The methods by which the Western nations have sought to provide for their own security perhaps have not always conformed to the rules which prevail on the playing fields at Eton and Harrow. But neither has the Soviet Union been playing cricket. Such steps as the Western powers took in the late 1940's and early 1950's to consolidate their military position were essentially reactive and defensive. If someone asks why the West should remain so suspicious of Soviet intentions and methods nearly two decades after World War II, he may find his answer in the Battle of Budapest, which took place more than a decade after World War II ended, and in the Cuban crisis, which reached a climax in late 1962.

Many Europeans remain unwilling to ratify in all its implications the uncontested penetration of Soviet military and political power to a new boundary line which cuts through the heart of Europe. In their eyes, this penetration defies those limits, fixed by historical conditions, which men and nations should not attempt to overreach. This extension of Russian influence into the center of Europe which, as Kennan notes, altered the world strategic and political balance, has never received formal approval by Western statesmen. The empire of Soviet communism was not pushed into Europe by peaceful means. It was "imposed by the skillful manipulations of highly disciplined Communist minorities, trained and inspired by Moscow, and supported by the presence or close proximity of units of the Soviet armed forces."[2] The West Europeans, having granted independence to the populations of almost all their own erstwhile colonial territories, will not accept as permanent the Soviet hegemony over the peoples of Eastern Europe, who are politically more advanced and culturally much more akin to themselves than the peoples of Africa and Asia. For the Western Europeans to legitimize the intrusion into their midst of a regime which, at the time of the rising in Hungary, had to be maintained in power by methods reminiscent of Ghengis Khan would represent the total abandonment of their own traditional concept of law and government as founded upon the *consensus populi.*

So long as these considerations are clearly borne in mind, a

[1]George F. Kennan, "Peaceful Coexistence: A Western View," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1960, p. 173.
[2]*Ibid.,* p. 179.

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review of the disengagement debate which has taken place over nearly a decade can contribute to a more mature grasp of the interpenetration of political and military factors in the current effort to find a solution to the arms problem. The term "disengagement"—as used in contemporary literature on arms control—has come to mean many different things. The word is employed to designate a neutralized zone, a demilitarized zone, a zone from which only "foreign forces" have been withdrawn, or a zone in which all or "foreign" forces have been reduced or "thinned out." It may refer to parts of Germany; or all of Germany; or Germany and Poland, Czechoslovakia and perhaps Hungary; or larger regions of the NATO and Warsaw Pact areas, including parts of western Russia. Disengagement may be intrinsically related to, or separated from, plans for the reunification of Germany, the settlement of the Berlin problem, or some other political objective. It may allow the affected countries to retain their existing treaty ties, or require them to sever such ties. It may refer to all military forces and weapons, or only to certain types of forces and weapons. Disengagement concepts may be predicated upon the equality of the prescribed geographical areas, or the numerical equality of forces allowed to be retained, or a certain ratio of power reduction, or some combination of these and related factors which may appear to involve symmetrical alterations in the existing security situation. Small wonder that the debate over disengagement has sometimes been so confusing. Several different concrete schemes have at various times been proposed—some of them vague and utopian, others more precise and fairly realistic.[3] Nevertheless, many publicists and even some analysts who ought to have known better have grown accustomed to speaking of "disengagement" in the abstract.

II

Let us survey in a summary fashion some of the principal proposals for disengagement in Europe which have been ad-

[3]At one time or another since 1955, various types of disengagement proposals have been advanced by Sir Anthony Eden; Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki; George F. Kennan, former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR; Denis Healey and the late Hugh Gaitskell of the British Labour Party; Air Marshal Sir John Slessor and Captain B. H. Liddell Hart; Herr Ollenhauer, Fritz Erler and Helmut Schmidt of the West German Social Democratic Party; Frank Aiken, Irish delegate to the UN; the French Socialists; the Soviet government, and others. Several of these proposals are described below in the text. For a useful compilation of summary views with analysis of the whole disengagement problem, see Eugene Hinterhoff, *Disengagement* (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1959).

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vanced either by the Soviet bloc or from within the West. Prior to 1955, a number of prominent individuals had speculated on the possibility of creating a demilitarized safety belt through the center of Europe.[4] On July 18, 1955, at the Geneva Summit Conference, Prime Minister Anthony Eden suggested sketchily that there were certain reassurances which the Powers could give each other:

> There is one which I certainly think should be considered. We should be ready to examine the possibility of a demilitarized area between East and West. . . . There is the suggestion of a mutual security pact. There is the prospect of an agreement about the total of forces and armaments of the two groups both in Germany and in the countries neighboring Germany. This would be subject to reciprocal supervision.[5]

Eden made it clear that he was thinking of a situation in which a reunified Germany would be free to associate with countries of her choice, i.e., she would be allowed to hold membership in NATO.

Marshal Bulganin, in replying for the Soviets, declared that the "military groupings of some European nations directed against others" should be replaced by an all-European system of collective security, to be achieved in two stages. During the first stage the signatory Parties would not be relieved of their obligations under existing treaties, but they would promise to refrain from the use of armed force. Pending agreement on the reduction of arms, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the

[4]James P. Warburg, former adviser on German affairs to the U.S. government, submitted a memorandum on February 26, 1949 to Secretary of State Dean Acheson in which he suggested the permanent demilitarization of Germany, the withdrawal of American, British and Russian troops from all Europe west of the Soviet frontiers, and a nonaggression guarantee to all the countries west of the USSR. Hinterhoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-142.

Professor Arnold Brecht, of the New School for Social Research, proposed the creation of a neutral belt from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Under his plan, any attempt by the signatory Powers to send their armed forces into the territory of the countries located in the neutral belt would be deemed aggression. The neutralized countries, however, would be allowed to align themselves, either politically or economically, with outside Powers and they would also be permitted to look after their own defenses. "The Idea of a Safety Belt," *American Political Science Review,* September 1949.

M. Paul van Zeeland, Foreign Minister of Belgium, presented to the NATO Council meeting in Paris on December 11, 1953 a plan whereby the reunification of Germany would take place under the following conditions: 1) Soviet troops would be withdrawn from East Germany, which would be completely demilitarized; 2) in Poland, Soviet troops would be withdrawn beyond the Vistula, and in Germany NATO troops would be pulled back to west of the Rhine, but Poland and the Federal Republic would be permitted to maintain their own national defense forces. Hinterhoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-165.

[5]Statement by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, July 18, 1955. In *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955,* edited by Paul E. Zinner (New York: Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), p. 199.

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territories of European countries, and the prohibition of atomic weapons, the signatories would promise not to increase their armed forces stationed on the territories of other European states. During the second stage, said Bulganin, the North Atlantic Treaty, the Paris Agreements creating the Western European Union and the Warsaw Treaty would be simultaneously terminated and an all-European security system established. He called for a re-establishment of the situation which existed prior to the Second World War.[6] He was undoubtedly attempting to prevent the rearming of Germany within NATO, to secure the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Continent, and to break up even such a purely European defense organization as WEU.

At the Foreign Ministers' Conference which opened in Geneva on October 27, 1955, British Foreign Secretary Macmillan reiterated Eden's proposal for a zone of arms limitation on either side of the line of demarcation between a reunified Germany and the East European countries, but he also stressed the condition that a reunited Germany must be free to join NATO. It is difficult to believe that the Western Powers could seriously have expected the Soviets to agree at that time to such a proposition. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov declared that since the Paris Agreements had come into effect and West Germany had entered NATO, and since the Western Powers insisted upon the alignment of Germany with NATO, the Soviet Union could no longer regard all-German elections as the basis for unification; henceforth reunification could not be brought about except by agreement between the two German states.[7]

In November 1956, just a few days after Soviet tanks had rolled back into Budapest in overwhelming numbers, the USSR

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 202-203. In their final directive to their Foreign Ministers, the Heads of Government of the Big Four instructed the Ministers to consider various proposals related to European security, including: "A security pact for Europe, or for a part of Europe, including provisions for the assumption by member nations of an obligation not to resort to force and to deny assistance to an aggressor; limitation, control and inspection in regard to armed forces and armaments; establishment between East and West of a zone in which the disposition of armed forces will be subject to mutual agreement. . . ." *Ibid.*, p. 226.

[7] Statement by the Soviet Foreign Minister, November 8, 1955, *ibid.*, pp. 259-263. During the following year, both the French and the British Prime Minister retreated somewhat from the positions which they had instructed their Foreign Ministers to take at Geneva. In April 1956, Guy Mollet admitted that the chances of reunification of Germany would be lessened if it were to be integrated, fully armed, into Western Europe. In July of the same year, Anthony Eden stated that a security agreement in Europe would not be conditional upon Germany joining NATO. See Hinterhoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-187.

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presented to the West a new disarmament proposal which provided among other things for a significant reduction in the size of armed forces maintained by the Big Four in other European states, including one-third of their forces in Germany. As part of this plan, the Soviets professed a willingness to consider the notion of aerial inspection which had been contained in the West's "open skies" offer at the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955. The use of aerial photography to ensure compliance was to apply to a depth of 800 kilometers on each side of the dividing line in Europe.[8] Such a gesture was interpreted to mean that the Soviets might be more willing to entertain the idea of inspection over the territory of the satellites than over the territory of the USSR. The United States welcomed the Soviet proposal as a positive step forward and assured that it would be given careful study. It was obvious, however, that American policymakers looked upon the Soviet declaration of November 17, 1956 primarily as a propaganda document, full of allegations which NATO could not take seriously at that critical time. The Eisenhower Administration, moreover, regarded the Soviet proposal concerning aerial photography as an effort to bypass President Eisenhower's suggestion, made at the Geneva Summit Conference, for aerial inspection of Soviet and U.S. military power centers.

The years 1957 and 1958 witnessed the peak of the Great Debate over disengagement in Europe. British Labour Party leader Hugh Gaitskell, speaking at Harvard University early in 1957, discussed the dilemma confronting the Soviets in East Europe and whether this situation might affect their willingness to come to equitable terms with the West in Europe. He said:

> The path to be followed seems to me to be an extension of the Eden plan put forward in 1955. It was then proposed that there would be a withdrawal of forces from the frontier between East and West Germany, leaving within Germany itself a zone in which there would be no foreign troops. Would it not be possible to extend the area of such a zone until it covered, say, the whole of Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary and, if possible, Rumania and Bulgaria? The withdrawal could be a gradual one, taking place over a period of time. The withdrawal and the subsequent national forces allowed to the territories in question would obviously have to be subject to control. . . .
>
> In the early stages it might be advisable to leave the alliances unchanged. In other words, to begin with both NATO and the Warsaw Pact might continue to apply. But if foreign troops withdrew it is doubtful

[8] *New York Times,* November 18, 1956.

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that this situation could continue for long. Indeed, it is possible that the Russians would refuse to contemplate the plan without neutralization on both sides from the start. . . .

Finally, together with the permanent controls on arms in these territories, there should be a comprehensive European security pact, in which the various States in the neutral zone would have their territories guaranteed by the Great Powers as well as by each other.[9]

Gaitskell added that the acceptance of the existing German-Polish frontiers would probably constitute an intrinsic part of any European settlement. But he was careful to deny that he was contemplating either the dissolution of NATO or the withdrawal of American troops from Europe. U.S. forces would be expected to remain in France, the Low Countries and Britain. NATO would not retreat farther back than the frontiers of Germany.[10] Subsequently, Denis Healey, who had participated in the development of the Gaitskell proposal, presented his own substantially similar plan for disengagement. His plan, too, covered Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, but he added the possibility of additional country trade-offs, e.g., Denmark for Rumania.[11]

The high point in the disengagement debate came with the exchange of arguments between George F. Kennan and Dean Acheson. Kennan, in the course of the series of Reith Lectures delivered over the B.B.C. during the winter of 1957-58, argued that the state of despondency which then prevailed throughout Eastern Europe in the wake of events in Poland and Hungary constituted a danger to the peace of the world. The despondency, he said, could not be allowed to last indefinitely and would not end until Soviet forces had departed from the satellite countries. This in turn could not be achieved until U.S. and other Western forces had been withdrawn from Germany. Kennan contended that it was unrealistic of the West to hold out for Germany's right to retain membership in NATO after reunification; to accept such a condition would be tantamount to a major defeat

[9]Extracts from the second of the three Godkin Lectures, delivered at Harvard on January 9, 1957. "The Art of Coexistence: The European Problem," *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, February 7, 1957. The Lectures were published under the title, *The Challenge of Coexistence* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

[10]Gaitskell's views were further elaborated in "Disengagement: Why? How?," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1958.

[11]See Denis Healey, *A Neutral Belt in Europe?*, Fabian Society Tract No. 311, January 1958; "The Case for Disengagement," *The New Republic*, March 17, 1958; "A Blueprint for Mutual Disengagement," *ibid.*, March 24, 1958; and "How to Start Disengagement," *ibid.*, March 31, 1958.

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for Soviet policy. Kennan denied the assumption that the United States stood to suffer a military or political disadvantage by withdrawing from the center of Europe. He rejected as unjustified both the fear that the Soviets were really poised for an attack upon Western Europe and the uncritical belief that the satellite armies contributed to the total military strength of the bloc. In his eyes, the preoccupation of Western strategists with the need for achieving local balance indicated a failure to understand the extent to which the advent of the new long-range missiles was about to revolutionize the nature of warfare and defense problems. Kennan discerned in disengagement the possibility of bringing about a geographical separation between the forces of the great powers and of persuading the Europeans to accept a greater share of responsibility for Continental defense than they had hitherto shown themselves disposed to do. Kennan did not urge that U.S. troops be withdrawn from the Continent, nor did he specifically discount such a possibility at a future date. He merely suggested that there might be a general withdrawal of American, British and Russian armed power from the heart of the Continent. He warned sternly against any decision by the United States to arm its Continental allies with nuclear weapons, since this might make any Russian withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe "unthinkable once and for all." In lieu of American military protection, the evacuated countries would be encouraged to maintain territorial militia forces patterned on those of Switzerland which would perform a police function and, in the unlikely case of Soviet attack, serve as a background of organized resistance and make the invader pay bitterly.[12]

Dean Acheson, rising to the counterattack against the Kennan thesis, equated disengagement with a form of subtle American neo-isolationism—a futile and lethal attempt "to crawl back into the cocoon of history." He scored those who were asking "whether it is necessary to continue facing the hazards of the military situation . . . whether coexistence with the Communist system cannot be bought at a cheaper price and with less effort."[13] Acheson offered certain specific arguments against disengagement, based upon the strategic disadvantages which the United States could expect to incur thereby. These will be dealt with

[12]George F. Kennan, *Russia, the Atom and the West* (New York: Harper, 1958), pp. 60-63.

[13]Dean Acheson, "The Illusion of Disengagement," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1958, p. 373.

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below in general terms of the pros and cons of disengagement, and hence they need not be taken up here. But it should be noted that the former Secretary of State looked upon disengagement as something impossible of achievement. He observed that the United States and the Soviet Union confront each other tensely wherever they maintain warning stations. This is a form of contact which no withdrawal from Germany would affect:

> There is confrontation in every part of the world where the area of the open and free world system may be reduced by Soviet military, economic or political penetration. No action in Germany will produce disengagement here. The word is a mere conception, which confuses and does not represent any reality.[14]

At the height of the debate within the West set off by Kennan's lectures, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki came forth with his second and more important proposal for a denuclearized zone in Central Europe as an appropriate means of reducing international tensions and facilitating agreement on broader disarmament questions. Rapacki's zone would include the territory of Poland, Czechoslovakia and East and West Germany.

> In this territory nuclear weapons would neither be manufactured nor stockpiled, the equipment and installations designed for their servicing would not be located there; the use of nuclear weapons against the territory of this zone would be prohibited.
>
> . . . The states included in this zone would undertake the obligation not to manufacture, maintain nor import for their own use and not to permit the location on their territories of nuclear weapons of any type, as well as not to install nor to admit to their territories installations and equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons, including missiles' launching equipment.
>
> The four powers (France, United States, Great Britain and USSR) would undertake the following obligations:
>
> (A) Not to maintain nuclear weapons in the armaments of their forces stationed on the territories of states included in this zone; neither to maintain nor to install on the territories of these states any installations ment designed for servicing nuclear weapons, including missiles' launching equipment.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 375. Mr. Kennan's rejoinder to Mr. Acheson's criticism is to be found in "Disengagement Revisited," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1959. For other comments on disengagement during this general period, see Alvin J. Cottrell and Walter F. Hahn, "A New Strategy for Europe," *The Yale Review*, Autumn 1957; Michael Howard, *Disengagement in Europe* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1958); James E. King, Jr., "Kennanism and Disengagement," *The New Republic*, April 7, 1958, and "A Neutral Zone in Europe?," *ibid.*, April 14, 1958; and Wilhelm Grewe, "Containment, Disengagement and What Next?," *Western World*, June 1958.

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(B) Not to transfer in any manner and under any reason whatsoever, nuclear weapons nor installations and equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons . . . to governments or other organs in this area.

The powers which have at their disposal nuclear weapons should undertake the obligation not to use these weapons against the territory of the zone or against any targets situated in this zone.[15]

The Rapacki Plan provided for the creation of a system of broad and effective control in the area of the proposed zone, comprising both ground and aerial inspection methods, although it said nothing about the details of the inspection system except that these would be based upon "experience acquired up to the present time in this field, as well as . . . proposals submitted by various states in the course of the disarmament negotiations." The control machinery would be able to draw upon representatives appointed by organs of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty and representatives of states which do not belong to any military grouping in Europe.

Rapacki's Note must be read in conjunction with his earlier address to the United Nations General Assembly on October 2, 1957 and his later press conference remarks of November 4, 1958.[16] These flanking statements leave no doubt that his proposal for an atom-free zone was calculated primarily to show how seriously the Soviet bloc states looked upon the possibility that West Germany might in one way or another acquire nuclear armaments. The first statement inveighed against militarism and *revanchism* and warned that West Germany must not be allowed to become an atomic powder keg in Europe. Rapacki's press conference remarks reveal that he was more interested in preventing West Germany from obtaining nuclear arms than he was in rolling back such American nuclear weapons as were already located on German soil. He proposed that his plan be

[15]Polish Note and Memorandum, February 14, 1958. Text in *Documents of American Foreign Relations, 1958,* edited by Paul E. Zinner (New York: Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1959), pp. 195-199. On May 3, 1958, the United States in a Note of Reply rejected the Polish proposals as being too limited in scope to reduce the danger of war or enhance European security. "They neither deal with the essential question of the continued production of nuclear weapons by the present nuclear powers nor take into account the fact that present scientific techniques are not adequate to detect existing nuclear weapons. The proposed plan does not affect the central sources of power capable of launching a nuclear attack, and thus its effectiveness would be dependent on the good intentions of countries outside the area. The proposals overlook the central problems of European security because they provide no method for balanced and equitable limitations of military capabilities. . . ." *Ibid.,* p. 200.

[16]See *Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959,* Department of State Publication 7008 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), 2 volumes, Vol. II, pp. 889-892 and pp. 1217-1219.

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sliced into two stages. In the first stage, nothing more would be done than to freeze the existing nuclear situation in the delineated zone. The second stage, he realized, would be a more complicated affair. Sensitive to the American argument that the creation of a denuclearized zone would leave the West at a disadvantage in view of Soviet bloc conventional superiority, Rapacki stated that his side was prepared to link denuclearization with the reduction of other armaments in Europe.[17]

The Soviet Union, in a memorandum submitted to the UN General Assembly on September 26, 1961, reiterated three proposals which it had made on earlier occasions for the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, for the withdrawal of troops from foreign territory, and for the establishment of nuclear-free zones, including one in Central Europe. A nonaggression pact, argued the Soviets, would improve the situation in Europe by reducing mutual suspicion, but "would not alter the existing balance of power between the blocs by a single soldier or a single rifle." As for the withdrawal of foreign troops, the Soviet government expressed a preference for a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Germany, Hungary and Poland while the United States, Britain, France and Canada would withdraw within their national frontiers troops stationed in other NATO countries. If agreement could not be reached on complete withdrawal, then the Soviets would be willing to discuss a reduction of foreign forces. "As a first step there might be an agreement to reduce the number of all foreign troops stationed in Germany by one-third or by some other accepted proportion over a given period of time and to institute the necessary control over the execution of this measure."[18] The section of the memorandum dealing with nuclear-free zones bears quotation at length:

Another effective way of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons on

[17]On September 27, 1960, Premier Gomulka, in an address to the General Assembly, pointed out that since Poland had first advanced the idea of an atom-free zone in Central Europe, similar suggestions had been made for the Balkan area by the Rumanian government, for the Far East and the Pacific by the People's Republic of China, and for Africa by the President of Ghana. Gomulka also evinced interest in the proposal originally put forward at the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955 for a nonaggression pact in Europe. The Polish leader said that such a pact "would contribute effectively toward increasing security especially if it coincided with the establishment of a denuclearized zone." *Documents on Disarmament 1960,* Department of State Publication 7172, (Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 1961), pp. 259-260.

[18]*Documents on Disarmament 1961,* United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication No. 5 (Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 1962). See pp. 500-501.

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our planet would be to reach an agreement that such weapons should not be stored or produced by anyone at all in certain defined geographic zones. . . . It may literally be said that the air is full of plans for such zones.

. . . Hardly anyone will dispute that the establishment of such zones would reduce the probability of military conflict, would avert the possibility of a dangerous spread of nuclear and ballistic weapons to new countries and continents and would help to create an atmosphere of confidence in relations among States. . . .

The proposal to establish nuclear-free zones is particularly realistic in that no one would obtain any military advantage, and the existing balance of military forces would not be upset in this case, either.[19]

The Soviet government itself, although it has on several occasions suggested denuclearization in Central Europe, has not placed great emphasis upon it in its formal diplomatic overtures to the West. Apparently the Soviets have preferred to remain in the background in respect to this particular *démarche,* leaving the Polish government to play the principal role. Formal Soviet proposals have not been nearly as explicit as those put forward by Rapacki. Whenever the Soviets have mentioned the idea of atom-free zones, they have invariably referred to the Rapacki version. Undoubtedly they have hoped that denuclearization would seem less sinister and more reasonable to the West when suggested by the spokesman of the one East European satellite which Western statesmen have wooed most assiduously since late 1956. In all likelihood, the Soviets have expected the Rapacki Plan to commend itself to the leaders of those Socialist parties in Western Europe which might, either by themselves or in leftist coalitions, ascend to power in the coming years. Disarmament was one of the principal themes stressed by the communists during 1963 in their effort to forge a new "popular front" in Italy.[20] Harold Wilson, leader of the British Labour Party, speaking in Warsaw in June 1963, indicated that as Prime Minister he might be friendly to the Rapacki Plan when he made the following declaration:

[19]*Ibid.,* pp. 502-503.

[20]See Edmond Taylor, "A New Popular Front?," *The Reporter,* June 20, 1963. Taylor, in order to demonstrate the drift of West European opinion, reports an interview given in May 1963 by Paul-Henri Spaak to *Izvestia.* Spaak "declared that he 'accepted without hesitation' the Communist suggestion for a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw bloc, and spoke favorably of the Rapacki Plan for a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, which, as Secretary-general of NATO he had once denounced as a 'Soviet maneuver' to dismantle the alliance." *Ibid.,* pp. 17-18. For Spaak's earlier attitude, see below, page 498.

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We as the Labour Party are opposed now, and in all future circumstances, to the provision of nuclear arms to Germany, or to any German finger on the nuclear trigger, direct or indirect.[21]

Helmut Schmidt, a Social Democratic member of the Defense Committee of the West German Bundestag, has been among those within the West who have openly acknowledged the attractiveness of the Rapacki Plan. Schmidt has put forth a fairly detailed model for a regional zone of arms limitation in Central Europe, designed to achieve approximate parity not merely in arithmetical quantities of forces but with regard to the size and economic strength of the populations involved; the number of troops in the zone and the weapons with which they are armed; the size of the area affected; and the military characteristics of the terrain. He insists that "a zone of arms control must not be allowed to alter the present tactical or strategic situation to the advantage or disadvantage of either of the participating military blocs."[22] Hence he rejects any plan for zonal limitation which would encompass only the two regions of Germany. Schmidt admires the Rapacki Plan precisely because it equates West Germany with three East European states. Moreover, he makes it clear that the creation of a zone need not be conditional upon the departure of the Federal Republic from NATO, or the departure of the Eastern states from the Warsaw Pact.

According to Schmidt's plan, like Rapacki's, the zone would cover West Germany, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia (and perhaps Hungary also). The ratio of the populations involved would not deviate by much from 1:1. The size of the area covered would be 96,500 square miles on the Western side and 212,000 square miles on the Eastern (exclusive of Hungary). The depth of the zone would be 200-250 miles in the West, and 500-625 miles in the East. The larger area in the Eastern zone would warrant the retention by the Eastern states of somewhat larger ground forces than West Germany. The numerical ratio between the Bundeswehr and the Polish army might be fixed at 3:2; between the Bundeswehr and the East German force at 3:1; and between the Bundeswehr and the Czechoslovak army similarly at 3:1. In sum, the Eastern states would outnumber

[21]"No Nuclear Arms for Germany," *Manchester Guardian Weekly,* June 20, 1963.

[22]Helmut Schmidt, *Defense or Retaliation: A German View*, translated by Edward Thomas (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 151.

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West Germany by about 4:3—not an unfair numerical superiority for the East in view of the divided command. The national armed forces would be limited solely to conventional arms, subject to international control. Both alliances would be permitted to establish forward radar warning stations along the opposite boundaries of the zone—the Eastern states perhaps along the Rhine, and NATO along the Bug. Foreign troops would be withdrawn by controlled stages, until only small detachments of brigade strength would stand along the zonal borders to perform a symbolic function as guarantors against aggression. The status of the occupation forces in West Berlin would remain unchanged.[23]

III

An analysis of the substantive arguments which have been offered for and against disengagement or zonal arms limitations in Europe is an intellectual exercise fraught with pitfalls. Throughout the years of debate, as was to be expected, military and political issues have been so closely interrelated that it has usually been impossible to separate them, even for the sake of logical analysis. One might wish to make a careful study of the effects which disengagement would have on the military balance, but he soon finds himself drawn into the vortex of politics. Problems of local military defense quickly flow into the broadest strategic generalizations. Many writers shift back and forth unsystematically from one level of analysis to another. Hence the argumentation on both sides seems circular; it is often difficult to tell where the line of reasoning begins and where it ends.

Generally speaking, Western proponents of zonal arms reduction in Europe have argued along the following lines: The zonal approach would lessen arms tensions in Central Europe through the creation of some sort of neutral, demilitarized or mutually controlled belt between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. It would also create those conditions of political-military *détente* in which the prospects for a settlement of the German reunification problem would be greatly improved. If disengagement should take the form of a withdrawal of "foreign forces" from Central European territory, this would cause no harm to the quality of political life in West Germany, but the elimination of the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe would lead to a situation in which the gradual liberalization of the satellite

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 152-153.

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regimes could take place. Furthermore, an agreement on the thinning out of forces could help to remove the oft-cited Soviet advantage in respect to the size of available conventional forces and thereby render less acute the West's deficiency of such forces, lamented perennially by NATO statesmen ever since the Lisbon Council meeting in 1952. In view of the attention focused upon the "Nth Country" problem in recent years, it has sometimes been argued that zonal limitation would moderate the security fears of militarily dependent European nations, and to this extent it would lower the pressures for the acquisition of autonomous nuclear capabilities by those countries: If Germany had less fear of being attacked, she would have less reason to want nuclear arms, and if Germany did not possess such arms, the East European states would have no reason to demand their own. Finally, zonal limitation would contribute significantly toward the objectives of arms control and disarmament. It would lengthen warning times, reduce the chances of local skirmishes or forays which might get out of hand, and lessen the possibility of accidental occurrences which might lead to nuclear war. It would increase the probability that war, if it should break out, could be kept limited and controllable during the critical early stages, especially if a nuclear-free zone should constitute a central feature of the scheme.

So much for the reasons why zonal arms arrangements have seemed desirable to some in the West. The advocates of such arrangements have contended that they are not only desirable but feasible as well, in terms of both political and military reality. Up to the present time, they say, the preservation of peace in Europe must be attributed either to the fact that the Soviets never intended to carry out an aggressive attack against Western Europe or else to the fact that the American defense commitment to the NATO countries has been sufficient to deter an attack. So far as the future is concerned, the security of Western Europe will continue to be a function of both Soviet intentions and American pledges and determination. If the credibility of the American deterrent becomes increasingly doubtful as nuclear missiles of intercontinental range become more plentiful, the disengagers declare, then the willingness of the Soviets to risk a cataclysmic war by attacking Europe shows a corresponding or an even sharper decline. If the Soviets are seriously contemplating a future attack upon Europe alone (and not the United States), they are hardly likely to pull back a

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few hundred miles before launching the aggression. They could only reoccupy the evacuated ground with a massive military movement which would patently violate the nonaggression provisions of an all-European security treaty.

Even under the extreme assumption that Germany would be removed from NATO, the United States would be just as solemnly obligated to come to Germany's defense as it now is under the North Atlantic Treaty. What is more, Germany is of such overriding strategic importance because of its population, its resources, its location and its potential power, that the United States would have no choice but to come to her defense with fully effective measures in case of attack. The Soviets, therefore, would not venture to attack or reoccupy part of Germany unless they were prepared to accept all the risks of general war with the United States. Assuming for the moment that the Soviets are ready to run those risks and to carry out a limited seizure, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that they would have an easy time of it. If the zone of disengagement had been constructed in a relatively equitable manner with respect to geography and the forces involved, the West need not find itself at a strategic disadvantage. In fact, owing to its superior logistic capabilities, the West might very well stand to gain from a mutual pull-back of forces, because in the emergency of a purely European attack, it could, if properly prepared, reoccupy its present positions in Central Europe more rapidly than the Soviets could reoccupy theirs. Schmidt puts the case very well for his side:

> The Soviet army stands today 60 miles from the Kiel Canal and 75 miles from Frankfurt. In future it would be 500-625 miles distant from these vital points: its tanks would not be stationed just across the Elbe but away to the east of the Vistula and the Bug. . . . The Soviet army would have, in the event of war, *three* major rivers to cross, at each of which it would be exposed to the full force of interdiction at the hands of the Allied tactical air forces and medium-range missiles. By contrast the troops of the other NATO powers stationed in the Federal Republic would have to cross only one extra river, viz., the Rhine.[24]

The advocates of disengagement are prone to think that developments in long-range missile technology have served to downgrade the relative significance of the deployed position of both ground forces and shorter-range nuclear weapons. In their

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 154.

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eyes, the reasons which prompted the United States in the early 1950's to station its forces in Europe as sentinels of a "forward strategy" are no longer valid. They believe that the withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet forces now would not substantially affect the security of the Central European countries provided that the latter maintain an approximate equilibrium of indigenous forces, backed formally or tacitly by the same superpowers which presently keep forces on their soil. Against Western skeptics, the architects of military *détente* in Europe point out that the Soviets are much more obsessed over security matters than Western governments. It would be extremely difficult for them actually to withdraw their military forces when the time came to do so. A serious Western initiative in this particular dimension might set their military and political authorities at odds with each other. But if the Soviets should prove interested in reversing the process by which the division of Europe into two hostile camps has been deepening since World War II, then zonal arms limitation may offer the best available approach. At least the Soviets have seemed more willing to accept the notion of effective control and inspection in Eastern Europe than on their own national territory. So run the thoughts of those who belong to the disengagement and denuclearization schools. Some of their points strike the "prudent man" of Anglo-American culture as eminently plausible. Certainly they are not lightly to be dismissed.

IV

In examining the arguments against disengagement, it may be useful to take up the military arguments first. These arguments, in the final analysis, may not be the most compelling ones which can be made against the reduction of forces in Europe. Nevertheless, they have a legitimacy of their own, and they deserve to be taken into account by those who are charged with formulating arms policy for the Atlantic Alliance. One may conclude that the military arguments of the opponents are not as convincing as the military case put by the advocates of disengagement, and that if disengagement is to be rejected it should be rejected on political rather than military grounds, but before one reaches this conclusion he ought to weigh carefully the military arguments on *both* sides.

Virtually all proposals which look to substantial area disengagement are vulnerable to the charge that they lead to a

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deployment reconfiguration which would be disadvantageous to the West because they would greatly contract NATO's already relatively narrow defense-in-depth. If, for example, under a zonal limitation plan all American forces should be withdrawn from West Germany and all Soviet forces should be withdrawn from East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and perhaps Hungary, this would mean the withdrawal of American military power practically to the edge of the European continent, i.e., to France, Italy, the Low Countries, Denmark and Britain. At the present time, it is not at all clear that France would agree to serve permanently as a host to U.S. military installations. American forces in Italy even today are somewhat isolated from the center of Europe by the Alps. Turkey and Greece are already in forward, exposed positions, and no one can predict what their military utility would be once American military power had been pulled back from the center of the Continent. Britain, which already contains a sizeable unilateral disarmament movement and which has periodically witnessed political protests against the presence of American bases, poses a question mark for a post-disengagement period. All the countries around the edge of Europe which continued to allow U.S. bases to be stationed on their soil would feel increasingly vulnerable insofar as the total NATO target area had been shrunk as a result of the departure of forces from Germany. Such evacuation would leave a gaping hole in the central and most critical part of the Western front; all of the reasons which prompted NATO statesmen in the early 1950's to seek ways of bringing West Germany into the Western Alliance would have to be written off. The Soviets, on the other hand, could easily afford to pull their forces back a few hundred miles without suffering a similarly critical contraction.

Disengagement or denuclearization, its adversaries declare, would not really advance the cause of arms control and stability in Central Europe. To begin with, it would not necessarily reduce the possibility of local occurrences which might lead to nuclear war. There is considerable room for debate as to whether the proximity of contesting military forces in Central Europe is the major source of tension in that area. The danger arises more from political rivalry than from military confrontation. The possibility of border incidents, of course, always exists, but it can easily be overrated. Soviet and American forces have faced each other in Central Europe for nearly two decades and have grown rather accustomed to each other's modes of behavior. The

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nearness of the two sides has never presented serious problems; the burden of proof rests with those alarmists who claim that the slightest disturbance might set the match to nuclear conflict.

Indeed it may be much sounder, from the standpoint of military stability, to have the Americans and the Soviets go on glaring at each other than it would be to turn the ground over exclusively to the Bundeswehr and the Volksarmee. The two superpowers have so much at stake that they are bound to place a premium on rational action along the Iron Curtain in case a minor skirmish should break out. The same can be said of the risk of miscalculation. One authoritative analysis contained the following line of reasoning:

> [A] good case can be made for the view that there is less danger of war by accident in Central Europe than anywhere else. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd put this view as follows in 1958: "The world is a much safer place if, in critical areas, there is a direct confrontation of the major parties and not an area of uncertainty." . . . In Central Europe, the two great nuclear powers do confront each other directly across the demarcation line. . . . So long as this situation prevails, a war triggered off by chance border incidents will be an unlikely eventuality; an incident, to unleash war, would have to be a premeditated incident.
>
> Similarly, the risk of miscalculation will be negligible as long as the line between East and West is clearly drawn. The more unequivocal the Western and especially the American defence commitment is, and the more imposing and credible the military establishment supporting it, the more carefully will the Soviets calculate their every move; nothing will invite dangerous miscalculation so much as ambiguity.[25]

Those Western military experts who are skeptical of disengagement and denuclearization proposals question the assertions of the apologists as purely gratuitous. They are not at all sure, for example, that zonal arms limitation would significantly improve warning times. In the case of mounting preparations for a conventional attack, NATO already has fairly good intelligence flowing from Eastern Europe. To be sure, the establishment of overlapping radar networks (e.g., by the Warsaw Pact

[25] *Arms Policy and Stability in Europe,* Working Papers presented to the Fourth Annual Conference of the Institute for Strategic Studies, Bad Godesburg, June 29-July 2, 1962, Paper V, p. 3. Robert Osgood, too, has noted that while political disagreement prevails in Europe, military engagement rather than disengagement probably represents the best assurance of peace and security. He argues as follows: ". . . if neither the Soviet Union nor the United States wanted to engage in an armed conflict, both powers would have a greater incentive and would be in a better position to control a disturbance and to see that the other side or its allies did not foment or exploit it if their troops were on the forward line." *NATO: The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 314.

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on the Rhine and by NATO on the Bug or the Vistula), assuming that they could be proofed against enemy interference, would furnish additional warning of an aircraft attack (which is less likely), but would contribute little beyond BMEWS and MIDAS capabilities by way of warning against a Soviet missile attack (which is the more likely contingency).

The skeptics deny that disengagement or denuclearization would really enhance the safety of the European environment against the outbreak of war, or provide a better chance of keeping war limited if it should occur. Even granted that the Soviets are not at present disposed to aggression, this reluctance is a function of the NATO defense structure which they see when they gaze westward. The withdrawal of all U.S. forces and nuclear capabilities from Germany would present the Soviets with a military vacuum which might at some future time, under certain favorable circumstances likely to inhibit an immediate American response (e.g., a presidential election campaign), tempt them to move quickly with mobile forces, occupy large areas of Germany east of the Rhine and present the West with a *fait accompli* without having to encounter the risk of provoking a nuclear riposte in the early stages of the conflict. If the Soviets should seize parts of Germany in such a move, it is probable that they could not be dislodged except by a demonstration that the United States was fully willing to initiate nuclear action. Paul-Henri Spaak, while he was Secretary-General of NATO, put the problem very clearly:

> What should we do if, after the adoption and implementation of the Rapacki Plan, Soviet troops marched back into the neutral zone? Should we then decide on a nuclear counter-blow? On a third world war in which the United States would be exposed to nuclear attack at home, just because of a treaty breach and even before a shot had been fired? To say the least, that would certainly be a very difficult decision. And that is why, in my opinion, the West cannot possibly accept the Rapacki Plan or anything of the sort.[26]

Spaak's picture may seem slightly overdrawn. It is difficult to envisage a situation in which the Soviets could occupy parts of Germany without a shot being fired. This is especially true under the hypothesis that West Germany would be allowed to retain

[26]Quoted in Hubertus Prince zu Lowenstein and Volkmar von Zuhlsdorff, *NATO and the Defense of the West,* translated by Edward Fitzgerald (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 116. Spaak went on to conclude: "For my part, I am convinced that the presence of American troops before the Iron Curtain is the decisive factor for the preservation of world peace." *Ibid.,* p. 117.

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conventional forces of her own. But in view of repeated Soviet expressions of hostility to German "militarism," it is highly doubtful that the Soviets would agree to any zonal scheme which did not include stringent limitations upon conventional forces in Germany: the Kremlin is hardly likely to substitute for the presence of NATO the possibility of a war catalyzed by German military forces. Indeed, if the Soviets fear West German military provocation nearly as much as they profess to, then it is hard to say at what low level of limitation they would begin to feel secure, if ever. The Soviets would undoubtedly insist upon a German force level so low as to constitute dangerous exposure, and the contingency described by Spaak might then not be wide of the mark.

Disengagement, say its military critics, would alter drastically all the familiar presumptions on which the analysis of Western Europe's defense problem has been based for a decade. The factors of terrain, weapons deployment, access, approaches and logistics would be entirely different from what they are today. The involved debate which has occurred within recent years over NATO's conventional-nuclear dilemma, and which has served to bring about a considerable refinement of strategic analysis and military planning within NATO, would be rendered obsolete with all its valuable lessons. For many years, Western policymakers have been arguing about the rules of engagement and the calibration of responses to various types of Soviet moves in Central Europe in order to "make the punishment fit the crime." The idea of a "conventional pause," for example, by which NATO would refrain from introducing nuclear weapons into a conflict until it could achieve clarity as to the extent of the aggressive penetration, the nature of Soviet intentions, and NATO's own inability to contain the attack by conventional means alone, may be meaningful in the present confrontation but it would be altered almost beyond recognition in a European environment in which Soviet and American forces have been disengaged.

Anti-disengagers might be more inclined to see some merit in disengagement if the pro-disengagers would agree unequivocally that any violation of a European zonal limitation would immediately trigger nuclear war, and that this should be fully understood by both sides from the beginning and would be built into their force configurations. But the pro-disengagers exhibit little enthusiasm for such a proposition. In fact, as pointed out

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previously, the advocates of disengagement are fond of arguing that a force reduction in Europe would help to rectify the much-vaunted imbalance of conventional forces there, which allegedly operates at present to the advantage of the Soviets. The conventional imbalance has, perhaps, been exaggerated.[27] But the fact that the proponents of disengagement so frequently cite this particular rationale for their position reflects a basic attachment on their part to a conventional as opposed to a nuclear strategy for the defense of Europe. There is no certainty whatsoever that, if NATO does suffer certain deficiencies in the number of combat-ready conventional forces, disengagement holds out any solution. If disengagement were to go into effect, the willingness of the European allies to maintain conventional ground forces, never very high, would probably diminish. Furthermore, there is no assurance that the Soviets would think seriously of subscribing to a disengagement plan which would permit NATO to compensate for its conventional deficiencies.[28]

Finally, even if the Soviets would be so thoughtful as to permit NATO to solve one of its "felt problems," and to improve its relative conventional capability, no one can say precisely what effect disengagement would have upon the character of the defense problem in Europe. As likely as not, it would tilt the scales of strategy toward nuclear defense rather than conventional defense. A few sanguine souls could probably be found who would argue that disengagement in Europe would so improve the international climate that it would no longer be necessary to

[27]Glenn H. Snyder, among others, has criticized the notion that the West cannot expect to match the Soviets "man for man." He points out that NATO enjoys a 3:2 edge over the Warsaw Pact countries in population and a greater margin of potential industrial strength. What is more, the NATO countries had 6 million men under arms, compared to 5 million in the Warsaw Pact area, but he admits that a larger percentage of manpower in NATO was in naval and air forces. In land forces alone, the Warsaw Pact held approximately a 4:3 advantage. But, he adds, considering Soviet reductions in recent years and the manpower of the European neutrals who could be counted upon reliably to resist an all-out Soviet invasion of Western Europe, total West European ground forces exceed those of the Warsaw Pact. *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 154-155. Snyder's conclusion is even more convincing when the potential unreliability of the East European satellite armies is reckoned.

[28]On this point, Henry Kissinger has made a trenchant observation: "If NATO is prepared to create the forces of which it is capable, it would be able to negotiate with conviction about arms control in Europe. But to rest the argument for control schemes on the proposition that NATO, being unwilling to remedy its invulnerability, might as well offer to perpetuate its weakness for some political gain, is self-defeating. For an impotent NATO provides no incentive for the Soviet leaders to agree to any meaningful control scheme." *The Necessity for Choice* (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1962), pp. 159-160.

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worry seriously about the problem of defense. But responsible policymakers who are interested in genuine arms control objectives must think twice before attending to such advice and subscribing to courses of action which would radically modify the European military milieu with which all parties are now familiar.

The mutual retreat of nuclear weapons could be expected to have effects that are especially difficult to calculate. The Rapacki Plan and the other denuclearization schemes patterned after that plan would be asymmetrical in effects and would inevitably operate to the disadvantage of the West. Observers generally agree that NATO now has many more nuclear weapons in Western Europe than the Soviets have in Eastern Europe. Denuclearization schemes, therefore, are tantamount to offering the Soviets something for nothing unless they encompass regions in western Russia, such as the Ukraine and Byelorussia, where the Soviets have large numbers of intermediate-range missiles emplaced. The tacit assumption—which Soviet propaganda has sought assiduously to cultivate—that the redeployment of nuclear weapons in Europe must take place entirely off Soviet soil is dangerously lopsided, for it implies that Soviet fears of such weapons in NATO Europe are justified whereas European fears of such weapons in western Russia are not justified. It is hardly fair to formulate a new set of ground rules under which NATO forces in Western Europe may not aim land-based missiles at the Soviet Union but the latter may aim such missiles at Western Europe and continue to hold it hostage. The fear of the consequences of nonsymmetrical or unilateral denuclearization in Europe helps to explain why many Europeans were dismayed during 1963 to see the United States liquidating its Thor and Jupiter bases in Italy, Turkey and Britain without exacting any compensatory withdrawal by the Soviets on the Continent.[29] Some American analysts professed to see the U.S. decision as a reciprocal of the earlier Soviet decision to withdraw its missiles

[29]There is no intention here to suggest that the liquidation of the Thor and Jupiter bases is tantamount to the denuclearization of Western Europe. NATO forces on the Continent retained other nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the United States insisted that the decision to phase out the Thors and Jupiters was based upon factors which were becoming increasingly prominent prior to Cuba, such as the vulnerability and hence the seemingly "first-strike" character of those weapons. But in the eyes of the Europeans, the "softness" of the Soviets' above-ground intermediate-range missiles in western Russia made the latter every bit as provocative as the Thors and Jupiters. Apparently no effort was made by the United States, however, to induce the Soviets to show some appreciation of the security apprehensions of the West Europeans.

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from Cuba, but this interpretation gave small comfort to the peoples of Western Europe. Western Russia is, after all, a part of Europe. It is natural for Europeans to think that if there is to be any equitable reduction of arms and arms tensions in Europe the Soviets must be counted in on the deal.

Still other military criticisms can be adduced against denuclearization along the lines of the Rapacki Plan. Since that plan was spelled out in late 1957 and early 1958, it has been rendered virtually obsolete by advances in military technology. Those same developments which in the minds of the disengagers make the Rapacki Plan militarily acceptable also make it rather meaningless. Now that tactical aircraft can cross the entire width of the Federal Republic in less than five minutes and missiles of various types have become operational, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Central Europe would not materially alter either the military stability or the military security of the region. In fact, clearing out nuclear weapons from a prescribed zone can at the very most affect the configuration of peacetime deployment. It can furnish no security whatsoever for the zone after the outbreak of war, regardless of what kind of legal prohibitions have been established. So long as there are any worthwhile military targets within the zone, they will attract nuclear missiles or nuclear-equipped aircraft from outside the zone once hostilities have been initiated. What is more, contend the critics, the withdrawal of all battlefield nuclear weapons from a Central European zone would greatly weaken the deterrent by removing evidence of NATO's willingness to escalate to the tactical nuclear level in the event of a Soviet conventional attack which could not be contained by conventional means; such a withdrawal would also forfeit to the Soviets a decisive advantage in case they should opt for aggression in which battlefield nuclear weapons are employed.

Finally, say the military skeptics, the Rapacki Plan, which is addressed to the denuclearization of Central Europe, is unrealistic inasmuch as it leaves NATO's Mediterranean and Baltic flanks untouched at a time when nuclear submarines are becoming increasingly important in the strategic planning of both the West and the Soviets. At the present time, no doubt, the Mediterranean and the North Sea are more important to NATO than the Baltic is to the USSR. The creation of any denuclearized zone in Central Europe would lead inexorably to demands for the

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establishment of nuclear-free zones in those maritime areas on which NATO partially depends for the maintenance of a mobile sea-based deterrent, especially the Mediterranean and the North Sea. (The Soviets have already started to call for an atom-free zone in the Mediterranean.) The United States could, of course, call for the denuclearization of the Baltic, but the Baltic would not by any means constitute a fair trade-off for the Mediterranean, which is larger, strategically more significant, and politically easier to inspect.

These propositions, in sum, constitute the military rationale against disengagement and denuclearization. They may not add up to an overwhelmingly convincing case on military grounds alone. But the military arguments contra are on the whole as good as the military arguments pro, and deserving of just as much consideration. In short, the military debate is a stand-off; respectable analysts can be found on both sides. If any military analyst writes off the military arguments of the opposite side as completely worthless, he is in effect making a political judgment and allowing that political judgment to influence his opinion of the military merits of the question. Military analysts cannot be denied the right to hold political opinions as to the desirability of arms reduction in Europe. But professional military or strategic estimates of a situation must be carefully sorted out from the political preferences of the estimators.

V

The most telling arguments which can be made against disengagement are the political ones. First of all, there is no particular reason to believe that disengagement would bring about, either in Eastern Europe or in Germany, the favorable results predicted for it. Instead of leading conveniently to the liberalization of the satellite countries, disengagement might just as well leave the Soviet Union in a position of enhanced relative strength on the Continent. Then, irrespective of the actual military feasibility of reoccupation as comprehended by the experts, the USSR would be able to project the implicit threat of reoccupation in order to keep the governments of Eastern Europe in tow and even to increase its influence in the political affairs of Western Europe. One can argue that the communization of the satellites has, since 1956, proceeded to such a point (except in East Germany) that the presence or absence of Soviet

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military forces is no longer particularly relevant to the tightening or loosening of communist rule in those states. Throughout the Soviet bloc, methods of social control have become less crude, but not necessarily less effective, than they were in the Stalinist era. After disengagement, the Soviets would still be able to exert control through the local communist parties and secret police organizations which now dominate education, communications, industry and labor, the professions and, to a lesser extent, the peasants. The Soviets would also be able to wield formidable leverage through their economic-technological power, toward which all the economies of Eastern Europe have become completely oriented. Some of the satellites might like very much to broaden their trade ties with the West, but insofar as their economies have become competitive with those of Western Europe since World War II, opportunities in this direction would be distinctly limited. Every government from Warsaw to Sofia would know that if it embarked upon any policy that incurred the displeasure of Moscow, it could be made to suffer severe economic dislocations. It must be concluded, therefore, that military disengagement would not substantially enhance the satellites' chances of achieving genuine political independence, much less of overthrowing communism. In most cases, Soviet military forces would be just across the border, ready to re-enter at the invitation of a communist regime which found itself unable to suppress domestic insurrection.[30]

Some of the satellites have experienced a certain amount of political relaxation during the last six years *without* disengagement. This has been especially true in the case of Poland. One of the reasons why the Soviets have been inclined to tolerate the desire of the Poles for greater freedom has been the retention of a large Soviet military force in East Germany. Many thoughtful Poles realize that the price of their own political comfort is the political discomfort of those who have to live under the Ulbricht regime, which is, by any standard, more a prison camp administration than a government and which could probably not long

[30]No matter what an all-European security agreement would provide, the Soviets would be under strong political compulsion to come to the aid of a beleaguered communist regime, either with military forces or with "friendly police forces." They would undoubtedly deny that the intervention was a violation of the agreement, arguing that it was designed only to re-establish stability, and that it would be temporary. From their point of view they would be right, and many opinion leaders in the West would not only believe them but even sympathize with their awkward plight.

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survive a withdrawal of Soviet military forces. Indeed, East Germany's population is compelled to bear most of the burdens of a heavily militarized buffer between the communist camp and the liberal West. It is highly doubtful that any communist government in East Germany could afford to be less rigid than that of Herr Ulbricht without inviting dangerous popular agitation for "prison reform," and it is as certain as anything can be in politics that the Soviets would not countenance the fall of communism in East Germany, nor agree to any disengagement scheme which would create there the conditions for "counter-revolution." Polish communists, who recognize this fact and who realize further that drastic political changes in Germany might easily jeopardize Poland's possession of the former German territories beyond the Oder-Neisse, are quite content to see Soviet forces remain in East Germany. The withdrawal of those forces would probably augur the tightening of the screws upon Poland. The complex of German problems, therefore, helps to explain why it has been possible to present Poland as a sort of "show window" for the West, and why Rapacki has attempted so persistently to substitute denuclearization for disengagement.

In any discussion of disengagement, the future of Germany and NATO must occupy the central place. So far as the Western Allies are concerned, the political attractiveness of disengagement would increase if it could be logically demonstrated that such a development would contribute to stability in Central Europe, to the settlement of the Berlin question on terms acceptable to the West, to the reunification of Germany on the basis of free nationwide elections and the creation of a state able to choose continued adherence to NATO, and to an equitable settlement of the German-Polish territorial issue. The Soviets have given no indication, however, that they are willing to meet the West's irreducible conditions on the crucial issue, namely, the reunification of Germany, on which all the other aforementioned issues hinge. The Soviet Union cannot possibly acquiesce in the reunification of Germany through free elections. It is precisely at this point that communist totalitarianism of the party elect and Western liberalism of the popular majority meet in an irresolvable impasse. The USSR cannot accept a unified Germany except on the basis of bargaining between "two equal Germanys"—a bargaining process which would be protracted until all of Germany has been communized. Premier Khrushchev made this unmistakably clear in June 1963 when he declared that Germany

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will not be reunited except on communist terms.[31] The Western Allies, for their part, can make no concession beyond promising that if a freely reunified Germany should decide to adhere to the Western security system (which it almost certainly would do), NATO military forces—whether German or multinational—would not advance to occupy the region east of the Elbe. In other words, the NATO guarantee would be extended to the entire country but Soviet security apprehensions might be assuaged by virtually demilitarizing what is now East Germany.

Neither the USSR nor the United States will consent to German reunification except on terms so advantageous to itself as to be totally unacceptable to the other. Neither Power could ever trust a reunited and thoroughly neutralized Germany, because neither could have any assurance that the neutral posture would last; no one has come forth with a credible plan for maintaining it. Moreover, there are grounds for suspecting that Britain and France, having experienced the consequences of German aggression twice in a half century, and lacking the strategic power to try to manipulate the political future of Germany for their own strategic purposes, are not unhappy over the continued division of the German nation. Under these circumstances, the prospects for ending the political partition of Germany are not at all promising. Those who spin disengagement schemes to settle the German question manifest a considerable ignorance of political realities.

It would seem, therefore, that disengagement planners must predicate their designs upon the assumption that the division of Germany will continue. If they do this, they can hardly go on calling, as they have in the past, for the total withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany and of American, British and French forces from West Germany. Total withdrawal is almost certain to lead to greater political instability in Central Europe. Political warfare between East Germany and the Federal Republic would in all likelihood be intensified, and in the event of future popular outbursts against the East German communist government, the Federal Republic's temptation to intervene might prove well nigh irresistible.[32] Robert Osgood has suggested that the Soviets might not withdraw their troops in the first place unless they had carefully weighed all the possible consequences and accepted the risk of counterrevolution in order to

[31] *New York Times*, July 1, 1963.
[32] Henry A. Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

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secure some larger political advantage.[33] It is difficult, however, to imagine the Soviets trading a bird in the hand for two in the bush—giving up an assured position in East Germany while anticipating such nebulous results as the reunification of Germany on terms favorable to themselves, the excision of West Germany from NATO, and the eventual disintegration of NATO itself. There can be no doubt that these are the major objectives of Soviet policy toward Western Europe, but the Soviets would be taking a huge gamble if they should try to achieve them by withdrawing all their military forces from East Germany, for they might later find themselves confronted with the choice of suffering a major political defeat in Germany or else embarking upon a European war of incalculable consequences. Up to now, the Soviets have always coupled the possibility of military disengagement with political conditions that are completely unacceptable to the West. The principal danger confronting the Atlantic Alliance is that with the passage of time, as the prospects of nuclear war grow increasingly frightful, the politically unacceptable will gradually become "acceptable." Soviet diplomacy seems to be based upon the hope that it will. Whether it will or not depends upon the degree of political unity, intelligence and steadfastness of purpose that can be maintained within NATO.

It is one thing to say that some sort of Soviet-Western military agreement in Central Europe would have to *accompany* a German settlement, but quite another to suggest that zonal arms limitation would in all cases *lead to* a German settlement. Political and military factors are closely interrelated. The presence of arms and interstate conflict, however, are related more appropriately as symptom and disorder than as cause and effect. It is possible to conceive of a partial redeployment of armaments to more relaxed positions in order to reduce the likelihood of incidents that might lead to unintended war—a redeployment which might be accompanied by a genuine lessening of broader strategic, ideological and political tensions, depending upon whether the treatment was directed to the underlying problems or only to their surface manifestations. But projecting long-range political consequences of any act is always extremely difficult. It is just as easy to argue that disengagement, if put into effect, would exacerbate the political tensions between East and West Germany, or between nationalist elements and communist

[33]Robert E. Osgood, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

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regimes in the "peoples' democracies" of Eastern Europe. Hence disengagement, by lifting certain restraints which are now imposed by the presence of the responsible superpowers, could bring about greater instability, greater tension and greater danger than now exist, and therefore lead away from rather than toward political settlements.

VI

If military disengagement were to be linked to German reunification, the success of the scheme would depend largely upon whether: 1) reunification was to come about on the basis of free, all-German elections, or bargaining between the two German states as equals, or some other compromise position; 2) the two parts of Germany would receive symmetrical forms of strategic support from their major protectors during the transition to unity; 3) East and West Germany would retain equitable security forces during the transition period; 4) the reunified Germany was to be demilitarized or armed for her own defense, what kinds of weapons she would be allowed to maintain, and to what kind of inspection and controls by outside Powers she would be subjected; 5) the reunified Germany would be neutralized, allowed to choose a regional defense organization (either NATO or the Warsaw Pact) or integrated into an all-European security system with nonaggression and defense guarantees given by both sides; 6) the reunified Germany would be allowed to associate closely with communities of political and economic integration in Western and/or Eastern Europe; 7) the special complex of Berlin problems could be solved in parallel with the larger German problem; and 8) the question of the Polish-German territories could be satisfactorily laid to rest. When the Soviet Union and the United States consider all the political imponderables connected with the reunification of Germany, they may be compelled to conclude that they will have to rest content with the division of Germany for an indefinitely long time. If this hypothesis is correct, then it is irrelevant to devise theoretical disengagement plans as steppingstones to German unity.

Whether or not the Soviets and the NATO partners, animated by arms control considerations rather than by a political desire to alter Germany's present status, could negotiate some form of partial zonal arms reduction based upon the assumption that Germany is likely to remain partitioned is another matter, to

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which relatively little attention has hitherto been paid. Western analysts have encountered considerable difficulty in separating military from political factors and in constructing a politically realistic model of disengagement or partial arms reduction in Central Europe which could then be analyzed purely on the basis of its military merits. A strictly military analysis would not be concerned with the political implications of disengagement (such as its effects upon the prospects for German reunification) but would be addressed to such components as the following: 1) the geographic size and shape of the zone; 2) the size of the forces involved; 3) the nationality of the forces involved and the military implications thereof; 4) the numbers, kinds and characteristics of weapons systems involved (type, range, yield, accuracy and vulnerability); 5) the problems of command, control and communications; 6) intelligence capabilities and inspection requirements; 7) logistics, distances, access routes for re-entry and re-entry times; 8) the implications of zonal arms limitations for defense-in-depth; 9) the effect of zonal arrangements upon warning times; 10) the relationship between the zone and the deployment of weapons outside the zone; 11) the nature of the targets within the zone; 12) the possibility of compensatory adjustments outside the zone; 13) a calculation of the consequences which the establishment of the zone would have upon the military balance, with respect to both deterrence of war and local defense readiness in case war should break out; and 14) the significance of zonal limitation upon the planning of conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear operations.

Military analysts can scarcely be blamed for failing to produce analyzable zonal models which possess some semblance of political feasibility, for this is by no means a simple task. Theoretically there are almost no limits to the number of abstract models which arms control analysts can suggest. The political situation, however, sets uncomfortably narrow parameters. It is not inconceivable that the NATO allies might unilaterally introduce certain zonal arrangements in Western Europe for the purpose of improving the safety of the military environment against the occurrence of unintended developments, or to improve the flexibility and effectiveness of NATO's defense posture, or for both reasons. NATO might, for example, deem it useful to separate longer-range from shorter-range nuclear weapons by geographic deployment, or it might decide to phase out the tactical nuclear role of all air bases in a forward zone and limit the tactical

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nuclear air mission to vertical- or short-takeoff craft operating from unprepared positions farther back from the front. Such alterations of geographic deployment of arms or of command and control systems can be decided within NATO on their own military merits. They would be relatively easy to carry out, because they do not require bilateral negotiations with the Soviets. It is the formal published proposal of one government to another on the opposite side of the line which invariably gives rise to political difficulties and erodes mutual confidence within a free alliance.

Let us suppose that a group of arms control strategists suggests what appears to them, in view of the existing situation in Europe, to constitute a politically viable scheme of arms reduction. These strategists recognize that at the present time there is no prospect of compromise between Western insistence on free, all-German elections and Soviet insistence upon equal bargaining between the two governments in Germany as the foundation for reunification. They realize that the Soviets cannot be expected to agree to any plan whereby the communist regime in East Germany would be sublimated in a larger Germany whose future political, ideological and strategic orientation would be uncertain. Therefore, they base their arms model upon the expectation that Germany will not be united. They postulate a situation in which West Germany remains in NATO and East Germany remains in the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, in their hypothesis, the creation of a zone of arms limitation does not necessarily imply the withdrawal of all "foreign forces." It means no more than a zone in which all existing forces, foreign and indigenous, are reduced according to a proportionate standard—perhaps half—or in which foreign forces are cut in half while local forces stay at existing levels.

The plan just described probably comes as close to political realism as one can devise at the present time. Moreover, it has the merit of being predicated on the currently existing "balance" instead of requiring a search for a complicated formula which would permit the achievement of "stable parity" at a lower level of arms, and which would allegedly cancel the advantages and disadvantages on each side. NATO military commanders are probably in a better position to judge whether a relatively tolerable balance of forces now exists within a circumscribed area of equal geographic proportions—a balance which might with safety be cut approximately in half—than they are to come up with

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a new method of computing parity. As much as possible, the area should be delineated to encompass roughly comparable military strength. If NATO authorities are unable to determine whether "stability" or "parity" now prevails within a certain area, then it would appear rather futile to try to work out a complex equation for something called "stable parity" at a reduced armaments level. This type of proposal, especially if applied to troops only, but perhaps even if applied to *all* weapons systems as well (and the separability of these two terms is not always clearly understood), would seem to be mathematically fair on its face. It need not presuppose any diminution of the American resolve to defend Western Europe against attack. It would demand no major shift from a tactical nuclear strategy to a conventional strategy or vice versa. In the absence of deeper quantitative analysis, it appears to offer no decisive strategic advantage to either side. It is, in short, a partial arms control measure, pure and simple.

Yet even this plan, innocuous though it may seem at first glance, is not immune to certain telling political objections. Naturally, doubts would be expressed concerning the manageability of the verification problems to which the plan would give rise. Such doubts, of course, can be eliminated from the analysis simply by assuming adequate inspection and intelligence as an integral part of the plan. Nevertheless, formidable obstacles still remain. Many would argue that arms reduction in Central Europe without a settlement of the German problem makes no sense whatever. To say the least, West German leaders would be adamantly opposed to the acceptance of any arms plan which calls for the redeployment or reduction of Western forces while making not the slightest contribution toward the reunification of Germany. There may be many political realists within the Federal Republic who realize that the division of Germany is congealing toward historic permanence, but no public official can possibly countenance any formal arrangement which seems ever so imperceptibly to ratify the division of the country. If the United States places any value upon West German membership in the Atlantic Alliance, it cannot propose configurations of arms deployment in Central Europe which will set the political nerves of the German people on edge. Perhaps the Germans are reluctant to admit to themselves that there is no true solution to their dilemma in sight, but they are very much on their guard against false solutions. Meanwhile, the United States has little

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choice but to turn down Soviet disengagement proposals which seem designed more than anything else to undermine the West Germans' confidence in the loyalty of the United States.

The mere discussion of disengagement fans the suspicions of those Europeans who, under years of prodding by President de Gaulle, wonder whether the United States is becoming steadily more reluctant to honor its NATO commitments. Speculation about a possible Soviet-American arms *détente* in the wake of the partial test ban treaty concluded in Moscow on July 25, 1963 alarmed many Europeans. Only a month earlier, during the course of his visit to Germany, President Kennedy had reiterated the willingness of the United States to risk its own cities in order to defend those of Western Europe.[34] Nevertheless, many Europeans were apprehensive over the new turn of international events. The post-test ban treaty debate on the possibility of negotiating a nonaggression agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact as a logical "next step" demonstrated how politically volatile any formal East-West arms agreement concerning Europe can be. To be opposed to a nonaggression pact in the age of the nuclear missile seems scandalous in the extreme; it is somewhat comparable to being in favor of sin or, worse still, war. Most Western statesmen, of course, are not opposed to a nonaggression promise *in se*: they cannot see the need for such a thing. There is, after all, a commonsense validity to the contention that the United Nations Charter is a permanent nonaggression pact among the members, and that international security is not materially improved by piling one verbal pledge upon another.

Actually, there are several legitimate reasons why the West has been wary of entering a nonaggression treaty with the Soviet bloc: 1) It might imply that, since the USSR has sought the pact so ardently while the West has been reluctant to go along with the idea, the Western Alliance has harbored the more aggressive intentions. 2) A nonaggression pact would probably give the Soviets a cheap propaganda victory in the neutralist world (just as, strangely enough, the test ban treaty was hailed as a triumph of Soviet diplomacy, despite the fact that the very same type of treaty had been proposed by the Kennedy Administration in August 1962, only to be rejected categorically by the USSR). 3) Such a pact would not substantially enhance the security of Europe; in fact, it might lull some of the NATO partners into a premature relaxation which would impair

[34] *New York Times*, June 26, 1963.

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NATO's efforts to maintain an adequate defensive posture in the years ahead. 4) A nonaggression treaty might bring with it Western diplomatic recognition of East Germany, which is a member of the Warsaw Pact,[35] and thereby fulfill a long-standing Soviet objective. 5) A nonaggression pact might be construed to prohibit the first use of military force under any circumstances, in which case if the East German regime should take an "administrative decision" to close the access routes from West Germany to Berlin, the Allies would then have no legal right to initiate the use of force, if necessary, to defend their rights in the German capital.[36] 6) A nonaggression pact would be sure to set many Europeans to thinking that the United States and the Soviet Union were moving toward the quasi-neutralization of military alliances on both sides of the dividing line. Its net result, therefore, could be to spur nuclear proliferation by increasing the desire not only of France but of other European countries as well (including West Germany) either to acquire independent national deterrents or to participate in the creation of a European deterrent independent of the United States. If such criticisms as these can be marshaled against the proposal for a nonaggression agreement, they would apply *a fortiori* against any hint of disengagement.

The sensitivity of West Germany on this score was amply demonstrated in the reactions of the Bonn government to the suggestion in August 1963, following the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty, that the "next step" in the lessening of East-West tensions might be an agreement on safeguards against surprise attack. On July 19, 1963, in the midst of the Moscow test ban talks, Premier Khrushchev had proposed an exchange of inspectors at such static control posts as ports and railway stations, highway centers and airfields. This was a favorite Soviet idea which dated back to the mid-1950's; it was designed to assuage fears of a build-up for a conventional military attack and involved no mobile or "on-site" inspections of the type which the Soviets deemed obnoxious. Such an exchange of inspectors was recognized as a limited-value measure. It would furnish intelligence only

[35]The Bonn government refused to assent to the partial test ban treaty until after it had received assurances from U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk that East Germany's adherence to the treaty would not in any way give rise to the presumption that the Western Allies were granting implicit recognition to East Germany's claims to be an independent state.

[36]President Kennedy, in a press conference on August 1, 1963, said: "One of our interests in a nonaggression agreement would be greater security for Berlin." *New York Times,* August 2, 1963.

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on the concentrations or deployments of ground, air and naval forces, insofar as these could be determined from the pattern of traffic through key centers. It would provide no additional security against a surprise missile attack. It would, however, make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to coordinate a Soviet missile first-strike against the United States or Western Europe with preparations for a massive ground assault against Europe. It would also reduce the West's fears of a sudden move against Western Europe by Soviet ground and air forces, whether conventional or nuclear. For these reasons, the United States manifested an interest in the general idea of exchanging inspectors. But after Premier Khrushchev's proposal, the USSR indicated a desire to link the exchange of inspectors with disengagement, just as it had earlier tried to link the test ban with a nonaggression pact. Semyon K. Tsarapkin, the Soviet delegate to the Seventeen-Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva, said that an exchange of observers could not precede a reduction of armed forces in East and West Germany.

The West German government, fearing that the exchange of inspectors was a logical prelude to the reduction of force levels, and not wishing to be excluded from the "second step" negotiations as it felt that it had been from the test ban negotiations, proposed that the question of erecting safeguards against surprise attack be turned over to the North Atlantic Council for inter-Allied deliberation. The Federal Republic was particularly disturbed by reports that the exchange of inspectors would take place only on the soil of Germany. If such a proposal were ever put into effect, it would not be a truly international arms control measure, since the controls would be imposed on German territory and nowhere else, and would lead eventually both to disengagement and to the neutralization of Germany. Secretary of State Dean Rusk attempted to allay German apprehensions with the following remarks, made at a press conference on August 16, 1963:

> Now, one of the problems . . . will be whether this is something that can be taken up specifically as a precise move with respect to surprise attack, or whether it is going to be related to other and more difficult questions, such as levels of forces, or nuclear free zones, or questions of that sort. . . . The more things are linked into other matters, the more difficult they become. And I don't see myself that linking static control posts into mutual reduction of forces is likely to lead to an early agreement. I think that makes it a very, very unpromising prospect.[37]

[37] *Ibid.*, August 17, 1963.

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A few days later, President Kennedy said that on the issue of exchanging inspectors there would not be a United States view, but there would be a NATO view following extensive consultations.[38] Neither the Secretary nor the President, however, was able to quiet German misgivings that the United States was moving in the direction of piecemeal disengagement in Europe.

VII

Disengagement, despite the fact that it has found some articulate and sincere champions within the West, corresponds to the perennial Soviet goal not merely of separating West Germany from NATO, but eventually of inducing the full retreat of the American military presence from Europe. Many influential Europeans look upon the slightest beginning step in this direction as the proverbial "camel's nose": a little disengagement in their eyes leads ineluctably to complete disengagement. They fear that the establishment of a formally negotiated zone of arms limitation will generate irresistible pressures for gradually extending the concept until finally all U.S. forces have been evacuated from the Continent. These misgivings—that the very first step backward will start NATO on a toboggan ride down the hill to disaster—constitute perhaps a sad and generally unwarranted commentary upon the quality of Western diplomacy. They are nevertheless real. They are founded upon the historical experience of democratic alliances, which have invariably had difficulty preserving their cohesion when the adversary whose aggressive behavior originally summoned the coalition into existence changed the expression on his countenance. Europe's misgivings are also founded upon the geo-strategic facts of NATO's situation.

A modest initial step toward disengagement in Central Europe, executed for the sake of arms control, "tension-reduction," or "confidence-building," may in itself seem quite symmetrical so far as the security of the superpowers is concerned. It would therefore prove attractive to those who think rather naïvely that the direct confrontation of military forces—no matter how responsibly controlled—must be ranked as a likely occasion for, if not a cause of, war. But for peoples whose continued security hinges upon a guarantee from a friendly transoceanic power, the issue looks very different. These people, it has often been noted, are much more interested in the maintenance of a thoroughly frightful

[38] *Ibid.*, August 21, 1963.

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and therefore thoroughly effective deterrent posture than they are in preparations for the actual fighting of a war in Europe. They have frequently been disturbed in the past by reports that the United States was shifting over to a conventional defense strategy backed by the threat of strategic retaliation and was downgrading the role of tactical nuclear weapons; the Europeans felt that such a change of emphasis might imperceptibly weaken the deterrent and raise, even if only slightly, the risks of limited aggression which fall below the threshold of exciting Washington into a massive nuclear response. In their view, disengagement would represent an even more dangerous transformation of the West's deterrent stance. For them, it is irrelevant that the experimental phase of arms limitation should appear to conform to the canons of mathematical-strategic *aequitas*. They are sure that once the process begins, there is no stopping it, and that the farther it is carried the more unsymmetrical it becomes, to the West's disadvantage. In the end, U.S. military power may be negotiated right off the Continent, whereas Soviet power will never be farther away than the USSR's western borders.

The peoples of Western Europe realize that the Soviets are in Europe by geography and by an unquenchable thirst for hegemony over their neighbors to the west; the United States is in Europe only by treaty and by a conquest, perhaps temporary, of deep-rooted isolationist tendencies. In 1950, the Truman Administration decided that a purely verbal pledge from afar would not suffice to lessen Europe's apprehensions over its defense. American military power, if it was to inspire confidence in its reliability, had to be made visibly present; it had to be stationed up on the front line. In recent years, European policymakers have been extremely sensitive to any hint of an American pull-back, whether of military dependents, or nuclear weapons, or the armed forces as a whole. Sophisticated military arguments about the significance of technological advances since the Alliance was formed—such as ICBM's, Polaris submarines and airlift capabilities—avail naught. Most Europeans, equipped with a political intuition all their own, reject any zonal arms limitations which smack of "disengagement" as the beginning of the end for the guarantee which the United States gave to Europe in 1949. The peace which they have known since 1949 has not been perfectly tranquil by any means, but it has been peace, and it has permitted the construction of a new Europe. Most Europeans, in all probability, would prefer to retain close military ties with the

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United States through NATO in the future, even if they do develop certain deterrent capabilities on their side of the Atlantic. But if in the years ahead U.S. policymakers seem increasingly attracted to zonal arms schemes which bear a resemblance to earlier proposals for disengagement, then it is to be expected that the suggestion concerning a separate European nuclear force set forth by President de Gaulle's Deputy Foreign Minister before the Consultative Assembly of Europe in late September 1963[39] will fall upon more and more sympathetic ears in Western Europe.

[39] *Washington Post*, September 24, 1963.

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BRITAIN'S NEW LABOUR LEADERS

by G. Edward Janosik

SPECULATION in Britain regarding the next General Election no longer turns on the single question: When will the election take place? Until the spring of 1963 discussion usually centered on the timing of the election, with the fall of 1963 and the spring of 1964 as the two most likely dates. After the sensational events of the Profumo affair became public, a new item of speculation appeared, namely, whether Harold Macmillan would continue as Prime Minister and lead the Conservative Party into the election.

The passing of time has provided the answer to the latter question, for the back bench revolt among Tory MP's quickly subsided when the issue of choosing a replacement for Macmillan was raised.* The results of the recent Stratford by-election and the long delay before the submission of the Denning Report[1] both argue against an election this fall. For the Conservative Party, Stratford was clearly a gamble which did not pay off. Had the Tories been able to hold their share of the Stratford vote, which in 1959 had been 68.5% in a straight contest with Labour, they might have regarded this as a vindication of their party and risked a General Election in the hope of retaining control of the House of Commons, albeit with a reduced majority. In the Stratford by-election the Liberals polled 20% of the vote, in sharp contrast to the election of 1950 when the last Liberal candidate to stand in Stratford lost his deposit. In a smaller poll than in 1959, Labour increased its share of the vote by 2.5%, while the Tory vote dropped 25%. This is hardly the sort of result to persuade Conservative Party managers to take the entire British electorate to the polls in the fall of 1963.

The extraordinary skill of Harold Macmillan as a politician is no better exhibited than in the appointment of Lord Denning, in the mandate given him, and in the procedure under which

*EDITOR'S NOTE: The passing of additional time has provided the definitive answer. Soon after this article went to press, Harold Macmillan was forced, by a sudden illness, to step down as Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party. When it became necessary to select a new party leader—Sir Alec Douglas-Home—and permit him time to acquaint the electorate with his personality and program, the Tories had no choice but to postpone the election until 1964.

[1]Lord Denning, a Lord of Appeal, was chosen by the Prime Minister in July 1963 to look into security aspects of the Profumo affair, and into "rumours which affect the honour and integrity of public life."

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Denning conducted his investigation. It was never clear whether the Denning Report was to be anything more than a personal report to the Prime Minister. Although the Prime Minister agreed to publish the entire report, it is apparent that evidence given in confidence by witnesses regarding the activities of third parties unrepresented by counsel, cannot be made public under the British legal system. As a writer noted in *The Observer* of August 31: "The evidence he [Lord Denning] has heard was unsworn and untested by counsel. Many of the key witnesses were experienced liars. And the apparent readiness with which he has been accepting assurances, all make this very unlike a hearing at law." Whether or not there develops a "profound sense that this matter ought to have been handled differently," it was handled Macmillan's way, and his way seems to be that of avoiding as long as possible a clear confrontation of this issue. Even though it dealt quite gently with the Prime Minister, the mere submission of the Denning Report succeeded in recalling to the consciousness of Britons one of the sorrier episodes of their political history. The report added nothing new, nor did it corroborate even a fraction of what the British press has hinted during the past six months, but its appearance cannot be other than damaging to the Conservative Party.

If a fall 1963 election is ruled out, the options of the Conservative government are materially reduced. The course would then be to wait until the fall of 1964, thereby incurring the criticism that the Tories will go to unbecoming lengths to retain tenure; or to hold the election in the spring of 1964, regardless of the political mood of the electorate. In order to obtain the maximum advantage of economic fluctuations, the Tories have been advised by one economist to choose neither the late spring nor early fall of 1964, but a date between the two.[2]

Regardless of when the General Election takes place, the prevalent assumption is that it will be won by the Labour Party. It is becoming increasingly difficult to avoid this conclusion. To be sure, the British political situation in 1957 seemed to augur a Labour victory, but the 1959 Election returned a Conservative government with a greater majority than it had won in 1955. Despite the remarkable recuperative powers of the Tory party in other postwar elections, it is difficult to see how the coming election can be salvaged. Perhaps the losses suffered by the Conserva-

[2]Samuel Brittan, "Charting the Polls," *The Observer*, August 4, 1963.

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tives may prove less severe than is generally expected, but actual victory seems remote. Public opinion polls tend to show an impressive margin of preference for Labour,[3] while the recent by-election record of the Government has been calamitous.[4] The May local elections were the most successful for the Labour Party since 1946, with the party regaining more seats than had been lost in the Tory landslide of 1960. Labour did so well that some political writers noted that a General Election held in May of this year would probably have given Labour a 100-seat majority in the House of Commons. Len Williamson, General Secretary of the Labour Party, estimated a Labour majority of 140 seats as of that date.

While it is unwise to ignore the evidence pointing to a Labour victory, certain imponderables are present. Polling day is still some months and possibly a year in the future. Trends such as those now observable have been known to change over a similar period of time. As portents of political fortune, by-elections are notoriously unreliable, fraught as they are with local issues and subject to variations in voter sentiment unequaled in a General Election. In its sweeping victory in the May local elections, Labour may have forgotten that its 1959 defeat followed a substantial victory in the 1958 local elections. For over a year public opinion polls have shown Labour to be leading the Conservatives, but there is an unsettled quality to these reports. Wide fluctuations have occurred in the findings of some of the polls, and unresolved discrepancies have developed among several of them. These variations may reflect the unusual events in the life of Britain during the past year. In addition to the Profumo scandal, the spring of 1963 saw the passing of the worst winter in over a century and a subsequent drop in unemployment as the building industry resumed normal activity. Simultaneously there occurred an improvement in the production and sales of motor cars and other durable goods, an improvement which the Conservatives attributed to changes instituted in the fall of 1962 by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Still in doubt is the effect of the Denning Report and, more significantly, the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. If the Tory party is not injured further by the first

[3]There has been controversy since July over the fact that *The Daily Mail* poll has shown a considerable drop in the preference for Labour, while the other major survey organizations show continued strong support for Labour.

[4]Average Conservative loss in 12 by-elections held in the past year was 16.6%, and in the year from August 1962 to August 1963, the average loss in 16 by-elections was 19%. Conservative losses ranged from 4.2 to 28.3% of the total votes cast.

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of these, and is credited with accomplishing the second, some courageous party members may think in terms of a fall 1963 election. The possibility is remote, but in light of the Tory reputation for utilizing political opportunities, it should not be completely discounted.

The Elections of the 1950's as a Guide to 1964

In order to predict the results of the 1964 General Election, one must examine the election results of the 1950's. The 1945 Election, which resulted in a marked victory for Labour, was not consistent with the pattern of British political behavior. After the 1945 Election, Labour had a 182-seat majority over the Conservatives in the House of Commons, but this majority was reduced to 17 by the 1950 Election in which the Tories picked up 86 seats.[5] In 1951 the Conservatives won control of the House of Commons with a 26-seat majority, which was increased in 1955 to 67, and in 1959 to 107 seats.

In view of this steady trend toward the Conservative Party during the 1950's, what conditions are needed for a Labour government to win the barest working majority in the House of Commons? First, the trend toward increased support for the Conservative Party must be halted and reversed by at least a 3% swing to Labour. Second, Liberal Party interventions must take place on a large scale in those constituencies in which the Labour Party polled between 41% and 49% of the vote in 1959, and the Liberal candidates must do at least as well as they did in 1959 when 85% of all Liberal candidates polled more than 11% of the vote in their respective constituencies. If these conditions prevail, Labour might gain approximately a 25-seat margin over the Conservatives in the House of Commons, and an overall majority of less than 20 seats. A 2% swing and Liberal interventions of the nature described would likely give Labour an overall majority in Commons of less than 10 seats, the sort of situation found almost intolerable by Clement Atlee when the 1950 Election gave Labour an overall majority in Commons of a mere 5 seats. If the swing from the Tories to Labour were from 5% to 6%, Labour would not have to think in minimal terms, but even in these circumstances could not hope for much more than a 75-seat margin in Commons, again assuming more extensive Liberal interventions than in 1959.

[5]Not all Conservative gains came from Labour; the Liberals lost 3 seats, and the number of Independents and Minor Party MP's was reduced from 22 to 3.

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For Labour to win solely on the basis of a swing from the Conservative Party, 6% of the British voters would have to shift to Labour as compared to 1959 results. Such a change would be unprecedented in post-World War II politics in Britain. The largest shift in British elections since the war came in 1950 when the Tories were the beneficiaries of a 3.3% change. In 1955 the shift was 1.8%, and in both 1951 and 1959 it was 1.1%, with all these changes in favor of the Conservative Party. Despite the current popularity of the Labour Party, the record of electoral shifts in Britain during the last twenty years suggests that a change in party preferences of 6% or more would not be characteristic of the British voter. A shift of 4% to 5%, however, would not be an unreasonable expectation.

Voters become bored with political parties which remain in office for lengthy periods, in this case for thirteen years. Various groups, such as teachers, nurses and railwaymen, have been irked by recent Government actions. The Government has failed in such massive ventures as joining the Common Market and devising a defense policy capable of standing the test of time. In security matters, the record of the Government is not easy to defend, and the performances under pressure of some Cabinet members is appalling even to their colleagues. The titillating aspects of the Profumo affair and the Argyll divorce case may not have alienated many Tory voters, but the prestige of the Government and its ministers has been unmistakably damaged. Notwithstanding this, Labour Party members do not underestimate the recuperative powers of the Conservative Party; they fully expect its resurgence before the next election. This is the same Conservative Party which survived the Suez crisis in 1956 and the ensuing monetary problems, serious disturbances in Central Africa, and losses in the 1958 local elections, and then managed to win the 1959 General Election with an increased majority in the House of Commons.

In all likelihood, the role to be played by the Liberal Party in the next election will be crucial. Without extensive interventions by the Liberal Party, a direct shift of 4% or 5% from Conservative to Labour might result in stalemate, with neither party able to call upon a working majority. If the Liberals continue to draw the support of about 15% of the electorate, as they did in 1959 in constituencies where Liberal candidates stood, Labour will clearly gain an advantage. In the 1959 Election Liberal candi-

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dates stood in 37 of the 123 constituencies where Labour attracted from 40% to 45% of the total vote. In 14 constituencies where the Liberal candidate received 10% or less of the votes cast, the Tories won 11 and Labour won 3 seats. In the remaining 23 constituencies where the Liberal candidate polled 11% or more of the total vote, Labour won 21 seats and the Conservative Party won 2 seats.[6] This would indicate that it is the size of the vote cast for the Liberal Party which determines whether advantage accrues to the Labour or to the Conservative Party. With the introduction of a Liberal candidate into a constituency contest, the Conservative Party is disadvantaged when the Liberal vote reaches a range of 11% to 36%. Thus far the Liberals have endorsed candidates in 87 of the 123 marginal constituencies, and are negotiating in 10 additional ones. Although there are certain unknown factors in this situation, it is known that in 1959, 3 out of every 4 Labour candidates were successful in the constituencies where Liberal candidates stood for office.

Labour's chances in the next election will be affected by the degree of unity of the party, its program and the relative influence of its various segments, including the Labour Left. It is the opinion of the Labour Left that the adoption of its policies by Labour in the late 1940's and early 1950's would have reversed the decline of the Labour Party and given the socialists nineteen years of power, against which the Tories would now be attempting to assemble a victory. The left wing attributes the troubles of the Labour Party to the fact that Labour leaders have permitted a drift to the right which has diminished the differences between the parties until the electorate no longer has a meaningful choice. The confusion arising from this situation manifests itself, according to the Labour Left, in ever-growing abstentions on the part of traditional Labour supporters, and in the failure of Labour to attract young voters. The solution, in their opinion, lies only in a definite and unmistakable move toward the left. However, the likelihood of such a reorientation by the Labour Party, should it win the next General Election, is negligible. At no point in the power structure of the party is the left wing in a dominant position. The Parliamentary Labour Party, the National Executive Committee and the Annual Conference are completely under the

[6]If the same pattern is repeated to any extent in the 1964 Election, a hypothesis worth testing would be that the vote for Labour is virtually unaffected or slightly lessened by the candidacy of a Liberal who draws 10% or less of the total vote, but as the Liberal vote passes that point Conservative losses increase at a growing rate and the Labour Party is benefited.

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influence of moderates within the party, and there is no apparent prospect of a change in the situation.

The Parliamentary Labour Party

The Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) is controlled by the center and right wing of the party. This was true before the death of Hugh Gaitskell and continues to be true with Harold Wilson as head of the party. The selection of Wilson as Party Leader by the PLP should not be interpreted as a renascence of radicalism. On the first of two ballots taken to fill the post of Party Leader, Wilson received 115 votes to a combined total of 125 for George Brown and James Callaghan. Undoubtedly many factors other than sympathy for Wilson's purported leftist leanings accounted for the votes he received on the first ballot. Many MP's voted for Wilson because they believed Callaghan could not win and because they felt Wilson was more credible as a possible Prime Minister than was George Brown. No one will ever know how many of the votes he received on the first ballot and how many of the 29 votes he picked up on the second ballot were forthcoming only after Wilson gave certain guarantees regarding his future policies. Any commitments made by Wilson to broaden his support would not have been made to the left, of whose loyalty he was already assured, but to those MP's in the center and right wing whose votes he needed.

The internal politics of the Labour Party are likely to exert on Wilson gradual but constant pressure toward the right. Following the disorders in London when Queen Frederika arrived for the wedding of Princess Alexandra, a controversy ensued regarding the subsequent state visit of the Greek king and queen. When left wing MP's, who look at the Greek monarchy with a critical eye, urged Wilson to take a public stand on the matter, his response was that while foreign policy issues may lose elections in Britain, they do not win any.[7] He went on to say that the next election would be fought on domestic issues on which Labour's position was already established and which therefore did not require extensive debate or revision.[8] As Wilson becomes more

[7]Wilson's only overt concession to the Labour Left was his absence at the state dinner for King Paul and Queen Frederika. His position as Leader of the Opposition required his presence, but he failed to attend.

[8]Despite Wilson's well known views concerning his satisfaction with Labour's domestic policies, the Annual Conference of the Trade Union Congress on September 5, 1963, passed a resolution advocating nationalization of the road transport, aircraft, steel, shipbuilding and electrical engineering industries. The leaders of the TUC tried to smother the event by refusing to debate the resolution, there

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experienced in the role of Party Leader, he will increasingly rely on those members of his party whose support and restraint are consistent, and who do not ask him to engage in political adventurism. Already he has indicated that he is not the tool of persons whose anti-Establishment attitudes extend to the Labour Party leadership and whose political attitudes have a high emotional content.

Evidence to support the assertion that the PLP is controlled by the right and center can be derived by studying the nature of the Shadow Cabinet, which is composed of ten members elected by the PLP after the opening of Parliament in November. Only one member of the Shadow Cabinet, Fred Willey, can be described as belonging to the left wing, and even he is not an extreme supporter of it. Other members of the Shadow Cabinet may incline to the left on certain issues, but the overall character of the group is decidedly moderate. When the incumbent Shadow Cabinet was chosen in 1962, Callaghan led with 190 votes out of a possible 250, Wilson placed fifth, and Willey seventh.

Despite left wing sniping at the leadership, there is no discernible move to defy the party. In 1961 the whip was withdrawn from five members of the PLP who had refused to accept a party decision to abstain when defense estimates for the Air Force were voted in Commons. For some years it had been Labour policy not to oppose defense estimates, but because this particular item included funds for nuclear weapons, the five insisted on voting against it and were disciplined.[9] On May 31, 1963, the PLP with much deliberateness and over the misgivings of certain MP's, restored the whip to the five after the Labour Chief Whip, Herbert Bowden, indicated that he had secured from the disciplined members unqualified undertakings to abide by the PLP's standing orders. It is true that the five rebellious members had enjoyed both membership in Parliament and freedom from party discipline for a two-year period, but they were ultimately forced by mounting pressure from their constituencies to set things right, if not on their own terms then on terms satisfactory to the party.

being only one speaker in addition to the mover and seconder. This did not prevent Aims of Industry, a propaganda agency for a group of British industries, from immediately commenting upon and publicizing the TUC action, nor did it prevent *The Observer* of September 8 from quoting Conservative leaders to the effect that "Ted Hill [leader of the Boilermakers and a moving spirit behind the passage of the resolution] is the best Conservative we've got; he never lets us down."

[9]William Baxter, West Stirlingshire; S. O. Davies, Merthyr Tydfil; Emrys Hughes, South Ayrshire; Sydney Silverman, Nelson and Colne; Michael Foot, Ebbw Vale, were the five members.

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At least two of the five members had been told by their constituency organizations that the party stands above its members, even MP's, and that other candidates would be selected to stand for the General Election unless all difficulties with the PLP were previously resolved, and party discipline restored.

The left wing of the Labour Party is extremely vocal, but the extent of its influence in the PLP is limited. There are only a few MP's who feel that the present socialist leadership is weak and pallid, who urge a neutralist foreign policy for Britain, who insist that the death of Stalin wrought a change in the nature of communism and regularly criticize the trigger-happy Americans for persecuting the Soviets. The ability of such members to recruit others in the party varies with the specific issue.

For example, the following letter appeared in the London *Times* on November 20, 1962:

> Sir—If Russian missiles in Cuba were a threat to American cities (as we believe they were), then the U.S. missiles ringing the USSR are equally a threat to Soviet cities. This is the lesson that millions have learned from the terrifying events of the Cuban crisis.
>
> Now that Mr. Khrushchev has withdrawn his missiles, Mr. Kennedy should respond similarly. Unless the West makes some counter-concession, Mr. Khrushchev's present policies may be replaced by tougher ones.
>
> We in Britain should press the United Kingdom government to ask Mr. Kennedy to remove his Polaris and Thor Missile bases from our country immediately. These bases heighten world tension. They make it almost certain that the British people would be incinerated in the first hours of a world war.

This letter was signed by 41 MP's, but at least three names usually found on such communications were missing in this instance. On the other hand, 14 names appended to this letter are rarely or never affixed to similar appeals. It can accurately be said that the hard-core strength of the left in the PLP does not exceed 30 members, and that circumstances determine the amount of additional support. Even if the left wing could add the votes of five to ten MP's on any one issue, the strength of the left would be about 15% of the PLP, hardly enough to influence party leadership.

The months which have elapsed since Wilson was elected Party Leader have given the left little cause for jubilation. While it is true that Wilson was previously associated with the left, there is no valid reason for believing he was firmly committed to it. He is not a unilateralist, he holds no extreme views on public

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ownership, and he is not a doctrinaire socialist. Foremost in his mind is his desire to see Labour win the next election, and he obviously wants very much to be the next Prime Minister. He does not consider the Labour Party to be a debating society, setting its political course only after all differences of opinion within the Labour movement have been exhaustively explored. He is not a purist who stops to wonder whether the Labour Party is morally ready to assume power, nor is he sympathetic to those who raise this question. He is a skillful politician who is a worthy opponent for the flexible, responsive, somewhat opportunistic Conservative Party, and his chief problem will be to persuade the diverse elements of the Labour Party to follow him.

In the formidable task of keeping his party united, Wilson employs his political instincts to good purpose. After his election as Party Leader, Wilson reallocated Opposition Front Bench duties, adding from the left wing only Richard Crossman, who acts as Labour spokesman on scientific matters. To Patrick Gordon Walker, a moderate member and a close friend of Gaitskell, Wilson gave responsibility for Foreign Affairs. Another Gaitskell protégé, Denis Healey, was moved from Colonies to Defense, and an old associate of Wilson's on the Board of Trade, Arthur Bottomley, was assigned to Colonies. Significantly, Bottomley had not supported Wilson in the leadership struggle. An even more interesting appointment was that of Charles Pannell as Labour spokesman for Public Buildings and Works. Unpopular with the left for his uncompromising attacks on communism, Pannell had been Gaitskell's representative to Labour back-benchers in several party struggles in which Wilson was the antagonist.

Since he has become Party Leader, Wilson has repeatedly stressed that the policies he is now implementing were planned while he was working with the late Hugh Gaitskell. He has completely disengaged himself, to the extent that he was ever involved, from the unilateralists and neutralists in the party. His approval of continued British membership in NATO is unqualified. He opposes British efforts to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent and supports a Western deterrent only if the United States has a veto power. He favors enlarging the size and effectiveness of Britain's contribution to NATO forces, and urges a "series of carefully controlled and balanced reductions of armed forces, including withdrawals of foreign arms and forces from Central Europe." He supports German reunification by democratic means and the right of the people of West Berlin to live

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in a society of their own choosing, with freedom of access to and from the West, and the continued presence in Berlin of Western troops for "as long as their presence is needed as custodians of whatever agreement may emerge from future negotiations."[10] He strongly opposes the spread of nuclear weapons, particularly in regard to Germany, and in this he reflects the views of many Britons whatever their party allegiance.

His popularity is widespread in the constituencies. There may be members of the left wing who do not subscribe to all his policies, but Wilson has been able to avoid public criticism from his party. Within the constituencies there is far less restiveness than was apparent during the leadership of Gaitskell.

Another facet of Wilson's ability to lead the Labour Party was revealed early in May when the National Union of Railwaymen set a strike date in their dispute with Dr. Beeching's plan for railway closures. Wilson told the NUR that their problem was political, not industrial, and that it should be handled in the House of Commons instead of the picket line. The general opinion expressed in the British press, which does not frequently compliment Labour leaders, was that Wilson cut the Minister of Transport, Ernest Marples, to ribbons in the debate on the Beeching plan. Eventually, under considerable prodding from Wilson, the NUR negotiated with Beeching, and the strike was called off a number of days before it was scheduled. Having demonstrated an ability to work with the three major elements of his party, namely, the Parliamentary Labour Party, the Constituency Labour Parties and the Trade Unions, Wilson has now moved beyond the point where his old supporters on the left can make special claims on him. As far as Wilson is concerned, that chapter in his career is over. He is now head of the entire Labour Party, entitled to the respect of all but not the exclusive property of any segment of the party.

The National Executive Committee

The National Executive Committee (NEC) is more subject to left wing influence than is the PLP. This is due primarily to the fact that of the 28 NEC members, seven are elected by the Constituency Labour Parties (CLP), which as a group have a greater inclination toward the left than either the PLP or the Trade Unions. Ever since the Bevanite revolt of the 1950's, the seven members of the Constituency Section of the NEC have been

[10]*The Observer*, August 31, 1963.

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dominated by the left. This state of affairs has existed long enough to be taken for granted within the party, so that the situation is almost institutionalized and is considered to be based on fundamental justice of a sort. The Constituency Section members of the NEC are the only members in whose election the Trade Unions have no vote. Since the left wing of the Labour Party has existed from the earliest days of the movement, it is considered only fair for the left to have a degree of representation, ineffective as it may be, in high party councils.

Whatever the reason, James Callaghan was the only moderate candidate who came close to being elected in 1962 by the constituency parties to a place on the NEC. With the selection of Wilson as Party Leader, Callaghan, as the defeated candidate with the highest number of votes, took Wilson's vacated place as a constituency member on the NEC. When the Constituency Section of the NEC is joined on some issues by members like Jennie Lee of the Women's Section, the left can muster nearly one-third of the NEC vote. Even this, however, is less impressive than it sounds when confronted with the support for moderate policies coming from the 12 Trade Union members and the majority of members of the Women's Section.

During the past two years the NEC has incurred the displeasure of the left wing, chiefly because of certain activities of the 17-member Organization Sub-Committee, which until February 1963 had been chaired by George Brown. It is the invidious task of the Sub-Committee to enforce the Party Constitution, Rules and Standing Orders, and when necessary, to disaffiliate organizations and expel individuals. Under the leadership of George Brown the Sub-Committee did not shrink from its duties and its activities became controversial. Under the circumstances it was not difficult for the left to disseminate the idea that Sub-Committee decisions were only taken against persons on the left, that much acceptable activity and many acceptable persons were being proscribed, and that the Sub-Committee engaged in witch hunting. These charges were given credence when the Sub-Committee tried to expel Lord Russell—who, with Lady Wootton and Canon Collins, had acted as a British sponsor of a peace meeting held in Moscow the preceding summer—ostensibly because Lord Russell had failed to pay his annual six shillings party subscription. The Secretary of the Merioneth CLP where Lord Russell lives explained that no party worker in that sparsely populated area had called for the subscription and it had been overlooked, but that Lord

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Russell contributed much more than six shillings a year to his CLP. About the same time it became known that the NEC was planning to recommend to the Annual Conference an amendment to the Party Constitution which in effect would make it easier to proscribe individuals.

In addition to its heavy-handed action in the case of Lord Russell, the Sub-Committee took very seriously its responsibility of endorsing candidates chosen for Parliamentary elections. Many persons in the constituencies interpreted the directive that "the selection of Labour candidates for Parliamentary elections shall not be regarded as completed until the name of the person selected has been placed before a meeting of the NEC, and his or her selection has been duly endorsed" as requiring nothing more than *pro forma* approval by the NEC. When the NEC, acting on the recommendation of the Sub-Committee, refused to endorse two candidates chosen by the constituency parties, the refusal caused much dissension and resentment within the left wing.

The faction opposing the party leadership magnified the controversy, especially the issue of endorsement of Parliamentary candidates. With the help of the left-wing press the problem became an important issue. A total of 23 amendments to the Party Constitution was submitted to the Party Conference, proposing the establishment of an Appeals Tribunal to review disciplinary actions of the NEC, with the power to overrule NEC decisions. Most of the 23 amendments were designed to permit maximum influence from the left over the proposed Appeals Tribunal. Nine additional amendments were also submitted which in one way or another would have limited the power of the NEC to endorse Parliamentary candidates.

It is too soon to say whether the selection of Harold Wilson as Party Leader and the replacing of Brown by Ray Gunter as chairman of the Organization Sub-Committee will help to end this struggle, for the issue may be too fundamental and the controversy too acrimonious to be affected by a mere change of personnel. Moreover, up to the present the NEC has been able to count on the support of the Party Conference, and will probably not be inclined to alter its policies in this sensitive area.

The Party Conference

The 1962 Labour Party Conference differed in character from the two preceding annual meetings. The 1960 Conference which passed a resolution pledging the Labour Party to unilateral dis-

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armament, and the 1961 Conference which reversed this decision, were notable for their bitterness and their disruptive effect on the party. In contrast, the 1962 Conference was characterized by the theme of unity which pervaded its sessions. On some matters there was wide disagreement, but for the most part the 1962 Conference reaffirmed decisions taken by the PLP and the NEC.

The 1962 Conference made no significant changes in the Party Constitution. The age requirement for joining the party was reduced from 16 to 15 years. Additional Young Socialist delegates were admitted under certain conditions to the Conference, and all future Conference delegates were required to be individual members of the party, rather than holders of indirect membership through a Trade Union or affiliated group. The Conference defeated all other amendments to the Party Constitution, thus demonstrating confidence in the leadership exercised by the PLP and the NEC. Among the amendments rejected by the 1962 Conference were the following which would have:

1. made Conference decisions on policy matters binding on the PLP.
2. permitted all duly endorsed Parliamentary candidates to participate with the PLP in the election of Party Leader.
3. given to the Annual Conference the power to elect the Party Leader.
4. limited the power of the NEC in endorsing Parliamentary candidates.
5. required all MP's and paid party officials to declare their business connections for publication in the annual report of the NEC.
6. given Constituency Labour Parties equal representation with the Trade Unions on the NEC.
7. permitted the five MP's from whom the whip was removed to attend the Annual Conference as delegates from their divisions.

There were only two issues on which the party leadership was defeated or gave ground. The NEC, with George Brown moving the amendment, recommended that the Membership Clause of the Constitution be altered to read as follows:

> Individual members shall be persons of not less than 15 years of age who subscribe to the conditions of membership, provided they are not members of *or associated with* political parties or organizations ancillary or subsidiary thereto declared . . . to be ineligible for affiliation to the Party.

This amendment was opposed by some in the party because of the loose interpretation permitted by the phrase "associated with." Many party members who freely admit the problem of infiltration by persons wishing to use the Labour Party as a vehicle to advance ends to which the party is opposed, are fiercely proud of the Labour movement's tradition of open discussion and diverse

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opinion. They wish to retain an atmosphere of freedom within the party, despite the possibility that the image of the party may become blurred in the process. Then, of course, there are those in the party at whom the amendment was aimed, and who could hardly be expected to support it.

The amendment as such was never voted upon. Since debates on amendments to the Constitution take place in executive session, the proceedings are private and must be pieced together from the verbal accounts of those present. These sources stated that as soon as George Brown presented the amendment, another delegate moved "Next business." Wilson, who was chairman of the Conference, refused to accept the motion until some debate on the amendment had been heard. Discussion on the issue was bound to be heated, and after Charles Pannell, noted for his anti-left sentiments and his sharp tongue, raised an already high temperature by invidious remarks about those opposing the amendment, the proposal to move on to further business was again offered. This time Wilson accepted the motion. It was then passed by a vote of 3.5 million to 2.8, roughly a 56-44% division which indicated remarkably strong support for the NEC amendment.

The point on which the NEC seemed to give ground to left-wing pressure related to proposals which called for establishing a committee or tribunal for hearing appeals from disciplinary actions by the NEC. Special significance was attached to this group of proposals because some of them were advanced by constituency parties which had actually elected Labour MP's; the large borough parties of Sheffield and Liverpool were among the petitioners; and a large number (21) of amendments had been offered on this issue. The NEC gave assurances that it would examine every suggestion in the proposed amendments concerning party machinery for dealing with disciplinary matters, and that a report on the entire question would be made at the 1963 Conference—but no guarantees were given that changes would be recommended.[11]

[11]In July 1963, the NEC by a 15 to 9 vote rejected the proposal for the establishment of an Appeals Tribunal. Not unexpectedly, the proponents of the defeated proposal were led by Anthony Greenwood, Barbara Castle and Tom Driberg. The NEC argued that the problem was not sufficiently extensive, in that in the last ten years only two people had been expelled by the NEC, and that about 50 people lost their party membership as a result of the reorganization of three local parties following their capture by Trotskyites. Other than these instances, the NEC itself had acted as an appeals court for 18 people expelled by constituency parties. In view of this action, the NEC will officially recommend to the 1963 Annual Conference that no action on the establishment of an Appeals Tribunal be taken.

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Although the left wing of the Labour Party was not prominent in the conduct of the formal Conference, it assumed a major role in the informal "conference" on the edges of the main meeting. Each year, during the week the Conference is in session, a number of organizations representing many shades of viewpoint within the party hold special meetings. Depending upon the political slant of these meetings, the views expressed are visibly to the left or to the right; although it is interesting to note that the speakers' platform at the pro- and anti-Common Market meetings normally represent a political mosaic.

In 1962, the informal conference began a day earlier than the Party Conference, and continued for four hours after the Conference had adjourned for the day. More than half of the informal meetings were sponsored by the left wing, which therefore had many opportunities to present its case. Persons attending the Conference who like their politics strong, and who enjoy lively performances, need go no further than the meetings held by the left wing, but the real power of the Labour Party is far removed from these sideshows. Many veteran members at the 1962 Conference, speaking more in sorrow than in satisfaction, declared that the vigor of the Labour Left was steadily diminishing. The only meeting held by the left wing which was attended by a large and enthusiastic audience was the one sponsored by the *Tribune* at which its editor, Michael Foot, spoke. The size and temper of the crowd were not unexpected, for Michael Foot is a virtuoso in whipping up emotion.

The Constituency Labour Parties

On the basis of impressionistic evidence many British political observers agreed until recently that extremism typified the attitudes of the Constituency Labour Parties. Research of a more thorough nature undertaken in this area in the last few years suggests that the extent of left-wing influence in the constituencies has been overestimated. According to recent studies, there is as broad a spectrum in the political attitudes within the constituency parties as there is in the PLP and in the Trade Unions.[12] If this is so, an explanation of the predominance of left-wing Labourites as constituency members of the NEC is in order.

One factor operating in favor of left-wing Labourites is the

[12]Richard Rose, "The Political Ideas of English Party Activists," *American Political Science Review,* June 1962.

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tendency of constituency parties to vote for incumbents. Conference delegates are usually mandated by their constituency party and are allowed little discretion on which candidates to support for the NEC. Since the names of the incumbents are already well known, there is a tendency for even moderate constituencies to vote for left-wing incumbents. One constituency delegate explained the inconsistency between her mandate on NEC choices and the moderate political attitudes of her constituency by stating that the preponderance of moderates and right-wing members on the NEC needed restraint on some points and goading on others, and that the seven left-wing constituency members on the NEC served this purpose. Another reason for the popularity of left-wing members of the NEC is that they are usually available for speaking engagements in the constituencies. Since they are extremely able as speakers, they are likely to attract a large crowd and national press coverage, both of which are dear to the hearts of constituency party leaders.

The Constituency Labour Parties may be suspected of political extremism simply because the views of some are presumed to be the views of all. A majority of resolutions dealing with party organization and administration sent to Transport House for consideration at the 1962 Conference aimed at fundamental changes in the Labour Party and even in the British Constitution. How else can one interpret a proposal that the Labour Party Leader should be elected by the entire Party Conference, or the proposal that policy decisions made by the Conference must be considered binding on members of the PLP? Since such resolutions are patently opposed to Labour leadership, they attract considerable attention and tend to overshadow moderate sentiment. However, party leaders and experienced political analysts were aware that 60% of these anti-leadership resolutions originated in constituencies which polled less than 40% of the vote for the two major parties in the last General Election, and evaluated them accordingly.

It is highly probable that a majority of the constituency parties voted with the left on two issues at the 1962 Conference. The first of these was the aforementioned NEC proposal to add the phrase "associated with" to the membership clause of the Party Constitution. This action did not imply a broad endorsement of left-wing views, for many members voted to move to the next piece of business because they felt that Labour's reputation for

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allowing personal freedom was more important than increasing the proscriptive powers of the NEC.

At the 1962 Conference the left wing was nearly successful in passing a resolution which would have required the NEC to restore to the party program the principle of municipalization of rented property. Even though Anthony Greenwood, one of the leaders of the Labour Left, concluded the debate on housing and asked for the rejection of this proposal, it was defeated by only 40,000 out of over six million votes cast. Obviously, a number of the large unions must have voted for the measure, along with the left-wing constituencies and a good share of the moderate ones. Lack of proper housing is one of the most urgent social problems in Britain today, and the vote may have expressed resentment against landlords in general, many of whom are linked in the public mind to the Conservative Party.

Although the amount of left-wing activity in the constituencies has been exaggerated in the past, it was undeniably prevalent during the 1950's. During the 1960's, however, even at the height of the unilateralist controversy, most of the constituency parties sided with Gaitskell on this foreign policy issue[13] and on other questions. A contribution to the growing recognition of moderation in the constituencies has been made during the last three years by the Campaign for Democratic Socialism. Organized in 1960 shortly before the Scarborough Conference which voted in favor of unilateral disarmament, CDS assumed the organizational task of reversing this decision, which was done a year later at Blackpool. One of the major features of the campaign of CDS was the dissemination of propaganda literature supporting moderate policies. For the first time, the *Tribune* and the *New Statesman* had to compete with journals representing dogmatic views. Furthermore, the election of Harold Wilson as Leader reduced, at least temporarily, the pressures on NEC and PLP from the constituencies. In view of the moderate course Wilson is pursuing, the tranquility may not endure; but at the moment there is agreement that his administration of Labour policies is more consonant with constituency sentiment that was Hugh Gaitskell's. This may be due to Gaitskell's interpretation of left-of-center in the context of British politics, as opposed to Wilson's application of the term

[13]Keith Hindell and Philip Williams, "Scarborough and Blackpool: An Analysis of Some Votes at the Labour Party Conferences in 1960 and 1961," *Political Quarterly*, July-September 1962, pp. 306-320.

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only within the Labour Party. The latter is a more popular view in the constituencies, including the moderate ones.

Conclusions

Unlikely as it now appears, the Conservative Party might win the next General Election. The odds favor Labour, but the Tories have gained such a huge advantage with four successive victories that Labour may not be able to recapture all its lost ground at one time. If the Conservatives win, they will certainly do so with a substantially reduced margin in the House of Commons, and there is a possibility that the election results will give neither party a working majority. There is little chance of the Liberals winning enough seats in Commons to give them the balance of power, but extensive interventions by the Liberals in marginal constituencies could make the difference between a Labour victory and a Labour defeat.

A victory by Labour would not mean a drastic or fundamental change in British foreign and domestic policies. While specific differences with the United States in foreign policy would remain, continued British membership in NATO and an increase in the effectiveness of the British Army on the Rhine could be expected. Britain will persist in her efforts to maintain a close relationship with the United States and to effect an understanding between the USSR and the United States which could lead to a relaxation of Cold War tensions. Political support for these policies is to be found in the Parliamentary Labour Party, in the National Executive Committee, in the Party Conference and in the Constituency Labour Parties. The historic divisions between those in the Labour Party who want it to be socialist and those who want it to be socialistic, i.e., less doctrinaire, will continue as in the past, but the effort made by Hugh Gaitskell to develop a Labour policy relevant to the 1960's has in the main been successful. It is ironic that the administration of these policies by another man should mend the last rifts in the Labour Party and present a strong, unified, credible alternative to the present Conservative government.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AFTER KHRUSHCHEV AND MAO*

by John R. Thomas

THE current Sino-Soviet conflict bears the unmistakable imprint of the two leaders—Khrushchev and Mao—under whose regimes it developed. It is, in part, because of their policies and outlook that the conflict exists at all. In view of this, one cannot help asking what impact the death or the physical incapacity or the political removal of either of these two leaders will have upon Sino-Soviet relations. Would it radically alter these relations?

The recent past suggests that such an event could drastically alter the ties between the two giants of the communist world. Stalin's death helped to bring on the current Sino-Soviet ideological imbroglio by unleashing polycentric tendencies within the communist world. A similarly abrupt change in either the Chinese or Soviet leadership could end the seeming impasse in current Sino-Soviet relations, which is characterized by neither war nor peace. The elimination of either of the two contending leaders would provide the survivor with abundant opportunities for reshaping intrabloc relations as well as perhaps even the foreign policy of the other state.

These opportunities could occur in the early future, certainly by the time the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) acquires a significant nuclear capability, since both Khrushchev and Mao (men in their late sixties) are known to suffer from ailments likely to shorten their lives or severely impair their capacity to rule.[1]

I

It is not suggested, however, that attempts to subvert the other camp lie wholly in the future. Indeed, the Soviets have already accused the CPR of interfering in internal Soviet politics.[2]

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and should not be interpreted as reflecting the official opinion or policy of the Institute for Defense Analyses or of any department or agency of the U.S. government.

[1]Khrushchev himself raised this possibility earlier this year when he reminded the Soviet people that he will not be at the helm forever. *Pravda,* April 26, 1963.

[2]They have charged the Chinese with calling for the overthrow of the current "modern revisionist" Soviet leadership. See *Problemy Mira I Sotsialisma,* No. 2, 1963, p. 2.

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Similarly, the removal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai in 1959 was apparently connected with Soviet efforts to capitalize on his disillusionment with Mao's policies.[3] The subversive efforts represented by these isolated incidents are likely to be stepped up.

On the Soviet side, these efforts may be directed initially at the Chinese military leaders. The Chinese military presumably have greater awareness of the consequences of a nuclear conflict with the U.S. and hence might be expected to feel increased disquiet over the riskier policies Chinese political leaders might pursue in an effort to demonstrate "success." The military profession in many countries has displayed some universal features which have troubled political leaderships in the past. In their zeal to carry out their primary function of protecting the homeland, the military share a common bond of great conservatism. In the totalitarian countries, this conservatism is reflected by wariness of those policies of the political leadership which risk placing the nation in situations beyond the capabilities of the military to repair should developments deteriorate to a point of war. The Soviet military have traditionally displayed this conservatism; they have demonstrated it all the more starkly in the nuclear age.[4] It is conceivable that the CPR military might similarly be affected as they become sobered by firsthand experience with nuclear reality.

Should the CPR political leadership ignore this reality and engage in risky ventures, such as an attempt to seize the offshore islands or Taiwan, particularly without Soviet support or in the face of Soviet opposition, the CPR military leaders might become more receptive to Soviet overtures. Indeed, there is some indication that past ventures carried out without Soviet backing have already aroused the opposition of the CPR military. Thus, Su Yu

[3]See David A. Charles' description of the contact between P'eng and Khrushchev in 1959 in *The China Quarterly,* October-December 1961.

[4]There is some evidence to suggest that the Soviet military have on occasion been less than enthusiastic about Khrushchev's dissipation of Soviet prestige by threats to act in areas in which Soviet power cannot effectively be brought to bear, e.g. Africa, Cuba or even the Middle East. Obviously, any massive Soviet military action to carry out the threats could trigger nuclear devastation of the Soviet homeland. Thus, Marshal Zhukov was sacked in October 1957 as Defense Minister for, among other reasons, advocating an "adventurist" foreign policy. In the context of the times, this referred to the Syrian crisis which had seen Soviet caution induced by a U.S. warning that Soviet territory would not remain inviolate if the Soviet Union acted on its threats against Turkey. This was the first such explicit warning issued by the U.S. in the nuclear age and may have caused wide consternation in Soviet military ranks. Since Khrushchev was making foreign policy, it can be assumed he was responsible for exacerbating a situation which apparently had created apprehension among the Soviet military but for which Khrushchev blamed Zhukov.

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was removed as Chief of Staff during the 1958 Quemoy crisis, which saw the CPR ignobly humiliated by the U.S. Su Yu apparently was unenthusiastic about undertaking the probe against Soviet opposition since this left the CPR no choice but to back down when it was confronted by U.S. firmness.[5] Subsequently, other Chinese military leaders evidently became disturbed by Mao's policies insofar as these alienated Soviet support needed by the CPR as a deterrent against the U.S.[6] Even now, there may be some connection between the CPR's reassertion of party rule over the army, promulgated in the spring of 1963, and possible uneasiness of the military about current and projected policy. The political leadership's plans for another Indian border incursion or an offshore islands probe, for instance, would undoubtedly make the CPR military apprehensive since they might be asked to implement risky policies without adequate deterrence against the U.S. provided either by a full Soviet backing or by the CPR's own massive nuclear-missile arsenal (a capability decades away).

Since many Chinese military leaders received their training at Soviet military academies or have had extensive dealings with the Soviet armed forces,[7] it is not implausible that they might engage in some form of collaboration with their Soviet counterparts to mitigate or head off risky policies pursued by the CPR political leadership. Such a development would resemble the situation in the late twenties and early thirties involving Soviet and German military leaders. The two latter groups then were associated in a mutually beneficial arrangement: barred by the Versailles Treaty from developing a war machine, the Germans obtained an agreement to develop and test new military equipment on Soviet soil in return for exposing the Soviets to the latest German military thinking and technological innovation.

[5]For a description of Soviet caution during the crisis which contributed to the CPR's humiliation, see the author's "Soviet Behavior in the Quemoy Crisis of 1958," ORBIS, Spring 1962. For demotion of Su Yu on account of his possible opposition to carrying out the probe without full Soviet backing, see Alice Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962).

[6]On this score, reference has already been made to Marshal P'eng Teh-huai's removal in 1959. Other changes in the Chinese military leadership, which occurred at the same time, may have been connected with P'eng's purge.

[7]Among the CPR military who received training or had close contact with Soviet counterparts are such leading figures as Su Yu and Lin Piao, currently the CPR's Defense Minister. Additionally, many junior Chinese officers likely to occupy top posts in the future have either studied at Soviet military academies or have had extensive contact with the Soviets. (The author saw a significant number of these officers on Moscow streets during his service with the U.S. Exhibition in the summer of 1959. Their number far exceeded the military attaché requirements of the CPR's embassy in Moscow.)

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It is possible that there was a subsequent meeting of minds between the Soviet and the German military on the idea that each was saddled with a political leadership which was damaging the interests of its country. This may even have resulted in groping efforts to find a common basis for mitigating the excesses of Hitler's and Stalin's policies, thus accounting in some part for the purges of the Soviet and German military commands in 1937-38.[8]

Difficult as it may be to believe that such politically opposed groups as the German and Soviet military should have collaborated, even tacitly, this is not the case regarding the collaboration of Chinese and Soviet military elites. Since they share a common ideology and have had many contacts on a military level, their recognition that U.S. power is the main military threat to their respective homelands could obviously lead them to some understanding in the interest of avoiding certain risks.

The Soviet military may already be trying to reach their Chinese counterparts through the nuclear "education" campaign conducted to date. This campaign has pointedly stressed the vulnerabilities of even a large country like China to a nuclear-missile attack, the impossibility of such a country winning a future war if it does not possess nuclear-missile capabilities, and its inability to substitute human masses for modern arms. (The last point is an obvious refutation of Chinese claims that man is superior to weapons; Marshal Chen Yi, CPR Foreign Minister, as recently as last year reiterated that in the Korean War China fought the U.S. to a standstill despite American technological superiority.) Since the Soviet campaign was initiated after Sino-Soviet differences rose to the surface at the Twenty-second Party Congress in October 1961, there is little doubt that it has been directed at the CPR. Moreover, the campaign has described "basic facts of nuclear life" which have long been familiar to the U.S. and Soviet military audiences. Given the CPR's nuclear back-

[8]Some German military leaders apparently opposed Hitler's anti-Bolshevik policy since it violated the Bismarck-Von Seeckt precept against German-Russian conflict which could only benefit the other Western powers. They took as confirmation of this precept the outcome of World War I which saw Russia and Germany suffer the greatest disability of the major powers. Soviet military leaders like Marshal Tukhachevsky, at the same time, apparently sought assurance from their German counterparts that Germany would not capitalize on Soviet weakness which might result from internal Soviet efforts to soften Stalin's harsh policies. For a description of the "understanding" between the German and Soviet military, see John Ericson, *The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962), p. 411 ff. and F. L. Carsten, "The Reichswehr and The Red Army, 1920-33," *Survey,* October 1962.

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wardness, it must, therefore, be tailored to a less sophisticated audience such as the CPR military. Finally, since this campaign has been conducted in the Soviet professional military journals rather than the popular Soviet press, it is more likely to have been aimed at the Chinese military than at the Soviet masses.[9]

II

It is unlikely that the Chinese leadership, if it should continue to advocate policies entailing high risks for the Soviet Union, would have similar opportunities to meddle in Soviet politics.

Even the so-called hard-line Molotovites have not evinced any sympathy for the Chinese insofar as the latter advocate policies that would expose the Soviet Union to the risk of nuclear destruction. On this point Molotov is as conservative as Khrushchev, since he learned his lesson from the same mentor.[10] To the extent that any policy advocated by the CPR would increase the risk to the USSR, Molotov and his adherents would oppose it as much as Khrushchev. Therefore, there is no one in the Soviet elite today to whom the CPR could appeal with policies that would pose greater risks for the Soviet state. Furthermore, any Soviet leader who let his actions be influenced by the Chinese would incur opprobrium as a foreign agent and traitor to the Soviet Union, thereby losing political influence and prestige in Soviet ruling circles, if not his life.

Nuclear developments have increasingly made it possible for Soviet contenders for power to use charges of recklessly exposing the Soviet Union to nuclear destruction in order to beat down the opposition. This was not politically possible in earlier days

[9]The Chinese military undoubtedly read Soviet military pronouncements with great care. It is reported that Soviet military magazines and publications were withdrawn from Chinese army clubs and mess halls in 1961. (See Richard Hughes, "Red Army Out of Step," *New Republic,* September 17, 1962, pp. 9-11.) Nevertheless, it is probable that the upper echelon of the Chinese military leadership continues to have access to Soviet military views as a means of keeping up to date on military developments abroad. In this connection, the Soviet military have explicitly advised the Chinese military that the Chinese press is denying them the truth about the consequences of nuclear war. (See *Red Star,* September 14, 1963.)

[10]Stalin rarely, if ever, indulged in a foreign adventure that risked exposing the Soviet Union to destruction. Molotov is undoubtedly more fundamentalist in his beliefs and hence is opposed to Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence policy insofar as it increases East-West contacts. In Molotov's view, these contacts break down the spartan discipline required, in view of limited Soviet resources, to achieve Soviet objectives. He and his followers therefore probably agree with the CPR that communist orthodoxy should be preserved and that revisionists like Tito should be kept at arm's length. This does not mean, however, that Molotov or his adherents would expose the Soviet Union to an adventurous foreign policy which might result in its nuclear destruction.

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when a display of nuclear heroism was needed to win or retain the reins. Thus, in 1954, Malenkov declared that nuclear war would mean world destruction. Khrushchev then charged Malenkov with being defeatist and proclaimed instead that only the capitalist world would be destroyed in a nuclear war. But after toppling Malenkov from power, Khrushchev had to backtrack; he has since charged Molotov and his adherents with reckless willingness to expose the Soviet Union to nuclear devastation. The CPR in turn is now chiding Khrushchev for retreating from his position in the mid-fifties and is charging him with the defeatism that Khrushchev attributed to Malenkov. However, given the development of destructive weaponry like the 50 and 100 megaton bombs, it is doubtful that any future Soviet contender for power will be able to use his fearlessness of the consequences of nuclear war as a political tool for mustering internal Soviet support.[11]

Khrushchev's successor will probably come from the ranks of a new generation which has no direct links with the revolutionary days of 1917 and whose ideological drive to expand communism may therefore be tempered by the pragmatism and the sharp concern for national survival already displayed by Khrushchev. While he may not eschew the political use of force, e.g. exerting pressure by nuclear threats, it is improbable that he will be more disposed than Khrushchev to confront the U.S. with a massive overt challenge in a world environment characterized by rough nuclear parity—especially an environment rendered more complicated, if not more dangerous, by the CPR's nuclear capabilities. Hence, a possible CPR "hard line" would have even less appeal in the Soviet Union in the future than now, when Molotov or his adherents may still be receptive to a more militant ideological line but not to a policy of Soviet brinksmanship. This is likely to place limits on possible future meddling in Soviet politics by the Chinese.

The CPR's opportunity for intervention is likely to be limited by other factors also. Khrushchev is a transitional figure. He is not one of the makers of the Revolution like Stalin, or like

[11]A Soviet military spokesman claims the Soviet Union has 100 megaton weapons in its arsenal. (Marshal of Armored Forces, M. Katukov, *Kommunist Vooruzhenykh Sil*, No. 8, April 1962, p. 24.) However, Khrushchev has openly conceded that such multi-megaton weapons would present a fearful threat even to those who use them. As he put it, ". . . for many people the question of socialism would be eliminated altogether because they would have disappeared bodily from the face of the earth." *Pravda*, January 17, 1963.

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his younger comrades, Mikoyan or Kaganovich; hence he is truly a product of the people plucked from the masses by the Revolution. His formative years were spent in the intensely ideological atmosphere of the 1920's. Though not an intellectual Marxist, his behavior reflects that ideology's firm print. It is unlikely that Khrushchev, given his ideological commitment, can concede that Soviet and world communist interests will ever diverge, and that "what is good for world communism" may not always be good for the USSR.

The difficulties Khrushchev has experienced with China have not led him to any drastic re-evaluation of the ideology of Soviet foreign policy. Nevertheless, he has led the struggle against the Chinese *within* the communist bloc, using until recently subterfuges like the vehement attack against the Albanians to mask the intensity of the split between the two communist powers. It is unlikely that Stalin, with his ingrained despotism, would have tolerated the emergence of "polycentrism" within the communist world. He did not do so in the case of Tito. It is at least doubtful that a future leader of Soviet communism will display an equal degree of what has really been the remarkable patience of the current Soviet leadership with Chinese behavior and pretensions. Khrushchev's attitude toward China may be, of all Soviet leaders, the most conciliatory—not because of any special tenderness for his Oriental colleagues, but simply because of his awareness of the need for at least outward solidarity of the communist bloc. Khrushchev, it seems, believes the best way to advance the communist cause is to project an image of communism that is bound by History to win the world. In his view, a split in the communist movement would severely mar this image and impair the chances of such a victory.

III

To assess the impact that a change in Soviet leadership might have on Sino-Soviet relations, note should be taken of the various tendencies of Soviet foreign policy in the recent past. The main direction is quite self-evident: the attempt to push the West out of Berlin, to weaken and destroy NATO and to forestall West European unity. This policy with Berlin as the pivot was initiated by Khrushchev about four years ago. It is conceivable that in its inception it represented a strategy agreed upon by the Chinese, in that the Chinese promised to postpone their more vigorous pressure for Taiwan until the Berlin-East German issue was

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resolved, receiving in return a Soviet pledge of subsequent support for the CPR's objectives. Such a strategy would imply that a primary objective of Peking is to keep up a state of tension between the USSR and the U.S. and to prevent even a temporary accommodation between the two sides.

The second strain, less pronounced but clearly visible in Soviet foreign policy, has been an attempt to accomplish the above objectives not so much by forcing a U.S. withdrawal as by creating favorable soil for neutralism in Europe. This was the logic behind the unsigned memorandum to West Germany of December 1961, which in effect asked the Federal Republic to repudiate its alliances. This traditional diplomatic gambit, which antedates the Soviet regime, was part of an intermittent Soviet attempt to frighten or to cajole the European nations into the realization that good relations with the USSR are more important to them than all the American guarantees and bases. This aim is pursued by the USSR as a second line of attack behind the direct pressure on the U.S. to abandon its positions in Europe.

The third line, different in character from the preceding two techniques (which are really mutually complementary), is the notion of seeking a direct understanding with the U.S. No one would argue that the Soviet Union is on the verge of reaching a basic agreement with the U.S. or that it is about to suggest to the U.S. a division of the world into spheres of influence. But from time to time the U.S. receives hints about a possible understanding. In the midst of vilifying U.S. policies at the Twenty-second Party Congress, Gromyko injected such a hint by declaring that no other power (presumably including the CPR) would dare or be able to disturb the peace if the U.S. and the USSR reached an understanding. This may have been cajolery to offset some of the brutal threats voiced by Khrushchev and Malinovsky, but the fact that it was declared at all, and in the knowledge that it would further aggravate the morbid sensitivity of the Chinese on the subject, suggests that it is not inconceivable as a future Soviet diplomatic gambit or even a policy. Gromyko's statement may not be comparable to Stalin's famous hint of March 1939 about not pulling the West's "chestnuts out of the fire." Interjected in the midst of Soviet denunciation of the Nazi menace, Stalin's refusal to make common cause with the Allies was a prelude to Nazi-Soviet negotiations. Nevertheless, Gromyko's remark certainly could evoke memories of Soviet history which has witnessed

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the Soviets making a deal with a noncommunist power previously labeled as a deadly enemy.[12]

How will the problem of succession affect Soviet-Chinese relations and the three lines in Soviet foreign policy noted above? If previous parallels have any validity, then the experience of the years 1923-1925 and 1953-1957 shows that a Soviet dictator is unable to nominate his successor. More important to the U.S., the two periods strongly suggest that in the struggle for succession the protagonists are often constrained to promise (and sometimes to grant) internal concessions and to work for some international relaxation. The Berlin gambit, for example, was initiated only after Khrushchev had triumphed decisively over his rivals both in the party and the army. The parallels may be misleading, especially in view of the tremendous increase of Soviet military strength and international standing even since 1953; they are, nevertheless, instructive as an indication of how earlier epochs of Soviet reasonableness might be repeated.

Will the personalities involved make much difference? Soviet policies today would probably have been nearly the same, in substance (but not in method), had someone other than Khrushchev achieved the supreme power. But personalities are likely to be more significant in the next regime. There will be not only a new leader or a committee of leaders, but a new generation as well. Some of the maneuverings for the succession may already be taking place. The reputed choice of Khrushchev until recently was Kozlov, although the latter's second heart attack in April may have put him out of the running. In any case, Kozlov or others at his level such as Suslov, while not of the revolutionary generation of Khrushchev, Mikoyan and Kaganovich, held fairly high offices under Stalin and are not as free of the stigma of Stalinism as are the younger members of the hierarchy like Polyanski, Shelepin and some others. The continuing denunciations of Stalinism may be the preliminaries of the struggle between two generations of leaders: those who began their political climb under Stalin, and those whose significance dates from the post-1953 period.

Whatever group or person prevails, the chances are that the next generation of Soviet leaders will be less concerned with international communism per se, and more zealous in promoting

[12]For a detailed examination of the implications of the Twenty-second Party Congress for Sino-Soviet relations, see Adam B. Ulam, *The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 179-217.

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the Soviet Union's national interest. This possibility does not necessarily imply a more peaceful policy on the part of the USSR. The new leaders brought up in the period of the Soviet Union's brilliant successes and expansion may well be more reckless in their plans and ambitions than their predecessors. It is unlikely also that they would be more "liberal," except, as suggested above, in a sense that is incidental to the struggle for power and makes all the contenders don the masks of "socialist legality," "consumers' interest," and the like. It is perhaps conceivable that Khrushchev's successors might decide that the neutralization of U.S. power is their first order of business *after* which they would solve the problem of China. But on the whole, the probability is greater that Sino-Soviet relations over a longer period of time will deteriorate, that the next group of leaders will be less willing than Khrushchev to extend *any help* at all to their (potentially) most powerful and aggressive competitor, and that open hostility will sooner or later split the communist camp and thus transform the whole nature of international alignments.

IV

Red China's foreign policy may contribute to such a deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations in the near future. This is probable because the CPR's current policy is based on the promotion of its national and revolutionary interests not only at U.S. but also at Soviet expense, particularly in Asia and other underdeveloped areas. The difference between Soviet and Chinese aggrandizement methods is also likely to be a contributing factor to a Sino-Soviet impasse. The Soviet Union today is a world-wide power. By virtue of its power growth and material involvement in situations around the world, from the Congo to Cuba, it has increased the danger to itself that any Soviet involvement—in even the smallest imbroglio in a far-off corner of the globe—could lead to a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Ironically, its growing might has made it even more imperative that the Soviet Union exercise greater caution in promoting the communist cause. By contrast, the CPR is still a regional power with little material capability as yet to intervene in distant turmoils. Consequently, the CPR has not been under the U.S. nuclear gun. This has given China greater freedom to advocate less responsible courses of action.

The CPR stands to lose this freedom to behave less responsibly as it acquires greater power and is recognized as a growing menace deserving the attention now focused on Soviet actions.

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In the interim, Chinese "hard-liners" may be misled by the CPR's seemingly greater freedom of action into risky probes of U.S. will and intentions. The CPR's nuclear acquisition might add impetus to the hard-liners' advocacy of even less reliance on the cautious Soviets, whose revolutionary zeal has been damped by the specter of a nuclear holocaust.

In such a situation, a nuclear-armed CPR, intent on pursuing risky policies which might place the Soviet national existence in jeopardy, might well precipitate a final rupture between the Soviets and the Chinese, thus shattering their coordinated drive against the West. Such a development might convert the current East-West confrontation into an uneasy stalemate among all the major nuclear powers—a stalemate marked by open Soviet-Chinese rivalry. This could produce a new alignment, the shape of which would be difficult to predict at this point.

All that can be said with certainty is that the ideological erosion in the bloc will continue, as advancing technology renders aggressive pursuit of the communist cause around the world even more dangerous. This danger might not, however, be universally, or at least uniformly, recognized in the communist world. A backward China challenging the policy of the more advanced Soviet Union even now epitomizes the workings of antagonistic contradictions which Lenin postulated for the capitalist world and to which the socialist world was supposed to be immune. (In this sense, it is ironic that Lenin's view of history, which based the predicted disintegration of the capitalist world on the uneven development of its parts, better fits the communist world.) China's acquisition of nuclear weapons may well speed the disruption of the socialist world. Thus, the communist power most loudly proclaiming its devotion to winning the world for the proletariat would destroy precisely that prerequisite—bloc unity—needed for such a victory.

However, before a Chinese hard-line policy ran its course and led to the drastic consequences noted, it might engender internal opposition. Mao's policies are being questioned inside China even now.[13] Any future risky moves by a nuclear-armed China might evoke even greater opposition from the Chinese "soft-liners"—leaders whose appreciation of the nuclear danger may cause them to question moves that would risk the CPR's national survival as well as bloc unity. Their voices might be raised in a

[13]The May-June 1963 issue of *Problems of Communism* contains a discussion of the current domestic opposition.

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succession struggle that could follow Mao's death. It is currently assumed that Mao's immediate successor will be Liu Shao-chi. His chances for accession to power may not, however, survive Mao's death, just as Malenkov failed to secure a hold on Soviet power levers despite Stalin's seeming designation of Malenkov as his heir apparent. But, even if Liu prevailed, his rule, given his advanced age, would in all likelihood prove short-lived. This, then, would only postpone a power struggle in China, in which the soft-liners would be one of the contending parties. In that event, the Soviets might have a chance to influence the outcome of the struggle by backing the soft-liners.

V

To summarize, Sino-Soviet relations could be drastically affected by a change in the current Soviet and Chinese leadership. These relations may be shaped by the basic difference in the nature of the succession struggle in each camp. Since no rival for power in the Soviet Union is likely to advocate policies entailing greater risks to Soviet national survival, the succession struggle there, in terms of foreign policy considerations, will probably be one essentially of personalities. By contrast, the CPR's succession struggle is likely to involve basic foreign policy differences as well as personalities.

This political asymmetry would give the Soviets an opportunity to meddle in Chinese internal politics while barring the Chinese from a similar opportunity. Soviet opportunities for exploiting differences in Chinese ranks would be enhanced by the failure of the Chinese hard-liners to demonstrate success over the next decade in terms either of direct CPR victories or the seizure of power by national liberation movements instigated and supported by the Chinese. Moreover, their problem would be compounded if their failure on either count were clearly due to U.S. action. Thus, the U.S. can weaken the hard-liners' hand in an internal struggle by forcefully resisting any direct challenge, whether over Taiwan, the offshore islands, or elsewhere in Southeast Asia.[14] If the U.S. stymied the Chinese after they acquired nuclear arms, it would demonstrate pointedly that these weapons had produced no greater direct gains for the CPR than they did for the Soviets. Moreover, the United States would thereby underscore

[14]At the same time, firm U.S. action in meeting any communist challenge would also help influence any internal Soviet struggle over hard vs. soft policy toward the U.S. if that should arise as an issue in Soviet politics.

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that the CPR's chances of successfully blackmailing the U.S. into concessions were even smaller than those of the Soviets. The CPR could not hope to succeed when the Soviets failed with a much more powerful nuclear arsenal than the CPR would have for some time to come. At the same time, if Chinese-backed national liberation movements had failed to seize power and U.S. military capabilities had deterred overt CPR intervention, then it would be evident that the Chinese policy had been as barren as the Soviet policy which the CPR had been attacking.[15]

Faced by lack of tangible success, the Chinese would then either have to accept failure or step up risk-taking in order to make gains. The latter course might engender opposition from those Chinese leaders who by then would better appreciate nuclear reality.[16] Moreover, such internal opposition might be further stimulated by an increasingly inescapable conclusion that the CPR's objectives could not be won without Soviet support, which the CPR should solicit at any cost. This, combined with Chinese reverses, could lead to the CPR's reconciliation with Soviet-style peaceful coexistence as the most active policy that can be carried on with safety by the communists in a nuclear world.

The United States will play a key role in determining whether a new Soviet and Chinese leadership reach such a consensus. Firm U.S. reaction to a Chinese challenge today will help Khrushchev to maintain his argument that the U.S. is not only not a paper tiger but, on the contrary, a very real "beast" with dangerous nuclear teeth which it will use if provoked. In addition, it could enable his successor, who is likely to maintain the Khrushchev line, to gain the eventual triumph in the current debate with the Chinese communist leadership.

[15]Chinese failure would be evident even if some of the third areas were still in turmoil because of Chinese-instigated subversion. In fact, continuing violence might alienate the indigenous populations, as occurred in India in the early 1950's after years of communist use of force. Khrushchev has already taunted the CPR about its lack of progress. In his speech to the Supreme Soviet on December 12, 1962, he pointedly noted the CPR's failure to win back territory held by imperialists (Macao, Hong Kong).

[16]This situation would resemble the post-Stalin re-examination of Soviet policy which culminated in Khrushchev's modification of the thesis of the inevitability of war.

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LAOS AND THE DEFENSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

by Frank N. Trager

SINCE the end of World War II, Americans have passed through a nearly continuous series of crises, most of which have stemmed from the global conflict between the Free World and the communist bloc. Their frequency tends to deaden our responses, especially when, as in the cases of Laos and Vietnam, the crises seem so remote in space and so far removed from our cultural understanding. In our anxiety to relieve the tension created by these distant emergencies, we sometimes seek or accept solutions which return to haunt us later. The Laotian "solution" —neutralization—proposed during the Eisenhower Administration and accepted by the Kennedy Administration, is one of these expedient settlements which now looms as a serious danger to U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. At a minimum, it places a nearly insupportable burden on U.S. efforts to defend Thailand and South Vietnam. At worst, the "neutralist" arrangement in Laos may provide the communists with a springboard for the piecemeal conquest of mainland Southeast Asia.

The neutralization of Laos was formally accomplished at the Geneva Conference of July 1962 through the adoption of a fourteen-nation Declaration and Protocol on the Neutrality of Laos.[1] It was preceded by an accord on the establishment of a coalition government reached in June among the three contending pro-West, neutralist and communist factions. The solution imposes upon Laos a coalition government ostensibly dominated by the neutralists under Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma; specifically removes SEATO's protective "umbrella" from Laos; calls for the withdrawal of Soviet, North Vietnamese and U.S. military missions; and empowers the International Control Commission for Laos, by majority decision, to investigate violations of the Declaration, although its recommendations and decisions must be reached unanimously.

This scheme of neutralization rests upon the assumption that the "dominant" neutral faction—which has the allegiance of only a small part of the regular military units in Laos—remains both

[1]For text, see *New York Times*, July 22, 1962.

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neutral and dominant; upon the effectiveness of the ICC in spotting and acting upon violations; upon the intentions of Moscow, Peking and Hanoi and their ability individually or in concert to bring pressure to bear on the local situation; and upon Washington's determination to protect U.S. interests in the area and capability to act decisively. On the basis of the West's past experience with communist participation in coalition governments and our knowledge of Peking's past record and intentions in the area, the future of Laos as a neutral seems bleak. The present solution may be short-lived, and adverse developments may force U.S. policymakers to consider other alternatives to preserve all or some of free Laos, a pivot of the Asian rimland.

The Strategic Significance of Laos

Neutralization of Laos continues to provide the Pathet Lao, the communist forces in Laos, with a protected sanctuary in Phong Saly and Sam Neua provinces, the Laotian "Yenan" since 1954.[2] To these territories they have added, during hostilities from 1959-1962, most of Xieng Khouang province and the territory of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southeastern Laos.[3] Neutralization enables the Pathet Lao to operate legally in Laos and clandestinely over the borders in South Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia. To that extent, it places an additional burden on U.S. efforts to assist Saigon and Bangkok. Thus far there is no continuously active communist guerrilla effort in Thailand. But the nature of the Laos-South Vietnam border makes the latter country peculiarly vulnerable to infiltration, and substantially raises the cost of its defense. Each Viet Cong[4] infiltrator coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail

[2]Yenan, located in northwest China, was the headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party from the mid-1930's to the late 1940's, and the base from which the Chinese communists expanded their domain until it eventually included the entire Chinese mainland.

[3]The Ho Chi Minh Trail to South Vietnam is a route, suitable for motor transport, from North Vietnam to Mahaxay in Laos, then south to Tchepone, Laos. Tchepone has an air strip capable of taking planes at least equal in capacity to the C-47, workhorse of World War II. From there the trail proceeds south and east, by a network of footpaths, into South Vietnam. The Ho Chi Minh Trail is reported to be the best protected area under communist control.

[4]The terms Viet Minh and Viet Cong are generally used, and will be so used in this paper, to refer respectively to the communists of North Vietnam and their subordinates in the South. Viet Minh (Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh), the Vietnam Independence League, was founded in 1941 by Ho Chi Minh and his Lao Dong or Communist Party. In fact the name of this front was changed to Lien Viet in 1951 but the older name is still commonly used. Viet Cong is a derogatory abbreviation for Viet Cong San used by the South Vietnamese and meaning "those who direct guerrilla warfare and who are subversive agents," i.e., Vietnamese communists. The term is not used in the North.

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into South Vietnam requires the addition of from ten to twenty troops to the defense forces in South Vietnam. The option for this kind of escalation remains in Pathet Lao and Viet Minh hands.

One of the most important clues to the defense of this area is the strategic location of the Mekong River valley. The Mekong River, which rises in southwestern China, divides Laos from Burma, flows through a large part of western Laos, then forms the Lao-Thai border until it courses through the heart of Cambodia and on out to sea through the southern tip of South Vietnam. Thus, the defense of the Mekong is essential to the security of the neighbors of Laos. If the Mekong is breached and a large part of it falls under communist control, the countries to the south and west are deprived of a natural defense barrier.

It appears that the United States has failed to comprehend the enormous strategic importance of this river valley in the defense as well as the economy of mainland Southeast Asia.[5] For if the consequences of the loss of the Mekong had been clearly understood, Washington would not have been so willing to risk the future of Laos by accepting the Pathet Lao as a member of the Laotian government.

Some authorities argue that the range of mountains extending across the northern and eastern sides of Laos are even more crucial than the Mekong to the defense of Thailand, Cambodia and South Vietnam. General Rothwell Brown, who headed the U.S. military advisory mission in Laos, asserts that these mountains constitute "the only barrier protecting the great heartland of Southeast Asia." He describes their importance as follows:

> These mountains are not extremely high, though some of them run up to ten or twelve thousand feet, nor is the jungle growth particularly rank, and not nearly as impenetrable as much of the jungles of northern Burma and Assam in India. However, they do present a very formidable obstacle in the path of any major invasion coming in from the north and directed toward South Viet Nam, Cambodia, Thailand and the eastern reaches of Burma. . . .
>
> A glance at any relief map in any good atlas will show clearly that below the mountains of Laos and west of the mountains along the coast of Viet

[5]In an article, "A U.S. Program for Southern Asia" (*Current History*, March 1961, pp. 129-138), I called attention to its economic importance, and in "Never Negotiate Freedom: The Case of Laos and Vietnam" (*Asian Survey*, January 1962, pp. 3-11) to its strategic importance. In addition, General S. L. A. Marshall has written an article on its military importance in "The Big River" (*The New Leader*, May 28, 1962). The Mekong, in Marshall's view, "is the linchpin of freedom in Indochina for the simple reason that Pathet Lao control of the valley where it defines the southern boundary of Laos . . . would put all else in Southeast Asia within Communist reach, including South Vietnam."

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Nam, there lies a great alluvial plain capable of tremendous agricultural development, but certainly lacking in major military defense positions. Therefore, it is quite clear that once the mountain barrier is breached, the problem of defending the heartland of Southeast Asia becomes exceedingly difficult.[6]

This is the strategic importance of Laos: the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the long borders with Thailand, Cambodia and South Vietnam, the valley of the Mekong, and the mountain barriers. Perhaps Laos might be depicted as a pivot around which turns the defense of the rest of the mainland. If the forces opposing communism are defeated in Laos, they will have lost the most important natural barriers to the advance of communism. With the pivot removed, greater stress would be thrown upon succeeding pivots in the more costly defense structure, and the defense by conventional means of the neighboring countries would be rendered more difficult, if not in the long run impossible.

The Defense of Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is an important area of the Free World, coveted by Communist China for economic and strategic reasons. Exportable foodstuffs, industrial raw materials and fuel, unused but cultivable land, and the lebensraum still remaining in several parts of the area make mainland Southeast Asia a prime target for Communist China.

Southeast Asia also has substantial trade relations with Japan, India, Western Europe and the United States. This adds the new dimension of trade warfare to the area's potential economic usefulness to China. The fall of mainland Southeast Asia would also have psychological repercussions upon other areas of the world, for it would demonstrate U.S.-Western incompetence in defending staunch allies and friends such as Thailand, South Vietnam and Malaysia. The impact of the fall of the mainland would certainly be felt in Indonesia, encouraging Sukarno to pursue with greater abandon his own imperial ambitions. Such a development would cut vital Western commercial and military sea-routes, and would have a major impact on the defenses and essential interests of all neighboring states, from Japan, South Korea, Formosa and the Philippines to Australia, New Zealand and the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. It is impossible to foretell the precise effect which the communist conquest of Southeast Asia

[6]Rothwell H. Brown, *Laos: The Key to the Maintenance of U.S. Interests in Southeast Asia* (White Stone, Virginia, May 25, 1962, mimeographed).

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would have, but the above sketch of possible ramifications suggests that the defense of this area is worth the considerable effort required.

Southeast Asia is defensible if the will is present—but the difficulties are formidable. The governments of this area have shown a greater degree of political stability than the West expected of them, but they lack the internal security forces needed to cope with insurgency supported externally. Some of the neutral countries also exhibit symptoms of a paralysis of political will; i.e., under adverse circumstances or in a period of crisis, they may fail to act promptly against communist pressures. The unaligned states of Burma, Cambodia and Malaya, which generally favored the Geneva solution, did not welcome a test of SEATO's strength on the Laotian issue. Leaders in these countries held a low opinion of Prince Boun Oum, the former anti-communist Prime Minister of Laos, whom they consider to be a "playboy." Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that these countries, whatever their degree of neutralism, do not wish to see either a piecemeal conquest of Laos by the communist Pathet Lao or a diminution of U.S. military strength in the area until and unless there is a global settlement among the major powers, including Communist China.

Bilateral military arrangements seem to be replacing the multilateral regional defense organization, SEATO. The evident unwillingness of Britain and France to become involved in a military action to defend the area has limited SEATO's effectiveness. In place of SEATO the U.S. now has bilateral commitments to four area nations. Thailand and the Philippines, full SEATO members, are linked to the U.S. by binational agreements which these nations regard as more reliable than SEATO. South Vietnam, protected under SEATO's "umbrella" protocol, places its reliance on the presence of U.S. forces and a clear U.S. political commitment. Cambodia, which rejects any protection under SEATO, continues to receive U.S. military assistance.[7] The United States also has the trilateral (ANZUS) pact with Australia and New Zealand, nations vitally concerned with events in Southeast Asia.

The Southeast Asian rimlands clearly need external assistance in order to remain free from communist-bloc domination. This requires the continued presence of U.S. military strength and the

[7]Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam, while not signatories to SEATO, were placed under SEATO's protection by a special protocol to the pact. SEATO's protective umbrella over Laos was removed by the Royal Lao government's declaration of neutrality of July 9, 1962. In November 1963, Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, seriously or otherwise, requested the cessation of U.S. aid.

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development of a military doctrine and tactics for such an area as mainland Southeast Asia. In the years after World War II, the U.S. disregarded the knowledge and experience gained in the successful operations of the Chindits, the Marauders and the Kachin Rangers; we also forgot our historic eighteenth and nineteenth century guerrilla warfare experience. Nor did we derive any discernible benefits from the ten-year British operation in countering the Malayan (Chinese) communist insurrection. The United States failed to create those special forces needed to cope with communist unconventional warfare. Until the end of the 1950's the U.S. had to rely chiefly on conventional troop divisions which cannot be used to advantage in mainland Southeast Asia. What the United States needed were highly mobile, small, well-trained, jungle-fighting units utilizing the intelligence and support of the local population, whose defense and welfare must be insured and whose loyalty must be won.

Laos brought about a change. A Presidential directive in 1961 ordered the Departments of State and Defense to restudy the problems of insurgency, counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare. The result has been the formulation of socio-political and military strategies and tactics to counter warfare at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. The U.S. is no longer handicapped in places such as Laos because it lacks the required military capability.

Moreover, the logistics problem of large-scale supply in Southeast Asia is easier for the West than for Moscow or Peking, separately or concerted. The harbors and jet-handling airports of the capital cities—Saigon, Bangkok and even Rangoon—are more readily available to us than to the Sino-Soviet powers. The same is true of the roads, railroads and subsidiary airports for medium-sized tactical aircraft—especially for armed helicopters. It is easier, for example, to transport military personnel and supplies safely from Bangkok to the Lao-Mekong border than it is for Peking-Hanoi to reach Xieng Khouang and Tchepone in the interior of Laos. The West has similar logistics advantages in South Vietnam.

In sum, if the West applies the lessons learned in recent years and can prevent a communist take-over in Laos, mainland Southeast Asia can be defended. Insuring the security of Laos is of paramount importance. There are only two long-term solutions to the Laotian question: either Laos will become a part of the communist empire or the Free World must protect it until it can defend itself. President Kennedy and his advisers have sought to avoid the hazards of the "wrong war at the wrong place at the

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wrong time" by resorting to a third alternative: neutralizing Laos, so neither Cold War antagonist gains the advantage. Such a policy depends upon the questionable expectation that the Pathet Lao communist tiger will lose its stripes and become a tame partner in the coalition with the "neutrals" and the anti-communists in Laos. There is no historical record of such a political transformation in any communist party in any country.

The 1954 Geneva Agreements and the First Coalition

The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and the formation of SEATO later in the same year serve as benchmarks from which to examine the threatening crisis in Southeast Asia. Signed on July 21, the Geneva Agreements formally ended the eight-year Indochinese war. Under the Agreements, Vietnam was split at the 17th Parallel, with a communist regime in the north and the noncommunist but chaotic Republic of Vietnam south of that line. The Agreements called for the cessation of hostilities in, and the continued recognition of, the independent kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos. They also recognized the communist Pathet Lao presence in the two provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua in northeastern Laos, both bordering on North Vietnam. In addition, International Control Commissions (ICC), composed of representatives from India, Poland and Canada, were created for Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.[8]

The United States—which had supported, with considerable reluctance, France's "colonial" war in Indochina and then had attempted, at the last minute and in vain, to organize joint allied action to save Indochina in the spring of 1954—did not sign the Agreements. Washington merely issued a separate declaration taking note of the Agreements, thus permitting us freedom of action. The United States instead began to mobilize support for the creation of a collective defense organization to protect the noncommunist states of Southeast Asia against communist aggression. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan, was established by the Manila Treaty of September 1954. Its purpose

[8]See Donald Lancaster, *The Emancipation of French Indo-China* (Oxford University Press, 1961), especially Chs. XVI-XVIII. The official documents of the Geneva Agreements have been frequently published. See *Documents relating to . . . Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference,* April 27-June 15, 1954, Cmd. 9186 and *Further Documents . . . Geneva Conference,* June 16-July 21, 1954, Cmd. 9329 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954).

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was to deter direct armed aggression against Southeast Asian states and to prepare collective measures against the more likely forms of communist aggression, i.e., infiltration, subversion and guerrilla warfare. While not signatories to the Manila Pact, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam were included within its geographic scope by a protocol which thereby placed them under SEATO's "protective umbrella."

The prospects at the end of 1954 for a successful containment policy in Southeast Asia were not bright. It seemed as though the disorganized state of affairs in South Vietnam would give way in a matter of months to a communist take-over, and that Laos and Cambodia would succumb in a similar manner. It was only the appearance of a strong-willed, authoritarian ruler, backed by the United States, that brought order and stability to Saigon during the course of the next two years. But no such leadership or order appeared in Laos.

Under the Geneva Agreements, France retained two bases in Laos and the right to train the Royal Lao armed forces. However, France gradually permitted these bases to deteriorate, and as its obligations in Algeria increased, withdrew officers from their training function. Despite this gradual withdrawal from Laos, the French government did not relinquish its rights under the Agreements. As a result, the Royal Lao army received little modern training and equipment. Meanwhile, although the North Vietnamese forces which had crossed over into northern Laos during the Indochinese war were to have been withdrawn from Laos—whether they, or some of them, were withdrawn is questionable—the indigenous communist forces of the Pathet Lao were guaranteed by the Geneva Agreements the right to "assembly areas" in the provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, and a "corridor" between them.

From the beginning, the Pathet Lao claimed these provinces *in full.* They resisted political and other efforts made by the Royal Lao government to establish control over the area, and also resisted the efforts of the ICC to supervise the cease-fire agreement in their territory. The ICC was also frequently stalled because the Indian chairman, unwilling to act on the basis of a two-to-one vote, sought unanimity among the three members—a situation which the Polish member exploited whenever it suited communist purposes. Furthermore, the Royal Lao government was constrained by the Geneva Agreements to hold "general elections" and to provide for "special representation in the Royal

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Administration of the [two] provinces" in dispute. The ICC and its Indian chairman continued, especially after the visit of India's Prime Minister Nehru to Vientiane in the fall of 1954, to press the Royal Lao government to negotiate with the communist Pathet Lao and accept their dominant rights in these two (of twelve) Laotian provinces.

Elections were held in Laos in 1955, but no stable government emerged from the wrangle of dominant families, whose members represent the ruling elites of the two or three recognizable sections of the country.[9] This precarious situation lasted until the fall of 1957—a weak, squabbling government in Vientiane and an unmolested communist movement gaining strength in two distant provinces.

In November 1957, the Laotian Prime Minister, Souvanna Phouma, who was trying to follow a neutral line within and outside Laos, negotiated a settlement with the Pathet Lao whose leader, Prince Souphanouvong, is his half-brother. In this Agreement for Reunification, the two sides pledged their full allegiance to "Pandit Nehru's five principles of peaceful coexistence" and their desire to maintain good relations with all countries—but especially "with neighboring countries [i.e., Communist China and North Vietnam], without any distinction of the different political regimes."[10]

[9]The kingdom of Laos, formerly Lan Xang (a million elephants), has a recognizable history from the beginning of the 14th century. It apparently was a prosperous—and at one time an aggressive—kingdom according to 17th century Dutch (Gerrit van Wusthoff, 1641) and Italian (Jesuit Father J. M. Leria, 1641-47) sources. Later, it fell apart into rival northern and southern principalities. There were at least four petty kingdoms after this: Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Xieng Khouang and Champassak. Laos was conquered by the Siamese and the Vietnamese during the 18th and 19th centuries. When France succeeded in establishing her power in Indochina, she absorbed Laos as a "protectorate" in 1893—still recognizing the northern and southern divisions of the country. In August 1946, the heads of the two leading regional families, the late Sisavang Vong, the father of the present king, and Prince Boun Oum, agreed on a united Laos under the former as constitutional monarch. A constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly the following May. Savang Vatthana has been king since 1959.

[10]The Agreement for Reunification provided for:

1. A government of National Union, including representation from the now legalized party, the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS), the Laotian Patriotic Front, i.e., the communist Pathet Lao.

2. Restoration of the Royal Lao government's authority over the two Pathet Lao-held border provinces, their fighting units and war matériel. Members of the Pathet Lao, "so wishing," were to be integrated into the Royal Lao army "within limits of the budget." However, subsidiary agreements provided that administration of "principal posts" in the border areas would be shared; that only 1,500 Pathet Lao troops were to be integrated (the rest presumably to be demobilized), and these officers and men were to retain their separate units and be assigned to the areas where originally domiciled.

3. Supplementary elections to be held within four months.

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Thus, the Laotian communists, after three years of deliberate resistance to the implementation of the 1954 Agreements, became respectable political bedfellows. The agreement with Souvanna Phouma made it easy and even legal for the communists gradually to take over the Laotian government through subversion and infiltration. In the new cabinet, Souphanouvong was given the portfolio of Planning, Town Planning and Reconstruction, for which U.S. dollars were available; his strident "theoretician," Phoumi Vongvichit, became Minister of Religious Affairs and the Fine Arts. At the conclusion of these arrangements, the coalition government agreed to ask the ICC for Laos to withdraw because the terms of the Geneva Agreements had been "satisfactorily implemented." This took place on July 19, 1958, sine die.

The communists made a good showing in the supplementary elections, held in early May 1958, for 21 seats in the enlarged National Assembly of 59 members.[11] The elections followed a pattern which has become all-too-familiar in many new states. The communist Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS), in cooperation with front groups such as the Santiphab (Party of the Middle), campaigned vigorously by denouncing the government in the rural areas for its neglect of the peoples' needs and the U.S. aid program for its extravagance and corruption in high places, and by preaching peace, prosperity and friendship with communist states. The pro-government parties, the Nationalists and the Independents, quarreled over personalities and political issues and consequently split their tickets. The outcome gave the NLHS nine seats, their front groups, four; the pro-government parties won only eight, although they amassed 712,000 votes against only 280,000 for the NLHS.

The communists' election results alarmed the divided anti-communists and spurred them to join hands in a coalition. The Nationalists and Independents formed a new party, The Rally of the Laotian People (RPL), which controlled some 38 of 59 seats in the National Assembly. Soon thereafter, a group of army officers, civil servants, and leading families from southern Laos formed a new political group, the Committee for the Defense of the National Interest (CDNI). Apprehensive of the drift to the

[11]Prior to these elections the franchise had been extended to women and a new method of calculating the number of deputies for each of the 12 provinces, on the basis of one for each 50,000 inhabitants, had been approved in a new electoral law. The government estimated the population at three millions—there had been no census—and on this basis 20 new seats (plus one vacancy by death) were to be filled.

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left in Laos and disgusted with the conduct of some of the older, conservative leaders who had been prominent in various governments since 1954, the CDNI espoused a strong pro-Western, anti-communist stand along with a more progressive domestic program of reform. From the beginning, these "young turks" had the endorsement of some U.S. quarters and apparently of the then heir-apparent to the throne, the present King Savang Vatthana. Prince Boun Oum and General Phoumi Nosavan were among the CDNI's prominent leaders.

The Crisis of 1959

Following the May elections, Souvanna Phouma was forced to step down as Prime Minister when a majority of the members of the National Assembly, alarmed by communist election gains, opposed his coalition policies toward the Pathet Lao. As a result, a new cabinet, headed by Phoui Sananikone, outgoing Foreign Minister and a RPL leader, was approved by the National Assembly in August 1958. From then until the turn of the year, Phoui defined the aims of his government and set about to rid the government of corruption and gross inefficiency, to which badly administered U.S. aid and politically inept U.S. officials had contributed. He pledged his government to fight against internal communist subversion; departed from the pro-communist neutralism of Souvanna Phouma; and, perhaps to underline his views, negotiated treaties with Thailand and South Vietnam. He insisted that the International Control Commission, dissolved sine die, should be terminated.[12]

When Phoui took Laos on an anti-communist course, the communists reacted. At first, the North Vietnamese attempted to negotiate with Phoui to re-establish the ICC, in whose dissolution they had previously acquiesced. Simultaneously, especially during and after December 1958, North Vietnam stepped up its propaganda campaign against Laos and charged it with border violations. Viet Minh troops in small numbers, probably with some of

[12]This decision, in agreement with the position taken by the two half-brothers in 1957, may be interpreted as one which fulfilled the conditions of the 1954 Geneva Accords and hence freed the Lao government to undertake new arrangements for its security. Though admittedly this is an extreme interpretation, it offered an internationally legal basis — if one is required — for bilateral U.S.-Laos security agreements. Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone, however, expressly rejected the opportunity to enter into military alliances and establishment of foreign bases. (See the Release of February 17, 1959, quoted in Department of State, *The Situation in Laos,* September 1959, pp. 15-16.)

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the former "demobilized" Pathet Lao, reportedly moved into the Laotian provinces bordering on North Vietnam.[13]

On February 1, 1959, Phoui Sananikone forcefully rejected the North Vietnamese overtures regarding the ICC and denounced the military moves of the Viet Minh and Pathet Lao. The Royal Lao government at the same time alerted the United Nations to the ominous situation then developing and reaffirmed its decision to maintain the neutrality of Laos. In January, the Prime Minister had received the National Assembly's approval for his policy. In addition, at his request the Assembly agreed to recess for twelve months, granting full powers in the interim to him and a reorganized cabinet which included three army officers.[14] Phoui promised that at the end of the year new general elections would be held and a new constitution would be drafted.

In May, as the communist Pathet Lao and Viet Minh forces increased their campaign against the government,[15] Phoui proceeded to implement the uncompleted arrangements (agreed upon in November 1957) whereby 1,500 Pathet Lao troops were to be incorporated into the Royal army. These troops had been divided into two battalions, stationed in Luang Prabang and Xieng Khouang provinces. The move succeeded in the case of the 1st Battalion in the province of the royal capital; it failed in Xieng Khouang. The 2nd Battalion escaped on May 18 to communist sanctuary areas in the vicinity of the eastern border. The government formally declared it to be in rebellion and proceeded to arrest Prince Souphanouvong and other communist Neo Lao Hak Sat leaders in Vientiane.[16]

[13]Reliable intelligence on movements in northeastern Laos and across the Lao-North Vietnam border has always been in short supply, a circumstance made-to-order for clandestine communist operations.

[14]General Phoumi Nosavan became Secretary of State for Defense in this interim cabinet.

[15]It was during this period that North Vietnamese forces occupied the territory in the vicinity of Tchepone, Laos, just west and a little south of the 17th Parallel dividing North and South Vietnam.

[16]It is difficult to establish an order of events in this rather tangled situation, which worsened in 1960. I have relied on the following aids: the extremely useful descriptive accounts in *Current Notes on International Affairs,* published monthly by the Department of External Affairs, Canberra, Australia; the excellent, highly-specialized study prepared for the RAND Corporation by A. M. Halpern and H. B. Fredman, *Communist Strategy in Laos,* June 14, 1960; the instructive and convenient collection of Chinese communist documents from February 18 to September 15, 1959, made available by Peking, *Concerning the Situation in Laos* (Foreign Language Press, 1959); and the tendentious memoir, to be read with care, *Storm Over Laos, a Contemporary History* (New York: Praeger, 1961) by a participant, Sisouk Na Champassak, acting Foreign Minister of the Royal Lao government before the present settlement.

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This incident led to a round of skirmishes in Phong Saly and Sam Neua provinces in June and July. In August, Pathet Lao forces, supported by Viet Minh artillery, launched a series of attacks against the Royal Lao army positions in border areas contiguous to North Vietnam. On September 4, Laos appealed for assistance to the United Nations. Three days later the Security Council voted ten to one—the USSR opposed but the vote was on a procedural motion not subject to the veto—to "investigate" the situation. The Council set up a subcommittee, composed of Argentina, Italy, Japan and France, which visited Laos from September 15 to October 13. The subcommittee's report, published on November 5, substantiated many of the allegations made by the Royal Lao government. The subcommittee found that from July to October military activities of a "guerrilla character" had taken place; insurgent operations must have been centrally coordinated; and the hostile elements had received North Vietnamese aid—although the subcommittee could not verify that the frontier crossings had been made "by regular troops" of North Vietnam.[17] Whatever the form of intervention, North Vietnam clearly supplied troops and assistance to the Pathet Lao; Hanoi had plenty of time to withdraw or disguise its forces by the time UN officials and accompanying newsmen arrived.

On September 5, 1959, the United States issued a White Paper on Laos.[18] The State Department made clear the manner in which the communists, directed and materially assisted from Hanoi, Peking and Moscow, were attempting to obtain control of Laos through diplomatic maneuvers, political subversion and guerrilla warfare. It agreed to respond "to specific requests from the Lao government for improving its defense position."[19] The United States also indicated its willingness to "support the dispatch of a United Nations force to Laos if this becomes necessary to halt Communist aggression," and moved elements of the Seventh Fleet closer to the zone of conflict. During this same period, Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, spoke in Australia of U.S. atom-powered submarine readiness in the Pacific. These

[17] *Report of the Security Council Sub-Committee Under Resolution of September 7, 1959,* November 5, 1959, United Nations Security Council, s/4236:26. See also Sisouk Na Champassak, *op. cit.,* Chapter 12, and Halpern and Fredman, *op. cit.,* pp. 126-146. A by-product of this *ad hoc* visit was the appointment of a personal representative in Laos of the Secretary-General to advise him on the economic needs of that country.

[18] Department of State, *The Situation in Laos,* September 1959.

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 23.

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official U.S. statements preceded and lent credibility to the decision of SEATO, announced on September 26, that

> In the event of its becoming necessary to defend the integrity of Laos against intervention, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization has made preparations so as to be able to act promptly within the framework of the Manila Treaty.[20]

The United States appeared determined—in words, deeds and the promise of more deeds, and without concern for the Geneva accords of 1954—to thwart the clear communist objective of taking over Laos. This posture and its timing—while Khrushchev was cultivating the "Spirit of Camp David"—helped to blunt for a short time the communists' Laotian offensive.

The Election of 1960 and Kong Le's Coup

After these events in the early fall of 1959, hostilities temporarily subsided in Laos. During this lull the Laotians in late 1959 turned to domestic politics and, unhappily, to discord. The government of Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone had promised, in January 1959, to hold new elections for the National Assembly at the end of the year during which Phoui had a mandate to rule without parliamentary consent. With the elections set for April 1960, the two anti-communist groups, the RPL and the CDNI, had a falling out. The issue which divided them concerned which of the two groups would be in control of the government at the time of the election. This ill-timed and unproductive domestic quarrel was resolved as the year ended by a bloodless army coup that overturned Phoui's government. In early January 1960 civilian government was restored, with Khou Abhay, the choice of the CDNI, as Prime Minister.

In the election held on April 24, the two anti-communist groups won all the seats. By arranging for voting only in districts where it could maintain order, the army made it impossible for the communists or their allies to win any seats. Although there is no way to ascertain exactly what happened, there is no doubt that the election was not free and fair by Western standards. General Phoumi Nosavan, the real head of the CDNI, was the key figure in the elections. His candidate, Tiao Somsanith, was designated Prime Minister in early May.[21]

[20] *SEATO, Record of Progress 1959-60,* p. 6. This is the official report of SEATO, published in Bangkok.

[21] Just prior to the elections, Prince Souvanna Phouma, twice former Prime Minister, returned from his ambassadorial post in France to stand for and win an uncontested seat from Luang Prabang. He became President, the presiding officer, in the newly elected National Assembly.

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It seemed to many observers that Laos might be entering a period of strong and reform-minded government. But this optimism lasted only a few months. Soon after the election, on May 23, Souphanouvong and some fifteen other communist Pathet Lao leaders, who had been arrested on charges of rebellion a year earlier, escaped from jail or bribed their way out. They fled to the border areas and rejoined their communist comrades. Whether there was a connection between Souphanouvong's escape and the "neutralist" coup a few months later in August is not clear. But the communists, with their leadership restored, were ready to exploit the coup to their own advantage.

On August 9, at 3 a.m., while most government leaders were in Luang Prabang to arrange the cremation ceremonies for the late King Sisavong Vong, a young paratroop captain, Kong Le, with 800 troops, staged a successful coup in Vientiane.[22] For several days the situation was unclear. Kong Le reputedly was motivated by a desire to "reorganize the parliamentary system and cleanse the administrative machinery" and to prevent "Lao from killing Lao." But any interpretation of this man's motives cannot ignore the immediate political attack which he launched upon U.S. and French military advisers and his loudly proclaimed "neutrality" in the Cold War. Even though it can be argued that Kong Le may have been an "innocent front," it must be remembered that he insisted on installing a new leader who would return to the former policy of collaboration with the communists. Souvanna Phouma was his man, and he was named on August 15 as Prime Minister.

In the new cabinet, Souvanna Phouma also took the portfolios of Defense and Foreign Affairs. Quinim Pholsena, leader of the small communist-front Santiphab Party, who had earlier demonstrated his sympathies as a spokesman for the communist Neo Lao Hak Sat Party, held the Ministries of Interior, Sports and Youth. He used these posts to bring out mass, anti-American demonstrations in Vientiane as needed. In an effort to maintain his "neutral" posture, Souvanna Phouma gave a cabinet post to Prince Boun Oum, a strong anti-communist, who in terms of royal family

[22]The *New York Times* is a major source of information for the confused events following the coup. See the report of Kong Le's broadcast, August 10, 1960; Tillman Durdin's dispatches from Vientiane, August 15-23; and Jacques Nevard's subsequent reports from this same city and from Savannakhet. At the start, the *New York Times* reported that the American Embassy in Vientiane believed the coup had "little or no influence outside Vientiane" (August 10, 1960).

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status was second only to the king.[23] Souvanna Phouma announced that he also wanted to include Phoumi Nosavan and others from the CDNI in the cabinet. But Phoumi and other members of the previous anti-communist government refused to acknowledge the new government, established and maintained in power by Kong Le's paratroopers. General Phoumi and the main units of the Royal Lao army withdrew to their main southern base at Savannakhet, about 180 miles south of Vientiane, on the Mekong River in the panhandle of Laos.

Despite this rebuff, Souvanna Phouma continued his efforts to establish a coalition government by opening negotiations with his communist half-brother Souphanouvong. The Pathet Lao leader, in the meantime, had been broadcasting threats and calling upon Laotians to "rise up and kill" all "agents of the American imperialists," including the CDNI "rebel groups."[24] In the midst of this political strife the king made a valiant effort to bring together Souvanna Phouma and Phoumi Nosavan. Toward the end of August, the king summoned the National Assembly to the royal capital and worked out a compromise cabinet acceptable to, and including, these two political rivals. This cabinet was promptly and publicly denounced by Kong Le and Quinim Pholsena. Phoumi thereupon returned to Savannakhet. Souvanna Phouma, however, went back to Vientiane, made no visible effort to persuade Kong Le and Pholsena to accept the king's compromise, and again joined forces with the coup leaders, declaring Phoumi a "rebel" if he did not return to that city. Prince Boun Oum, convinced that the sponsors of the coup were communist influenced, if not controlled, left Vientiane to become the civilian leader of General Phoumi's rump government in Savannakhet.

Whenever Souvanna Phouma has made a final choice of political alliances, it has always been with the Pathet Lao and his half-brother, and with such communist sympathizers as Quinim Pholsena. In this instance, Souvanna Phouma seemed also to have the tacit approval of the new U.S. Ambassador to Laos, Winthrop G. Brown, who had arrived during the summer of 1960. Ambassador

[23]Dr. Joel Halpern, of the Department of Anthropology, University of California at Los Angeles, has written profusely and helpfully on Laos. Among his many papers especially pertinent to an understanding of "family" and the power structure in Laos are: *The Laos Elite: A Study of Tradition and Innovation* (The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 1960); *Government, Politics and Social Structure of Laos: A Study in Tradition and Innovation*, Laos Project, No. 21, UCLA; and *Laos Profiles Paper* No. 18, June 1, 1961, UCLA.

[24]See Thomas E. Ennis, "Operation Survival in Laos," *Current History*, March 1961, pp. 153-158.

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Brown reportedly gave assurances to Souvanna Phouma that the U.S. government considered the differences between his regime at Vientiane and General Phoumi Nosavan's at Savannakhet to be a question of internal affairs in which the United States would not interfere.[25] Immediately after Souvanna Phouma returned from the meeting with the king, the United States was reported as "giving guarded support to the new neutralist government." And five days later, two U.S. diplomats visited Savannakhet to deliver a sharply worded letter from Ambassador Brown, stating that the U.S. had no intention of supporting any revolutionary plans General Phoumi might have.[26]

In less than two months the new U.S. Ambassador had apparently reversed the course followed by Washington during the two previous years. The U.S. had rejected Souvanna Phouma on the basis of his communist-coalition policy in 1957, and had, in 1958-59, supported the governments of the RPL and CDNI, which expressly excluded pro-communist and Pathet Lao elements. The State Department in the fall of 1960, however, seems to have accepted Souvanna Phouma and his policy.

Whatever the weaknesses of the governments formed by the RPL and CDNI, these governments had been supported by Washington because they were anti-communist and pro-Western. That they—similar to all governments in Laos throughout the past millennium—had been dominated by an elite is true; it is also true that their observance of democratic practices in the elections of April 1960 left much to be desired. But these governments and their leaders, unlike those headed by Souvanna Phouma, understood the dangers of coalition with the communists and realized that they were fighting a part of the international communist movement. Yet, in what seemed a hasty about-face, the United States directed its sharp words not against the coup-makers in Vientiane, but against its friends in Savannakhet. At the same time, the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh military forces stepped up their campaign in the northern provinces of Sam Neua and Xieng Khouang and also in the Laotian panhandle at the 17th Parallel, where they threatened Savannakhet and engaged troops loyal to Phoumi Nosavan.

The Spread of Hostilities

Communist strategy in September 1960 sought to take advantage of the political divisions in Laos while simultaneously giving

[25] *Ibid.* [26] *New York Times,* September 7 and 12, 1960.

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indirect support to the Pathet Lao-endorsed Kong Le government. Radio Hanoi announced on September 19 that Souphanouvong was ready to negotiate with Souvanna Phouma. Meanwhile, it became increasingly clear to General Phoumi that, unless he marched north to retake the administrative capital of Vientiane and surrounding area, all of northern Laos would fall to the communists. Thus, on the same date, September 19, while fighting between the Vientiane and Savannakhet forces continued, Prince Boun Oum announced that General Phoumi's forces would not rest until they had captured Vientiane.

Before this threat could be carried out, Souvanna Phouma and General Phoumi once again accepted an invitation from the king to try to patch up their differences. It was agreed on September 28 that fighting should be temporarily suspended. However, Kong Le and Quinim Pholsena refused to accept the new cease-fire and Souvanna Phouma again abided by their views. He announced at a mass meeting in Vientiane that negotiations with the communist Pathet Lao would begin within a week. He told his audience that he absolutely refused to negotiate with the anti-communist Phoumi and Boun Oum, and added that he had invited an exchange of diplomatic representatives with the Soviet Union.

Approximately one week later, J. Graham Parsons, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and John N. Irwin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, alarmed by the turn of events, hastened to Vientiane. The United States had contributed since 1955 at least $300 million to Laos for the purpose of building a noncommunist state. After the Kong Le coup, Washington apparently decided to back Souvanna Phouma in the hope that he would bring peace to a noncommunist Laos. But Souvanna Phouma was once again opening the door to the Pathet Lao and had, by mid-October 1960, entered into diplomatic relations with Moscow.[27] Parsons presumably attempted to sway him from such a course, but failed despite the use of a temporary punitive measure—the suspension of aid funds.[28]

[27]Shortly after the arrival of the first Soviet Ambassador, A. N. Abramov, on October 13, 1960, the Pathet Lao received a Soviet airlift of petroleum products, weapons—including howitzers and mortars—and other military equipment. Text of U.S. Note to Soviet Union, *New York Times*, December 18, 1960.

[28]Parsons had formerly been Ambassador to Laos and had supported the Royal Laotian army. On his failure to wean Phouma away from his course see *New York Times*, October 17, 1960, and Phouma's later attack on Parsons, *ibid.*, January 20, 1961. Despite Parsons' trip, Ambassador Brown did not seem to weaken in his preference for Souvanna Phouma.

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It is difficult to imagine that Washington policymakers could have entertained any doubts about Souvanna Phouma's real intentions. More than ever, he was committed to a policy of coalition with the communists. If Souvanna Phouma had been willing to head a *noncommunist* coalition government, the U.S. might have taken a chance with him. But his rejection of the Parsons mission and the king's reconciliation efforts should have turned U.S. officials toward General Phoumi Nosavan, or someone else. Instead, in one of the most anomalous moves in contemporary diplomacy, U.S. policymakers during the fall of 1960 decided to continue military, financial and material aid to Souvanna Phouma and Kong Le's troops, *as well as* to Phoumi Nosavan.[29]

Despite U.S. policy vacillations, the anti-communists, led by General Phoumi, carried out by the end of 1960 their announced intention to overthrow Souvanna Phouma's government. Early in December, thirty-eight members of the National Assembly fled Vientiane and proceeded to Savannakhet where, on December 12, they unanimously voted censure of the Souvanna Phouma government. The king thereupon dismissed Phouma and, on the 14th, appointed a provisional government led by Prince Boun Oum. Meanwhile, General Phoumi's forces marched northward and, after a three-day struggle with the communist-supported rebels, recaptured Vientiane. The National Assembly formally voted its confidence in the Boun Oum government on January 4, 1961. After retreating from Vientiane, Kong Le and some of his troops joined the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh forces in the border regions, setting up a command center in Xieng Khouang province. There they regrouped their forces and began to receive a steady flow of supplies brought in by Soviet airdrops and by road from North Vietnam. This additional Soviet involvement in Laos was soon to be felt.

The Department of State, in its second White Paper on Laos, released on January 7, 1961, seemed to recognize, at least partially and inferentially, the folly of U.S. policy in Laos during the latter part of 1960, beginning with the critical error in political assessment at the time of the Kong Le coup.

> Although originally there may have been some doubt concerning the inspiration for Captain Kong Le's action, his motivation and support, those doubts have been dispelled by the tragic events of the past few weeks. His initial collaboration with the Pathet Lao, including arming them from the royal arsenals, his clandestine cooperation with foreign

[29] *New York Times,* October 4, 11, 20, 29, and November 17, 1960.

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Communist governments, and the baneful effect on Laos are all now a matter of history.[30]

Nowhere in this Department statement is there any mention of the role of the "difficult" Phoumi Nosavan, whose diagnosis of the Kong Le coup had been vindicated, and whose armed forces had fought their way up from Savannakhet for the eventual victory. The satisfaction expressed in Washington after this victory of the "pro-Western Government of Premier Boun Oum" was genuine, but it was not an occasion for self-congratulation.

Although the year 1961 started with a pro-Western government in power, the situation in Laos was far from stable. The Royal Lao government charged that there were seven battalions of North Vietnamese troops fighting alongside Kong Le and the Pathet Lao, and that they were equipped with Soviet matériel. In Washington, President Eisenhower convened an important meeting of Secretary of State Herter, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, and others on New Year's Day. There the decision was reached to increase "readiness" and "airlift capability" in Southeast Asia and to alert SEATO. The State Department took the unusual step of publishing a detailed intelligence note on "Soviet and North Vietnamese activities in Laos" since the withdrawal of Kong Le and his forces from Vientiane.[31] The communists were not intimidated; the combined Kong Le-Pathet Lao-Viet Minh forces were advancing, not only in the northern provinces, but also down the Plaine des Jarres in Xieng Khouang province. The Soviets announced that they did not recognize the new Boun Oum government; Souvanna Phouma, in exile, was Moscow's choice. He obliged by issuing a ringing denunciation of the U.S. for "betraying" and "double-crossing" him and his government.[32]

Thus, the Laotian crisis was approaching its climax as one administration gave way to another in Washington. The Eisenhower Administration had had a unique opportunity in Laos. But inexperience, ineptness, maladministration and even some corruption hurt the U.S. economic and military assistance programs, to which the American taxpayer had contributed some $300 million. Most of the aid went to pay for and equip the armed forces; much of the rest benefited the few, not the many.

The U.S. effort was handicapped also by the actions of one of

[30] *Department of State Bulletin*, January 23, 1961, pp. 115-117.
[31] *New York Times*, January 4, 1961.
[32] *Ibid.*, January 11 and 20, 1961.

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its foremost allies. The French, with internationally recognized rights for training the Laotian army, not only failed in this function but often thwarted improvements recommended by U.S. officials. One knowledgeable reporter, in an article assessing both U.S. and French roles, had this to say about the French:

> . . . the French, resentful of American intrusion into their one-time colony, often seemed more anti-American than anti-Communist; they failed to fulfill their treaty obligations to train the Laotian Army and assist the Laotians in fighting insurrection. They constantly influenced the Laotians against the Americans and kept up constant defeatist talk of neutralism and coalitions with the Communists.[33]

U.S. policy was never sufficiently imaginative to overcome the many obstacles. Washington improvised, without much success, a number of military devices, such as the non-uniformed Program Evaluation Organization, to counteract the lack of French cooperation. But the United States did not take advantage of the suspension of the 1954 Geneva accords which might have made it possible to nudge the French out of their training function. Twice, in September 1959 and early January 1961, Washington publicly authorized a degree of military readiness in the area to back up the 1959 SEATO policy. But, in the end, it failed to fulfill the brave words which SEATO had used. It could not locate that combination of Laotian political forces which would give internal stability to Laos, and its decision to support the Kong Le coup proved to be a disaster.

President Kennedy's Choice

When John F. Kennedy was inaugurated as President, one of the most critical foreign policy problems he and his advisers confronted was the increasingly desperate situation in Laos. If the United States was not to write Laos off as a hopeless situation, some form of major U.S. intervention would be necessary. This intervention might be diplomatic or military in nature; it might be carried out through SEATO, the United Nations, some new multilateral body, or unilaterally. Whatever the nature of the intervention, the Kennedy Administration would have to act swiftly.

While Washington was coming to a decision, the Laotian situation steadily grew worse. In the first three months of 1961, the communists, including the Viet Minh, extended their control

[33]Peggy Durdin, "The Grim Lesson of Laos." *New York Times* (Sunday) *Magazine,* May 21, 1961. Her assessment of the American role is equally unflattering.

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from Phong Saly and Sam Neua to Xieng Khouang, and launched new attacks in the eastern panhandle area, the area of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Thus, the communists established and consolidated control over eastern Laos, contiguous with the western borders of South Vietnam down to Cambodia. U.S. action required to prevent the communists from seizing strategic parts of Laos failed to materialize.

Meanwhile, proposals for the solution of the crisis were being offered in various capitals of the world. The British, seconded by India, proposed revival of the International Control Commission, which the United States had always opposed. Laotian King Savang Vatthana proposed that a Commission, composed of three of Laos' neighbors—Burma, Cambodia and Malaya—be appointed to supervise the neutrality of Laos. The United States backed this suggestion and urged the Soviets to do likewise. The Chinese denounced the king's plan as an American ruse, and, along with the Soviets, called for an "enlarged conference" similar to the 1954 Geneva meeting on Indochina, restoration of the ICC to Laos, and recognition of the Souvanna Phouma government as the only legitimate one.[34] Cambodia's Chief of State, Norodom Sihanouk, also disagreed with the king's proposal and put forth his own plan for an international conference not dissimilar to the Chinese proposal. The communist Pathet Lao and Souvanna Phouma endorsed the proposals of the Soviets, Chinese and Cambodians. The Thai, the most concerned about the communist gains, remained quiet and awaited the forthcoming March 27 meeting of SEATO, which would determine whether SEATO would honor its obligations or become a "paper tiger."

On March 23, just prior to the SEATO meeting, President Kennedy made his famous televised "map" talk on the situation in Laos.[35] The Presidential analysis confirmed that there was a "clear and one-sided threat" to Laotian neutrality, and that this threat came from the Soviet bloc. There had been "over 1000" aircraft sorties since December 13, plus "a whole supporting set of combat specialists, mainly from Communist North Viet Nam." The President hoped to stop this war by supporting the goal of

[34]Souvanna Phouma, after losing his post as premier in December 1960, had been living in Cambodia. In mid-February 1961, he again joined his Pathet Lao half-brother and Kong Le in Khan Khay, Xieng Khouang province, and gave them his support against the Royal Lao government.

[35]*Department of State Bulletin*, April 17, 1961, pp. 543-544. The *New York Times*, March 24, carried the text and transcript of the Presidential News Conference, including additional material on Laos.

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"a neutral and independent Laos tied to no outside power or group of powers." He was prepared to enter into "constructive negotiations," he announced, along the lines of the British proposal (i.e., a new Geneva conference), but he warned that if external aggression against Laos did not cease, "those who support a truly neutral Laos will have to consider their response." The SEATO meeting was specifically mentioned as one occasion for such consideration. The President added that "our support for the present duly constituted government [the Boun Oum government] is aimed entirely and exclusively at [obtaining the above] result."

The President had decided on an attempt to save Laos not by an act of military intervention, but by diplomatic moves which, if all went well, would secure the removal of all "intervening" parties, the communists as well as the United States.[36] Laos, then, according to the President's hope, would become independent and neutral, or neutralized by international agreement, the solution applied to Austria. The danger of this approach should have been clear: the incongruity of applying a "European" solution to a Southeast Asian problem where similar conditions do not exist.[37]

At the SEATO meeting, President Kennedy's call for a cease-fire and negotiations for a neutral Laos were, in effect, endorsed, despite the objections of some of its Asian members. The SEATO resolution adopted at the meeting warned that if these "efforts fail," and if "there continues to be an active military attempt to obtain control of Laos," SEATO would take "whatever action may be appropriate in the circumstances."[38] The SEATO meeting also revealed that Britain and France strongly favored a new Laotian coalition government headed by Souvanna Phouma; Thailand, and apparently the Philippines, favored the existing Boun Oum regime; and the United States attempted to harmonize these differences. W. Averell Harriman, then Ambassador-at-

[36]While the President had apparently decided upon diplomacy rather than military measures, he left himself an opening to opt for military intervention by ordering elements of the Seventh Fleet, with U.S. Marine ground forces aboard, to the scene at the time of his "map" talk and the special SEATO meeting, ready for deployment if necessary in Laos. Perhaps another factor dissuading the President from military intervention, which he regarded as the very last resort, was the April 1961 debacle at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba—with its attendant effects upon U.S. prestige. In any event, by the end of April, the President had definitely ruled out military intervention in Laos. This decision, according to Joseph Alsop (*Washington Post,* February 19, 1962) had been endorsed by Congressional leaders of both political parties.

[37]See Letter to *New York Times,* April 23, 1961, by William Henderson and Frank N. Trager.

[38]From text of *SEATO Resolution.* See *New York Times,* March 29 and 30, 1961.

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large and later Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, reported to the President that "Souvanna Phouma believes that he is the man of the hour in Laos."

The Soviets had no difficulty in agreeing to the idea of a new Geneva conference, since they had already recommended it. The President's "map" talk and the SEATO meeting confirmed U.S. willingness to accept this British proposal—thus rejecting the advice of those U.S. officials who had called for a policy of supporting the pro-Western groups in Laos. The U.S. did set one precondition to another Geneva conference: a verified cease-fire in Laos. This required some six weeks to negotiate, during which the communists proceeded to advance their lines in Laos with impunity. Simultaneously, they pressed forward in South Vietnam, where their forces were estimated by Secretary Rusk in May 1961 to be 12,000 or four times their size in late 1959. Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam, increasingly supplied via the Ho Chi Minh Trail which was by now completely in communist hands, had been considerably intensified after 1959. At the time of the March 1961 SEATO meeting, it was estimated that the Viet Cong were taking some 500 to 800 lives each month.

The Geneva Conference

The fourteen-nation Geneva Conference met on May 16, 1961, with the United States as a full participant. Its membership included all the states of mainland Southeast Asia, Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, the two Vietnams and Laos; the three members of the original ICC for Laos, India, Canada and Poland; the USSR and the People's Republic of China; the United Kingdom, France and the United States. From mid-May to mid-December 1961, these powers worked to draft a Declaration of Neutrality of Laos upon which they could agree. At the same time, the "three princes"—Prince Boun Oum of the Royal Lao government, Prince Souphanouvong of the Pathet Lao, and Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Geneva-named premier-designate—negotiated on the distribution of power in a new coalition government for Laos. Boun Oum and General Phoumi Nosavan, through a year of intermittent negotiating sessions, remained unwilling to surrender the two portfolios of Defense and Interior. In an effort to force the Royal government into a coalition regime, the United States at the beginning of 1962 withdrew the three million dollar defense support program, which went toward defraying the salaries of the Royal Lao armed forces. Boun Oum and Phoumi Nosavan

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refused to submit meekly to such financial punishment. They traveled to friendly Asian capitals in the vain hope of winning support for their point of view and a change in U.S. policy, but neither Thailand nor the Philippines could influence the U.S. government to alter its course.

Though President Kennedy in his "map" talk had declared our "support for the duly constituted government" in Laos, i.e., the government led by Boun Oum and Phoumi Nosavan, U.S. negotiators at the Geneva Conference quickly accepted the views of Britain and France with respect to the proposed political role of Souvanna Phouma, the self-proclaimed "man of the hour." Assistant Secretary Harriman and Ambassador Brown had apparently persuaded the Kennedy Administration to support Souvanna Phouma as premier-designate, despite his predilection for a coalition with communist participation.

U.S. policy at the Geneva Conference may have been determined as a result of the Kennedy-Khrushchev summit meeting in Vienna in June 1961. At this summit meeting, President Kennedy seems to have become convinced that the Soviets would adhere to an agreement for a neutral and independent Laos. During the Geneva negotiations, Harriman gained the same impression of Soviet intentions toward Laos. In May 1962, the Assistant Secretary was reported "to believe that Russians will cooperate in the effort to make Laos neutral."[39]

The Kennedy Administration decided to base its policies on these estimates of Soviet intentions and on previous estimates by Harriman and Brown of Souvanna Phouma's reliability. Washington hoped to secure a future neutral, independent Laos by means of a "diplomatic solution," without what the President called "the great hazard . . . of a shooting war . . . in the jungles of Asia."[40]

Resumption of Hostilities

The communists used the protracted negotiations at Geneva to improve their military-strategic position in Laos. During the year after the Geneva Conference began, there were repeated violations of the cease-fire by the communists. At first, during the late spring of 1961, one could have regarded these violations as patrol incidents or the "settling down" of the cease-fire line. However,

[39]*New York Times,* May 12, 1962.
[40]Transcript, Question 5, The President's News Conference, *New York Times,* May 18, 1962. See also Transcript, Question 7, The President's News Conference, *ibid.,* May 10, 1962.

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violations continued to occur. Harriman complained of several at a November meeting in Geneva.[41] The United States did little but complain until May 1962, even though the communists steadily added to the territory they controlled. Forgotten or ignored was the SEATO warning of March 1961 that if "an active military attempt to obtain control of Laos" continued, SEATO would take appropriate action.

At 3 a.m. on May 7, 1962, the communists began a heavy bombardment in a new sector of the tenuous cease-fire line. The target was Nam Tha, a key town south and west of Phong Saly province and close to the Chinese border, control of which permitted the Royal army to seal off communist-held Phong Saly at its southwestern provincial line. Nam Tha's army garrison had recently been reinforced, for the Pathet Lao had been observed strengthening their positions in the vicinity, as though preparing to lay siege to Nam Tha. Nevertheless, despite their numerical superiority to the Pathet Lao, the Royal Lao forces gave a miserable account of themselves. Forced to withdraw from Nam Tha, the Royal army fled across the Thai border.

Nam Tha represented the most serious breach of the cease-fire agreement, which had been a prerequisite for the Geneva Conference. The United States at last decided to take stronger measures. First, Assistant Secretary Harriman "severely rebuked" General Phoumi for provoking the Pathet Lao by increasing the size of his defending garrison and for neglecting his duties, i.e., traveling in search of aid to replace that which the U.S. withdrew. Secondly, the United States protested to Moscow, whose officials, on or about May 15, apparently confirmed their full support of the Kennedy-Khrushchev 1961 Vienna summit agreement on Laos.[42] Thirdly, to the plaintive question raised by the Acting Foreign Minister of the Royal Lao government, Sisouk Na Champassak—"What can we say now of our friends who have confidence in the Communists? We are waiting for their reactions."[43]—the United States gave at least one positive answer. On May 18, the first contingent of U.S. Marines landed in Bangkok. There they joined a smaller

[41]See, for example, his remarks, November 1, 1961, U.S. Delegation to the International Conference on Laos, U.S. Del. 118 (US PR/21, November 1, 1961).

[42]This was the guarantee that the Geneva Declaration, after it became operative, would be respected *within* Laos. That Declaration requires the United States and all other foreign groups to withdraw from any kind of bilateral support for Laos. Of course, this guarantee does not affect the activity, legal and clandestine, of the Pathet Lao (and their easily disguised allies from across the border) who remain in Laos. They can continue their activities with impunity.

[43]Quoted in *New York Times*, May 8, 1962.

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group of U.S. forces which had remained in Thailand after a recent SEATO military exercise. Eventually, some 5,000 to 6,000 U.S. troops were stationed in northeast Thailand at the invitation of the Thai government. They were joined by small British and Australian air and ground forces. After the Geneva Agreement of 1962 was signed, the U.S. substantially reduced the size of these forces.

These U.S. military units were sent to Thailand under the March 1962 bilateral agreement between the United States and Thailand. During the visit of the Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, to Washington in the first week of March, the United States gave assurances to Thailand that it would no longer permit the patient and futile search for unanimity in SEATO to endanger the security of this faithful ally. It was this assurance that made U.S. policy in Laos tolerable to the Thai Prime Minister, Marshal Sarit.[44]

With these forces in Thailand and with some 7,000 to 8,000 troops in South Vietnam (16,000 by the fall of 1963), the United States had built up its forces to the point where it could conceivably deal with external aggression against Laos and Thailand.

The Laotian "Solution": Geneva and Afterward

The alarm occasioned by Pathet Lao successes following the Nam Tha hostilities, the rapid deployment of U.S. forces in neighboring Thailand, and intense pressure from the great powers on the three princes, spurred the negotiations toward a coalition government. The three signed an accord on June 12, 1962, thereby establishing a regime providing roughly equal representation for the communists and the pro-Western faction. The "neutralist" prince, Souvanna Phouma, was designated Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. The communist Pathet Lao leader became a Deputy Prime Minister and Economics Minister, and the anti-communist General Phoumi Nosavan also became a Deputy Prime

[44]On March 7, Secretary of State Rusk and Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman issued a joint statement, confirmed by exchanges between President Kennedy and Marshal Sarit, which (1) pledged U.S. defense of Thailand on a bilateral basis; (2) broke the previously existing SEATO "rule of unanimity" which had blocked SEATO action in the Southeast Asian crisis and made it a "paper tiger"; and (3) in effect sounded the death knell of SEATO as presently constituted. See also W. Averell Harriman, "What We Are Doing in Southeast Asia," *New York Times Magazine,* May 27, 1962, for a useful summary explanation of U.S. policy in Laos; and also a House bipartisan report to the Foreign Affairs Committee, which indicts SEATO as offering "no security"—to Southeast Asians (*New York Times,* May 8, 1962).

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Minister and Finance Minister. Other notable cabinet appointments were: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Quinim Pholsena, a self-styled neutralist but on past evidence a communist sympathizer and a former spokesman for the Neo Lao Hak Sat; and Minister of Information, Phoumi Vongvichit, the theoretician of the Neo Lao Hak Sat. The coalition included nineteen members, seven from the neutralist faction, four from Phoumi's group, four from the Pathet Lao, and four Vientiane "moderates."[45]

The portfolios of Defense and Interior (the latter held by Pheng Phongsavan of the "neutralist" faction) were the major stumbling blocks in the protracted negotiations among the three princes. Their accord of June 12 required that "every decision" relating to the Ministries of Defense, Interior and Foreign Affairs must have the unanimous approval of the leaders of the three factions. This provision meant, in effect, that all decisions on foreign and domestic policies would require unanimity—the implementation of the now-famous Soviet "troika" principle.

Establishment of the coalition government removed the final obstacle to signing the Geneva Declaration of 1962. That Declaration and the accompanying documents purport to insure the neutrality of Laos. It declares overtly that SEATO shall have no relationship to Laos; thus SEATO's protocol coverage has been formally withdrawn from Laos, although the Declaration does not similarly exclude any communist alliances or instrument. It allows the new ICC for Laos, composed again of India, Poland and Canada, to "investigate violations" on its own initiative and by a majority vote, but "conclusions, recommendations and decisions" of the ICC must be adopted unanimously. A small French training contingent, comparable to that allowed under the 1954 accords, may by agreement remain for a limited time. All other forces and paramilitary units are to quit Laos. No nation is to interfere in the "internal affairs" of Laos. The Declaration clearly leaves the Pathet Lao in a superior position, contiguous to its sanctuary in North Vietnam, whose peoples are racially, ethnically and linguistically akin. It has been extremely difficult to investigate, let alone regulate, Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese activities in that part of Laos which they control.

[45]The new coalition government, with Prince Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister, was installed by Royal decree on June 23. For full listing of all members of the new cabinet, see *Current Notes on International Affairs*, June 1962, pp. 50-51. For the text of the various official documents, see the useful compilation prepared by George Modelski, *International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question 1961-62* (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1962).

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The signing of the Geneva Declaration of 1962 did not end the struggle for Laos. It represented at best a pause as Laos and the rest of mainland Southeast Asia entered a new—and perhaps decisive—phase. U.S. policy toward the area has undergone some important changes since 1961. The Eisenhower Administration had recognized the danger in mainland Southeast Asia. In part, it met the danger by large-scale material assistance to Vietnam and Laos, and on two occasions (September 1959 and January 1961) by a transient show of military force. However, it was incapable of coping with the unconventional conflict methods which the international communist movement so skillfully exploited in these two beleaguered states; nor did it meet the need for civic action and nation-building which would have won the population to the support of pro-Western governments. Today, the enormously complicated tasks of developing effective counter-insurgency warfare and of providing popular socio-economic reforms at the village level are being re-examined in Washington.

Events in Laos are steadily invalidating the settlement of Geneva 1962. During the past year, skirmishing between the Pathet Lao-Kong Le (neutralist) troops and those loyal to General Phoumi gave way to more serious fighting between the Pathet Lao and neutralist forces. The communists succeeded in wooing away one of Kong Le's chief deputies, Colonel Deuane Sipaseuth (or perhaps the Colonel was a "plant"), and some of his "neutralist" forces. Fighting then erupted on the Plaine des Jarres, ostensibly between the neutralists and the communists. A temporary reconciliation, involving Kong Le, Deuane and Pathet Lao General Singkapo was effected in December 1962-January 1963 by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. But this "truce" collapsed in the face of a series of assassinations. In mid-February 1963, Kong Le's close friend and second-in-command, Colonel Ketsana Vongsouvanh, was shot while at home in the village of Phonesavan. In early April, "neutralist" Foreign Minister Quinim Pholsena was murdered. Other killings occurred and fighting broke out. As a result, Kong Le and perhaps Souvanna Phouma may now be a little wiser with regard to the methods and objectives of their communist coalition partners. During the spring and summer, they were striving to rebuild the tenuous truce. In April, the U.S. Navy engaged in "precautionary" activities in the Gulf of Siam while the United Kingdom in May and June again sought to have Moscow persuade the Laotian communists to abide by the Geneva 1962 accords. Nothing came of this effort. In July, during the test

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ban negotiations in Moscow, Harriman discussed the question of Laos with Khrushchev, but these talks apparently produced no practical results.

Nor did the rainy season, from June to September, interrupt the communist advance. As the Rangoon *Guardian* reported on July 26, 1963, "civilians in Laos are suffering the most because of the fighting. . . . It has become necessary to provide harassed refugees with . . . basic [food] items . . . by airdrops." It quoted Souvanna Phouma as charging that the Pathet Lao and their allies were violating the cease-fire agreements. On August 25, the *New York Times* reported new evidence of these violations. After the rainy season was over, communist activity increased; on October 29, the United States charged that North Vietnam was violating the Geneva Agreement of 1962 by extensive truck supply of matériel to the Pathet Lao. In that same month Souvanna Phouma appealed to Great Britain and the Soviet Union (the Geneva co-chairmen) for help to preserve his government and restore peace.[46]

Partition—An Alternative Solution

Are there viable alternatives, acceptable to the American public, other than the withdrawals called for by the 1962 Geneva Declaration and the neutralization of Laos under a coalition government which includes the communist Pathet Lao?

Several approaches might be considered as possible alternatives. One might call for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. economic and diplomatic support for a neutralized Laos, but a continuation of U.S. efforts to preserve South Vietnam. This would not only mean the surrender of Laos to the communists, but would make the defense of the rest of mainland Southeast Asia considerably more difficult. In terms of strategy, geography and the morale of our Asian allies this is a very unattractive alternative.

Another possibility might be the drawing of a "so-far-and-no-further" line of defense in Laos.[47] If this were done, any encroachment across this line by the communists would automatically invoke U.S. participation of a magnitude at least equal to that in

[46]As of this writing at the end of October, nothing has happened to ease the situation. Souvanna Phouma has been quoted as saying that he expects "the offensive . . . in the Plaine des Jarres [including] North Vietnamese troops" before the end of the year (*The Asian Student*, San Francisco, October 26, 1963). To follow the events since Geneva 1962 see "End to Laotian Neutralism?", *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), April 25, 1963, pp. 209-211; Stanley Karnow, "Laos: The Settlement that Settled Nothing," *The Reporter*, April 25, 1963, pp. 34-37; and the *New York Times, passim*, especially October 27 and 30, 1963.

[47]See Frank N. Trager, *Asian Survey, op. cit.*, p. 10.

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South Vietnam. This solution might have been feasible before the Pathet Lao made their substantial gains of the past two years; at present it seems unlikely that a line of defense could either be drawn by the U.S. or be effectively maintained.

The continued encroachment on the Plaine des Jarres, the frequent violations of the cease-fire by the Pathet Lao since the Geneva Agreement of 1962, and the fact that their participation in the coalition government does not imply a change in their communist outlook, strongly suggest that *partition* of Laos would be a more effective policy for ensuring the security of what remains of Laos and the rest of mainland Southeast Asia. It would seem to be the minimum condition for a forward strategy—if one is to be applied. Any of the past violations of the cease-fire, e.g., at Nam Tha, could have provided the occasion for the adoption of such a policy. Each incident arising out of communist bad faith provides a reason and an opportunity to adopt a policy of partition. There will be no communist withdrawal, no true cease-fire in Laos, no stable coalition government.

Partition is a difficult solution to recommend and, as we have seen in Korea, Vietnam and Berlin, difficult to maintain. But partition would at least permit the preservation of a part of Laos, and would, if the new line is defended, add to the security of Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and especially Vietnam, where we are committed. Partition describes, in effect, the solution that was unofficially meted out to Laos at and after the 1954 Geneva Conference. The communists were awarded priority in Phong Saly and Sam Neua provinces and a corridor joining them across eastern Luang Prabang province.

Two possible methods of partitioning Laos come to mind. One plan, entailing greater risks, would require the use of SEATO or Asian, U.S. and Royal Lao forces to drive the communists back to those two provinces and the corridor, i.e., the area that was their *de jure* position of 1954. An alternative partition plan would recognize communist hegemony not only in those two provinces, but also in the province of Xieng Khouang, which, in effect, served as Kong Le's and Souvanna Phouma's base after the fall of Vientiane in December 1960. This plan would reward the communists for their effective effort since 1954, but it would stop the advance of the Pathet Lao. It is both less risky and less satisfactory (for the West) than the first plan, in that it accepts a communist gain for what it is in the present balance of global forces.

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As a more modest proposal, it is capable of enlisting broader international support. It would permit free Laos to retain the capital area of Luang Prabang, Vientiane and everything to the west and south. Laos would then consist of all of the panhandle and the western portion of the pan. A plan such as this would still have to be carried out by SEATO or Asian and U.S. forces, and the estimated 45,000 troops of the Royal Lao army. The latter's civilian leadership would be based on the CDNI, what is left of the Rally of Laotian People, and such elements of Souvanna Phouma-Kong Le's Lao Penhang or Neutralist Party as would wish to join in this coalition. That is, it would be *anti-communist,* not "neutral," in character. This solution would save the important Mekong Valley and the panhandle of Laos. It would still entail cleaning up pockets of Viet Minh and Pathet Lao forces in the panhandle, in operations comparable to the fighting in Vietnam, but it would make that task somewhat easier.

Partition is an unpopular event in any country—for example, consider the effect of partition on Poland since the eighteenth century. But precisely because Laos has not been a unified political entity, at least not since its division in 1694, there is a chance that partition could be imposed successfully. After existing 250 years as a group of separate little monarchies, Laos has been reconstituted as one kingdom, but the world in which it lives today has not given it an opportunity to become a quiet constitutional monarchy, pursuing in peace its Buddhistic ways.

Partition would preserve that monarchy and the Buddhist religion. It would also provide an opportunity to shut down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and add to the security of the rest of Southeast Asia; in particular, it would lighten the U.S. burden in South Vietnam. This would be no mean achievement. Partition would recognize the reality of communist penetration in Laos and draw a defensive perimeter before that penetration absorbs the whole of this important area. Two other factors contribute to the feasibility of this alternative: the arrival of U.S. forces in Thailand and Vietnam and their genuine acceptance in these two countries; and the possibility that Thailand could assist, in terms of religion, culture, language and in other ways, in the nation-building tasks of a partitioned but free Laos.

If the idea of partition were accepted, who would ensure it? In the final analysis, the free Laotians who accept it would have to defend their remaining territory. But they would require military

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and economic assistance for the long-term effort to rebuild what remains of their country. Obviously, the U.S. would have to defray the largest share of this cost. A Western military presence would also be required indefinitely. But it is altogether probable that assistance would be forthcoming from other friendly Southeast Asian nations.

Partition is an alternative to the larger, hazardous, shooting war which President Kennedy rightly fears, and an alternative to permitting a piecemeal communist conquest of Laos. If Washington announced the full details of a partition plan while simultaneously positioning the reinforcements needed to hold that line; and if the communists were clearly informed that they would be permitted to retain much of the gains their armies had acquired, the risk of a bigger war with Peking would be lessened. Peking's domestic difficulties at this time offer some insurance that, however belligerent China's attitude, she can ill afford to risk a war which would inevitably be carried to her mainland. The June 1961 Vienna agreement with Khrushchev, Moscow's guarantee to enforce the 1962 Geneva Declaration, Khrushchev's current troubles with the independent communist, Mao Tse-tung, and the present posture of Moscow on the test ban and other negotiable issues suggest that Moscow might be satisfied with the gains thus far made in Laos.

Even if Souvanna Phouma lives up to the expectations of our policymakers, it seems unlikely that he will be able to prevent communist penetration of the government and of the institutions of Laos. But many observers do not share the sanguine views of leading U.S. government officials with respect to Souvanna Phouma; they warn that if the present Free World policy for Laos is not altered, the communists will eventually take over all of Laos —with predictable consequences for the rest of Southeast Asia.

In a significant statement of U.S. foreign policy, delivered on November 16, 1961, at the University of Washington in Seattle, President Kennedy declared, "while we negotiate freely, we shall not negotiate freedom." Increasingly it becomes clear that, despite good U.S. intentions, this maxim was not applied to Laos. It is still possible to apply the President's prescription, thus saving the remaining part of a free Laos and strengthening the defense of all of mainland Southeast Asia.

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POWER AND LEADERSHIP IN THE ARAB WORLD

by H. B. Sharabi

THE phenomenon of power in the Arab world has undergone in the course of the last decade and a half a drastic transformation by virtue of two main factors. The first, which is measurable, has two aspects: the discovery and acquisition of new wealth, and the attainment of full national sovereignty. The other factor, which is not easy to assess, is related to the disintegration of the Muslim social order and the emergence of the masses as a new social force in political life.

Speaking generally and strictly in terms of political domination, one can say that power in the contemporary Arab world manifests itself in three types of leadership. One is *traditional*, in which power is hereditary and bound to custom and tradition, as in the case of the patrimonial monarchies, shaykhdoms, sultanates and amirates of the Arabian Peninsula, and, to a lesser degree, the monarchies of Jordan, Libya and Morocco. The second type is *feudal-political* (or *iqta'*)[1] leadership, in which power no longer comes merely from large landholdings or from sectarian, tribal or family status but also derives from political position and prestige; political office here becomes a new status symbol, to be acquired by the oligarchy of the old order, as in the case of Lebanon and Jordan, and of Syria, Iraq and Egypt before their revolutions. The third is *revolutionary* leadership, in which power is attained by the forcible seizure of the means of power in the state.

Although these three types of leadership differ in their systems of domination, patterns of control, sources, claims of legitimation, ideals, and material interests, they all share one distinctive characteristic, namely, personalized power: that is, under all three types of domination power resides not in the *office* but in the *person* who occupies that office. To elucidate this feature in terms of practical application and to bring into clear focus the functional attributes of leadership in the Arab world, each type of leadership is defined below.

[1] *Iqta'* leadership here corresponds to the socio-political leadership of *Za'im* analyzed by Arnold Hottinger in "*Zu'ama* and Parties in the Lebanese Crisis of 1958," *Middle East Journal* (Spring 1961). For my definition of *Za'im* in this context, see p. 586 below.

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Traditional Leadership

The purest and most susceptible to definition is the traditional type of leadership. In its simplest form, traditional leadership exercises control directly under a patrimonial form of government. The patrimonial ruler's domination over his subjects is identical to that of a master over his household. His power, outside the limitations set by tradition and accepted usage, is absolute. The system of patrimonial domination thus operates in two spheres of action: one in which all acts and procedures are regulated by established custom and tradition, and another in which the ruler's will is supreme. From the ruler's standpoint, and under both patterns of domination, his subjects are not, strictly speaking, "citizens" but constitute a species of property, in the same sense in which Ibn Khaldun defines the relationship between ruler and ruled as *malaka* (literally, possession) and *ra'iyyah* (flock).[2]

Exercising his power directly, the patrimonial ruler never delegates power but employs representatives whose sole function is to act as intermediaries. His administration, to use the term broadly, is not an independent bureaucratic structure performing specific functions and tasks but a body composed of retainers and servants, sons and uncles, who do his bidding and are personally responsible to him. Thus, an administrative system in the Western sense is impossible under patrimonial domination. Indeed, a genuine administrative structure with independent executive authority constitutes a violation of the patrimonial ruler's power and infringes upon the unity and totality of his sovereignty.

The major concern of any kind of traditional domination is not with the problem of legitimation—as is the case with revolutionary leadership—but primarily with the preservation of personal control. This is achieved mainly by upholding tradition and blocking any type of social or political reform, as in the classic case of Imam Yahya in Yemen. To permit any innovation or any form of change, even though it might enhance the ruler's immediate interest, would damage the very basis of his power. Thus, while the patrimonial ruler is always willing to enforce tradition and custom even where it restricts the sphere of his influence, he will not allow the adoption of the principle of new legislation; for if he allows the development among his subjects of an awareness of their own separate interests and of the capacity of

[2] *Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, trans. by Franz Rozenthal (New York, 1958), Vol. I, p. 383.

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advancing these interests, his subjects may act collectively against him. Once circumstances force patrimonial leadership to become dependent on the good will of its *ra'iyyah,* control begins to be lost and power to crumble. The leadership will then have either to depend on external support—for example, the oil shaykhdoms —or to engage in compromise while relying on force to maintain control. In other words, the subversion of patrimonial rule begins with the setting forth of the principle of the distribution of rights and responsibilities in the community.

Traditionalist leadership is best represented today in Sa'udi Arabia, the Persian Gulf shaykhdoms, and South Arabia.[3] In all these Arabian territories the principle of legitimacy and the pattern of political domination are firmly rooted (despite varying degrees of administrative and political innovations) in Islam and established social custom. Whether in the case of the King of Sa'udi Arabia, the Amir of Kuwait, or the Sultan of Muscat, the right to govern is not defined by law or based on some form of public consent but rather on the unquestioned legitimacy deriving from religious prescript and tradition. In the other Arab countries in which traditionalism plays an important role in political life, the existence of constitutional structures embodying the principle of independent legislation greatly affects both the bases of legitimacy and the scope of political power.

In recent years these traditionalist societies have experienced rising internal tensions, mainly under the stress of rapidly changing economic conditions and the impact of social revolutions in the surrounding Arab countries, which have set in motion a process of reform in the pattern and structure of government. In Sa'udi Arabia, for example, the idea of drawing up a constitution for a while was taken seriously. It is significant that it was the experienced and "progressive" Crown Prince Faisal who was to curb the "constitutionalist" movement, which his conservative brother King Sa'ud had half-heartedly endorsed in the hope of reducing tension and strengthening the Sa'udi monarchy. Faisal has clearly seen that to recognize the principle of popular sovereignty would undermine the very bases upon which the Sa'udi claim to power rests. In this light, the Sa'udi government's extravagant support of the Imam of Yemen against the Egyptian-backed revolutionary republican government of Sana is to be understood

[3]In Yemen, where a revolutionary regime on the Egyptian pattern was established in 1962, the fate of Zaidi traditionalism was still at stake at the time of this writing.

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not merely in terms of the Sa'udi's fear of having a base for revolutionary activity at their doorstep, but also and primarily from their determination to uphold the principle of traditionalist Muslim legitimacy against the claims of the first successful revolutionary republic in the Arabian Peninsula. Indeed, the civil war in Yemen is to be viewed as an ideological conflict between Sa'udi Arabia and Egypt, which represent the two great opposing forces in the Arab world today, the force of Islamic traditionalism and that of socialist republican nationalism.

Iqta' (Feudal-Political) Leadership

The second category, feudal-political power, is in its political manifestation basically another form of traditional authority. That it has come to represent a new pattern of power in Arab society, with its own type of domination, legitimation and control, is due to the disintegration of the old social structures and the interpolation of feudal influence and privilege into the new system of political and economic organization. Arab *iqta'* is of course not to be construed as synonymous with medieval European feudalism; the term is here used simply to denote that pattern of control which is usually enjoyed by the pasha, the bey, the mir, the agha, the tribal shaykh. In the prerevolutionary order of Arab society and in those countries in which revolutionary leadership has not yet made its appearance, this pattern of control was not only able to accommodate itself to the newly adopted structures of economic and political power but virtually to usurp and monopolize them.

The new Western-style system of government, with its parliamentary machinery and pluralistic parties, introduced during the last three or four decades into Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, was simply converted by this neo-feudal oligarchy into an instrument for securing total political control and thus retaining power and prestige. Under the new administrative system, the entire bureaucratic hierarchy from highest official to lowest clerk represents the same distribution of power and privilege as in the old order.

From the institutional standpoint, the usurpation and personalization of power by the oligarchy in all these states made practically impossible the growth and development of valid legal and administrative institutions. The act of holding office was regarded simply as a means of furthering one's political and economic interests and of exercising official influence in a field

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of personal endeavor. The intricate system of familial, sectarian and partisan patronage governed all official and administrative appointments and promotions. Any change in the system occurred only as a result of internal shifts in the distribution of power within the oligarchy; its radical transformation was possible only by the destruction of the entire socio-political structure upon which it rested, as was the case in Egypt, Syria and Iraq.

Under the peculiar structure of this form of political domination in the Middle East, allegiance is not so much based on loyalty as on the vital dependence of the less powerful on the powerful, who can provide jobs and further careers for followers and supporters. For example, in Iraq the "pasha" (as Nuri al-Sa'id was simply called) recruited among his following some of the finest of the country's young nationalists, who filled the higher ranks of the administration and the diplomatic service as well as certain posts in the army. That their true loyalty was not to him or to the regime which he served is beside the point. The point here is that so long as Hashimite power remained paramount, these young men had to choose between accommodating themselves to the existing pattern of power and privilege or risking financial ruin and professional failure. The fact that they did accommodate themselves to the status quo only reaffirms the general principle which governs political behavior in all Arab states: *Wherever political leadership is in firm possession of power, material interests will always take precedence over idealistic considerations.*

Loyalty in these conditions has its primary motivation not in a cause but in the calculated pursuit of interest, and leadership, on its part, is not a true *za'ama* (i.e., leadership established on the basis of free loyalty) but merely a new form of overlordship. The reason all doctrinal political parties (such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Ba'th and the Syrian Social National Party) are suspect under this type of domination is that they establish a basis of loyalty and a principle of leadership which go directly counter to those on which *iqta'* power rests. Consequently, feudal (*iqta'*) domination, like patrimonial rule, has as its major interest the prevention of any form of political innovation and the preservation of the socio-economic status quo which maintains it. Ironically, *iqta'* leadership in the Arab world has been most successful where the parliamentary system of government seemed most securely entrenched. But the fact is that in all those countries in which parliamentary government was introduced, political

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life was dominated not by political parties but by political "blocs," small cliques composed of influential personalities whose relationship to their followers and to each other was based not on political "cause" or doctrine, but rather on personal and sectional interests.[4]

In Lebanon today (and to a lesser extent in Syria, Iraq and Egypt before their respective revolutions), the predominant type of political leadership is not that of the ideological parties but of the political bosses who wield power by virtue of inherited family position, wealth or social prestige, or any combination of these attributes. Leadership is maintained by the rendering of services to a client group which in return for these services will support the leader, campaign for his person in elections, and generally uphold his position. In Lebanon, Salam, Edde, Karame, Sham'oun, to name only a few, are typical *iqta'* leaders whose power has been maintained not by any personal charisma, or a special qualification for political leadership, but primarily because they have been successful political brokers in Lebanese politics.

In this pattern of domination national leadership is seldom possible, and decision-making with respect to major issues is always the product of compromise between the various groups of *iqta'* politicians. Thus under *iqta'* domination, though the system of government is parliamentary, genuine representation in the Western sense is almost wholly lacking; instead another kind of representation prevails, in which interests, privileges, and rights of various groups are balanced by virtue of an intricate system of spoils in which both bloc leaders and their client groups actively participate. It is a pattern in which political action is dominated mostly by material rather than ideal motivations and interest. Though the *iqta'* type of leadership as here defined is characteristic of that kind of domination which is intermediate between the traditional and the revolutionary, it nevertheless manifests itself in the other two types as well but in varying degrees and in different modes. In them, however, because it is usually subordinated to radically different types of authority, domination and control, it is rendered limited both in the scope of application and the degree of influence.

Revolutionary Leadership

By far the most important type of leadership in the Arab world today is revolutionary leadership. In its inner structure it is not

[4]See H. B. Sharabi, "Parliamentary Government and Military Autocracy in the Middle East," Orbis (Fall 1960), p. 339.

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a new phenomenon in Islamic society, for in many respects it corresponds to the Islamic military sultanate of the tenth century.[5] The contemporary revolutionary leader, like the medieval sultan, is primarily a holder of military power; the source of his authority and the condition of his domination are in the final resort dependent upon his monopoly of the means of violence. The change of position under a given structure of government from army officer to prime minister or president does not in any real sense alter the nature of his power or the true source of his domination. As Machiavelli put it, "Power can easily take a name, but a name cannot give power."[6]

Indeed, for the revolutionary leader all problems revolve around the central problem of power. For to seize power is not to possess it unconditionally. "Power alone," MacIver has said, "has no legitimacy, no mandate, no office."[7] Hence, the major concern of revolutionary leadership is the legitimation of power. The military sultanate of the tenth century solved this problem by an accommodation with the caliphate, whereby the sultan's *de facto* control was legitimized in return for the sultan's formal acknowledgment of the caliphate as the fountain of all authority.[8] For the contemporary revolutionary leader, such a solution is, of course, no longer possible; sovereignty now is vested in the people and no legitimate means has so far been devised under a revolutionary regime for the people to exercise this sovereignty. The best illustration of this is Nasser's continuous efforts since 1955 to create a national assembly able to provide a medium of communication between ruler and ruled and at the same time to give a sense of popular participation in government. But neither the first assembly based on the National Union (the single party created in 1956 and reorganized in 1959 after union with Syria), nor that founded on the Union of National Forces (the new party created in 1962 following the dissolution of the Egyptian-Syrian union and the introduction of socialism into Egypt) succeeded in fulfilling this limited function. The method by which candidates were nominated and the manner in which elections were carried out only served to show more clearly where real power lay and to dispel any illusion that some might still

[5]See H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West* (London, 1950), Vol. I, Part 1, p. 24.
[6]*Discourses* (Modern Library ed.), p. 202.
[7]R. M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York: Macmillan, 1951), p. 83.
[8]Gibb and Bowen, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Part 1, p. 31.

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have had as to the possibility of reinstating parliamentary democracy in Egypt.

Every successful coup d'état in the Arab world has invariably been received with jubilation and public acclaim. The mandate which this has bestowed on the new leadership, however, has never been sufficient to invest it with the attributes of permanence which the caliphal act of legitimation conferred on the sultan, hence the revolutionary leader's obsession with constitutions, parliaments and legalities. This is a most interesting phenomenon, for it reveals a subtle but unmistakable transformation in the structure of revolutionary leadership once the first phase of excitement and enthusiasm has ended and the hard realities of power have presented themselves. It would seem that upon seizing power, the unknown successful leader of a coup d'état emerges at first as a genuine *za'im,* that is, as a savior, a hero, a symbol of national honor and freedom, and in possession of all power in the state. But no sooner is the routine of daily life restored and the normal functioning of government re-established than he tends to lose the qualities of *za'ama* and is forced to seek its restoration by any action capable of reawakening enthusiasm and support for his leadership. Since charisma, however, is not susceptible to being indefinitely sustained at a high level of intensity, it soon becomes necessary to establish legitimation by means of formal procedures independent of the masses' enthusiasm and moods. It is in this light that the evidently sterile preoccupation with constitutions and parliaments in revolutionary regimes begins to make sense. Democracy by plebiscite, as Napoleon III discovered, becomes the only alternative to undisguised military dictatorship. Equipped with the validating unanimity of a yes-or-no referendum, the revolutionary leader in the Middle East not only assumes the role of guide for his people in a newly-founded parliamentary system, but he also gains a badly needed breathing spell to consolidate his power during the subsequent period of transition in which appropriate channels for the popular exercise of sovereignty are provided.

Yet in the Arab world no revolutionary leader can with impunity put his trust solely in these external trappings of legitimacy. His real power of domination, as Ibn Khaldun long ago pointed out, resides in his firm control of the two key establishments in the state, the army and the civil administration. The process of entrenchment in the military establishment takes place simultaneously with the extension of control over the adminis-

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tration by the appointment of army officers in various key positions. A new ruling class and a new bureaucratic elite thus gradually come into being. In Egypt practically all the executive positions as well as most of the key positions of the bureaucracy are occupied by former army officers. In Iraq after the coup d'état of 1958 the same process of replacement occurred, to the extent that even after the counter-coup of 1963 in which a relatively large number of civilians participated, the dominant posts on all levels of government and administration remained in army hands.

Adib Shishakli's fatal error in Syria was to believe that he could secure legitimation and permanence for his regime solely on the basis of a parliamentary system and a civil administration controlled by a subservient single political party. But with the first military uprising in 1954, the entire machinery of government was paralyzed and neither parliament nor his Movement of Arab Liberation was of any use in coping with the crisis. Thus, *under that political pattern where the principle of violence is the primary deciding factor in the contest for power, parliamentary structures and constitutional façades are of little consequence.*

A feature characteristic of revolutionary leadership is its adherence to a puritan ethic and a philosophy of absolute ends. This is clearly expressed in the assumption by all revolutionary regimes of the moral responsibility for establishing justice as the goal of all social action by the state. This has resulted in the realization by revolutionary governments of far-reaching reforms on all levels of social and economic endeavor. In terms of the conduct of government, it has also led to the appearance of something novel in the Arab world: honest government, spartan leadership, devotion to duty, hard work in public office. Moreover, wherever the revolution has succeeded, it has destroyed social and political *iqta'* and sought to establish economic justice as a principle of public right. It is in this sense that the coup d'état in the Arab world represents virtual revolution. This has been especially true of the Egyptian revolution.

Viewed from another standpoint, the concept of the welfare state advanced by all revolutionary leaderships has also produced a new form of paternalism, whether in the Egyptian authoritarian model or in the liberal Tunisian. The relentless drive toward conformity and regimentation has tended to parcel out the new benefits as well as the old miseries while extending the domination of the state over the entirety of man's life. Whether or not

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time will ameliorate these conditions in the Arab revolutionary regimes, as in Turkey, remains to be seen.

In terms of political action, revolutionary leadership, by its very structure, cannot brook opposition. It cannot store power as it can the instruments of violence, to be used in an emergency. This is especially true of those regimes in which power was seized by coup d'état, as in Egypt and Iraq, less so of those regimes in which power was attained by national revolutions, such as in Tunisia and Algeria. As power, in order to exist as power, must remain in a state of constant actualization (lest it pass away), so the continuous exercise of power requires the establishment of total conformity as well as the enforcement of strict political orthodoxy. In the revolutionary regimes of the Arab world this principle is represented in different forms and applied in varying degrees of stringency, from the almost free atmosphere of Bourghiba's dominant-party type of democracy to Kassem's total, repressive kind of military dictatorship.[9] But under all the forms of revolutionary authority, which must be absolute in order to continue to function, the possibility of genuine political opposition is ruled out. Not only the problem of internal political organization, but every social issue and policy becomes a tool in the struggle for power, at least in the early years of the revolutionary regime's existence.

The revolutionary leader can have no organized political following in the true sense of the term. The single party of any revolutionary regime cannot act as an independent political body endowed with genuine freedom of action and decision, but represents rather an extension of the revolutionary leader's power.[10] Only the masses, which compose a crucial element of the leader's power, constitute his true following. Next to the instruments of military and police control, this unorganized amorphous mass is the most potent force which revolutionary leadership can employ. But as a source of power, the masses must be kept in a state of constant excitement, which is simultaneously the secret of their influence and the source of the danger they pose to all revolutionary leaderships. The masses are notoriously fickle, but in the Arab world they are not politically fickle in the sense in which the supporters of organized political parties are. For every mass lacks the inner discipline which gives party members a sense of objective orientation and the capacity to rebel. The masses are

[9]Sharabi, *op. cit.*, pp. 344-346.
[10]This is true even of Bourghiba.

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capable of only one thing—to follow or to refuse to follow the leader.

Personalized Power

In the contemporary Arab world, *personalized power* is the basis of all the types of domination and control. In all Arab states the power-holder commands and expects to be obeyed; he bestows rewards as quickly as he metes out punishment; he knows no limitations except those set by his personal strength to dominate and by the exigencies of the given situation. *Personalized power as it exists in the Arab world violates two principles of rational political association: the temporary holding of office and the limited authority prescribed by the functions of office.*

Lacking objectively binding rules imposed by valid procedure, personalized power in the twentieth century can enjoy only contingent legitimacy, even under the most traditional and conservative types of government. Throughout the Arab world, the precedence which the power-holder has over institutional authority has maintained the grip of basically medieval practices and habits and stunted the growth of the procedural and substantive forms of authority and legality which uphold the political life of the modern secular state.

Personalized power, moreover, finds itself the source simultaneously of administrative command and moral injunction. All revolutionary leaders seem to be imbued by a strange sense of self-righteousness. From the administrative and juridical standpoint, personalized power has shown itself capable of divesting the law from its objective, impersonal relevance. In times of crisis this has repeatedly expressed itself in the power-holder's propensity to disregard established legal principles and to refuse to be subject to any normative principle of limitation, which in Western countries is tacitly observed. If substantive norms of procedure and judgment can be changed at a moment's notice and new ones enacted according to the demands of the situation, all bases of rationality simply cease to exist. Thereafter, no verdict can be absolutely valid and every juridical enactment becomes suspect; not only does the political regime become provisional, but the very foundation of the state loses its validity; implicitly, everything is then permitted and no means can be justly judged unlawful. The counter-revolution thus appears always justifiable.

One consequence of this lack of rational limitations is that power has almost always spelled tragedy for those who have

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wielded it in the Arab world. Upon falling from power, the men of great power have suffered the nemesis of violated legality, sometimes in the form of exile and disgrace but quite often in the form of violent death. This boomerang potential naturally exerts a strong influence on the behavior of all power-holders, especially on that of the revolutionary leaders. Being aware of the alternative, they know that in the end they may have to resort to any means to remain seated on the tiger's back.

Another obvious consequence is the intrinsic instability from which all Arab states suffer. The traditionalist regimes have already begun to lose their hold on the sources of legitimacy by virtue of which they have thus far wielded undisputed power, and have been forced to resort more and more to the direct use of violence to maintain order and to suppress growing opposition. This is most obvious today in Sa'udi Arabia, which in addition has been shaken by the defection to Egypt of prominent members of the royal family. The intermediate regimes (e.g., Jordan, Libya, Morocco), in which monarchial absolutism and *iqta'* domination prevail, strive to arrest the surging tide of revolutionary change by means of dictatorial control and direct suppression of opposition.[11] In Jordan the fate of the monarchy seems to depend upon whether the army will remain loyal to the king or whether it will succumb to the revolutionary elements already active in it.

In this sense the revolutionary wave sweeping over the Arab world constitutes a political force undermining established structures and institutions and not merely an ideology calling for Arab unity and social and economic reform. In the revolutionary regimes, perhaps the most important factor contributing to instability is the fact that the usurpation of power has proved incapable of establishing new and lasting grounds for the exercise of power, and thus for the growth of institutions and an orderly process of succession. Power in all types of regimes in the Arab world has no real basis today except in itself. The vicious circle created by the constant threat of subversion and sudden seizure of power has made the relaxation of direct control impossible, which in turn has driven opposition underground and has forced upon power-holders the use of violent methods as the sole means of political action. This is as true today of Tunisia as it is of Egypt, Sa'udi Arabia or Jordan.

[11]Lebanon, though it may still represent an exception to this pattern due to the sectarian basis of its political life, has nevertheless tended in this direction under the increasing interference of the army in political life, especially after the attempted coup d'état of December 1961.

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How will the problem of power and leadership be solved in the Arab world?

The answer seems to lie neither with the idlers and coffee-house intellectuals nor with those who themselves wield power. To the empirical observer (who is not committed to the exigent demands of action), the values and goals of all political endeavor are meaningful only in terms of the use to which they are put in the struggle for power. In the ephemeral realm of political action where the issue of power dominates the lives of men and societies, the observer must maintain his fidelity to those limited but definable concepts which, though incapable of providing final answers, can alone throw some light on this field of investigation—where violence and force are supreme principles. Tentatively, therefore, one might accept by way of conclusion, as well perhaps as a new point of departure, Marx's cryptic but profound observation: "Violence is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one."[12]

[12] *Capital* (Modern Library ed.), p. 824.

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THE POSTWAR SOVIET-JAPANESE FISHERIES DISPUTE*

by George Ginsburgs and Scott Shrewsbury

THE right to fish in waters contiguous to the Soviet Union and Japan has been a traditional bone of contention between the two countries. Before World War II, this conflict was characterized, for the most part, by Japanese mastery of the seas; in the postwar period, its course has been shaped primarily by Soviet military domination of the northwest Pacific region.

The latest phase of this protracted struggle began in 1952. The Soviet Union, after displaying a marked lack of initiative, if not passivity, for nearly seven years, launched a campaign to force Japan to recognize formally the post-1945 status quo in the zone of mutual contact. Local fisheries were an integral and major element in the complex of issues which the USSR pressed Japan to settle amicably. The outcome was the Soviet-Japanese fisheries convention, signed on May 14, 1956. Still in force, that agreement expressed the official Soviet position favoring the overt transformation of a vast expanse of high seas off the Siberian coastline into an economic condominium, jointly administered by Japan and the much more powerful Soviet Union. It is within this framework that, ever since, the two nations have continued the perennial dispute, their main differences as yet unresolved and showing promise of continuing so indefinitely.

I

Although 1956 represents a definite turning point in the Soviet-Japanese fisheries controversy, the events of that year had their roots in the political developments of the preceding decade. During that interval Japan's military weakness vis-à-vis the USSR began to have its effect. Indeed, by the end of World War II, Japan was no longer a sea power. Its navy had been destroyed, and even its fishing fleet and industry had been totally shattered by the Allied advance. Because of territorial losses brought by defeat, especially occupation of South Sakhalin and the Kuriles

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by the Soviets, the Japanese found themselves barred from extensive portions of the northwest Pacific. This territorial change effectively canceled their concomitant right of free access to much of the region's marine resources. The Soviet Union emerged as the leading force on the East Asian continent, inheriting the role played by Japan since the turn of the century. Now it was the USSR which could dictate its will regarding Japanese fishing operations within an area which Moscow hereafter considered its own sphere of influence.

No formal statement by Moscow, defining the peacetime role and objectives it intended to pursue in this area, marked the dawn of the postwar era. In practice, however, Soviet behavior seemed to conform to a recognizable pattern, motivated by a twofold purpose. First, Moscow's actions sought to deal with the key issue of the juridical status of the waters contiguous to the Siberian shore, starting with the old problem of the legal width of the Soviet territorial seas. The Soviets, as early as 1921, had declared this width to be twelve miles from the mean coastal line marked by low tide,[1] but they had never been able to secure Japanese recognition of their claim. Now, despite Japanese protests, Moscow's rule was systematically enforced. Second, Soviet spokesmen attempted to advance the revolutionary legal concept that the Sea of Okhotsk—an international body of water—ought to be acknowledged as "Soviet internal waters and thus legally subject to the sovereignty of the Soviet Union."[2] This thesis was too extreme for even the Soviet Union to maintain seriously for long. It gradually disappeared from Soviet statements, although it has never been expressly repudiated.[3]

In the realm of positive diplomacy, the Soviets did not devote much effort to impressing the legitimacy of their conduct upon the Japanese government or to gaining the latter's acquiescence—because Japan was, at the time, under effective military occupa-

[1]For background history of the 12-mile rule in Soviet diplomacy, see France de Hartingh, *Les Conceptions Soviétiques du Droit de la Mer* (Paris, 1960), pp. 10-26; and T. A. Taracouzio, *The Soviet Union and International Law* (New York, 1935), pp. 63-69.

[2]James H. Guill, "Soviet Maritime Expansion in the Pacific," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 1959, p. 59, citing V. N. Durdenevskii and S. B. Krylov (eds.), *Mezhdunarodnoe pravo* (Moscow, 1947).

[3]However, as late as 1954, A. D. Keilin, *Sovetskoe morskoe pravo* (Moscow, 1954), p. 91, fn. 1, cited M. A. Sergeev, *Kurilskie ostrova* (Moscow, 1947), p. 119, to the effect that "in the instructions on protection of the Okhotsk shores issued by the Russian government in 1853 it was indicated that the Okhotsk Sea was an internal Russian sea," though without drawing any conclusions from that statement.

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tion. Thus, the Soviets were content in the main with enforcing to the fullest extent possible in their own sector the various fishery restrictions imposed on the Japanese by the U.S. Supreme Command. Chief among these was the edict establishing the so-called MacArthur Line.[4] In the Allied Council, the Soviet representative objected strenuously every time a proposal was made to revise the zones open to Japanese fishermen.[5] In addition, Soviet patrols continuously harassed Japanese fishing boats which ventured, or accidentally wandered, too near Soviet territory.[6] This latter action, while prompted in part by Moscow's desire to safeguard the integrity of its maritime frontiers, was also politically motivated: the USSR wanted to demonstrate the power of the Soviet presence on Japan's northern approaches and underline the need for Tokyo to pay close attention to the Kremlin's wishes. It has often been suggested that the Soviets were also seeking to obtain data for their espionage files from captured Japanese fishermen.[7]

II

For the first half-dozen years after the end of World War II, Moscow showed little interest in developing a comprehensive, dynamic foreign policy toward Japan. However, with the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, to which the USSR was not a signatory, Japan regained full sovereignty. Political and diplomatic issues had now crystallized sufficiently for the Soviet government to realize the need to include Japan as an independent factor in its long-range strategic plans for East Asia. The main purpose of the new Soviet approach was to woo Japan away from its latest military commitments to the U.S. Combining blandishment and pressure in equal proportion, the Soviets, seeking to "neutralize" Japan, have successively resorted to a variety of techniques. In nearly every instance, the tempting pros-

[4]Promulgated shortly after the surrender, the decree establishing the MacArthur Line ordered the Japanese to confine their fishing to the area immediately surrounding the home islands and the Ryukyus and thence extending eastward into the Pacific up to the 165th Median.

[5]After 1946, the Japanese on a number of occasions petitioned for an enlargement of their allotted fishing zone and, in spite of Soviet opposition, often obtained approval of their request. See, e.g., *New York Times,* June 13, 1946, p. 8.

[6]The general pattern followed by the Soviets in these cases was to seize the offending craft under the pretext that they had violated either the MacArthur Line or the Soviet maritime frontier, and take their crew members into custody. Some of the latter were released soon after their capture, while others were interned for longer periods of time.

[7]At least such an accusation was voiced by General Ridgway in a 1952 protest against Soviet seizure of 200 fishing craft off Hokkaido. *New York Times,* February 13, 1952, p. 3.

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pect of a fisheries settlement has figured prominently as a bargaining wedge for the Kremlin.[8]

The lifting of occupation-imposed curtailments on Japanese fishing activities did not appreciably reduce the bargaining value of Moscow's overtures on the fisheries problem: although the MacArthur Line no longer restricted the Japanese after 1951, a number of other, similar barriers were hastily erected in its stead by Japan's maritime neighbors. Thus, the Japanese position did not improve sufficiently to dim the attractiveness of the Soviets' tentative offers of settlement.

Although benefiting, in terms of an enhanced diplomatic bargaining position, from the restrictive measures against Japanese fisheries adopted by some of the countries in the Pacific basin, the Soviet Union has criticized these measures. Moscow has contended that the countries involved deliberately attempted to drive the Japanese away from their seaboards, and encouraged them to concentrate instead on intensified exploitation of the marine wealth of the northwestern corner of the ocean, thereby hastening depletion of the reserves off the Siberian coast on which the Soviet Far Eastern fishing industry is dependent.[9] For, whatever the reason—and these Soviet charges may not be altogether without foundation—after 1952, Japanese fishing activities in the northern Asian waters greatly increased, and this trend has persisted. Under these circumstances, the opposing interests of Japan and the USSR were soon bound to clash, especially since the Soviet Union was itself then in the process of expanding fishing operations in the Far East, spending heavily on ocean-type fishing equipment and constantly raising target figures for the size of the annual catch.[10]

At first, Moscow moved to protect its own fishing investments from Japanese competition by the simple expedient of stepping

[8]Cf. Council on Foreign Relations, *Japan Between East and West* (New York, 1957), p. 257: "A carefully calculated propaganda campaign was opened with a special message from Stalin to the Japanese people on New Year's Day 1952, and it has been stepped up in intensity since then." Also, Paul F. Langer, *Japan: New Problems, New Promises* (New York, 1959), p. 43. For a recent Soviet statement of this neutralist thesis, see G. P. Zhukov, *V interesakh Yaponii—neitralitet* (Moscow, 1960).

[9]V. S. Mikhailov, "Mezhdunarodno-pravovoe regulirovanie rybolovstva i drugikh morskikh promyslov na Tikhom Okeane," *Sovetskii ezhegodnik mezhdunarodnogo prava 1960* (Moscow, 1961), pp. 198-199, citing: *Western Fisheries,* February 1955, p. 3; *The Fishing News,* March 1956; *Japan Times,* April 12, 1959; *Pacific Fisherman,* 1959, No. 4, p. 4, No. 6, p. 36, and No. 9, p. 33.

[10]Reportedly, 700,000 tons of fish were procured by the Soviets from the Pacific in 1956, which represented 85% of the gross Soviet salmon catch for the year, 71% of the cetacean, 100% of crab, 65% of mollusks, 30% of herring, and 96% of seaweed.

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up its unilateral seizures of Japanese boats and crews. The frequency of such captures mounted steadily every year between 1951 and 1956.[11] On the surface, this Soviet campaign represented no more than an automatic response to a concerted Japanese economic challenge—a challenge to what Moscow viewed as the established status quo in the northwest Pacific. It was no different from the course adopted by a number of other countries similarly threatened. The Soviet policy, however, bore another, positive dimension as well, linked to an ulterior motive. The Soviets felt an urgent need to achieve prompt regularization of their political relations with Tokyo and to secure, at the earliest possible opportunity, Japan's official acceptance of the existing situation, especially the USSR's title claims to the northern islands. To that end, economic pressures were brought to bear by the Kremlin in the years that followed, with the matter of fisheries always playing a prominent role, in an effort to force Japan to accept a negotiated settlement of all their differences.

III

In mid-1955, such diplomatic discussions were initiated in London. It soon became evident that the Japanese and Soviet positions on almost every item of the agenda were far apart indeed. The basic impasse persisted until early 1956. On February 11, the Soviet press announced that the USSR Council of Ministers had considered the problem of protecting salmon stocks in the northwest Pacific and had decided to introduce measures to end "predatory catches of this fish" by the Japanese and put a stop to the "rapacious" fishing techniques which they employed.[12] About the same time, the Japanese reportedly were warned that unless a peace treaty were signed soon, they would have to vacate the Sea of Okhotsk during the coming March and April.[13]

The London talks, which had been suspended for a while,

[11]France de Hartingh, *op. cit.*, p. 97, notes that concurrently the incidence of seizures of Japanese boats by Communist and Nationalist China declined sharply. On January 6, 1956, the Japanese authorities issued a bulletin cataloguing such cases. At that time, the USSR was said to have captured 450 vessels and 3,892 persons since 1947. In 1955 alone, the Soviets took 125 craft, and 27 more were similarly dealt with in the first four months of 1956. According to that bulletin, "Soviet seizures increased almost twofold in 1955 over the seizures during any of the previous years." In 1956, the Soviets still held 70 vessels and 122 persons. *New York Times,* June 11, 1956, p. 10.

[12]*Pravda* and *Izvestia,* February 11, 1956, p. 1; English text in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* Vol. VIII, No. 6 (1956), pp. 33-34.

[13]*New York Times,* February 9, 1956, p. 5.

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were resumed, but again the diplomats remained at loggerheads on most key issues. Notifying the Japanese that trade and fishing agreements could not be signed until a peace treaty went into effect, the Soviets proceeded again to step up their seizures of Japanese fishing vessels. On March 21, 1956, Moscow followed up its earlier statement of intention by promulgating, unilaterally, the so-called Bulganin Line for the professed purpose of protecting the reserves and regulating the catch of salmon on the high seas adjoining the territorial waters of the USSR along the Siberian shore.[14] Henceforth, under the terms of the decree, in the landward seas within an approximate arc drawn from Cape Olyutorskii to the southernmost offshoot of the Lesser Kurile island group, fishing for salmon during the spawning season (May 15 to September 15) would be allowed only on the basis of special permits issued by Soviet authorities. The size of the overall catch for 1956 was reduced to some 25 million fish (50,000 tons).

Soviet sources have always described this act as a bona fide attempt to institute a long overdue measure for conserving fast diminishing marine resources and as a step taken for the benefit of all countries concerned. The Japanese, on the other hand, charged that these sweeping Soviet restrictions constituted simply another diversionary tactic aimed at influencing the London negotiations, and loudly protested the edict.[15] There was an element of truth in the claims of both parties.

Outwardly, the Soviet enactment complied with the standards requisite of a true conservation measure. The text specified that these rules were provisional and would continue in force only until "the conclusion of an appropriate agreement with the interested states." Moscow took pains to let it be known that "the Soviet Union is well aware what fishery in northern waters means to Japan" and that the USSR, publicly at least, subscribed to the proposition "that the fishery question must be settled with an eye to both Japan's interests and the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union."[16] Soviet sources also emphasized that "the fishing regulations adopted . . . extend equally to Soviet and foreign fishermen: Soviet fishermen had no privileges as compared to

[14] *Pravda,* March 21, 1956; English text in France de Hartingh, *op. cit.,* p. 96, fn. 8.

[15] *New York Times,* March 22, 1956, p. 71. Zengo Ohira, "Fisheries Problems Between Soviet Russia and Japan," *Japanese Annual of International Law,* 1958, No. 2, surmises that the announcement may have sought to force a Japanese decision.

[16] S. Nevsky, "Soviet-Japanese Relations," *International Affairs,* 1956, No. 4, p. 42.

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foreign ones, and in regards to foreign fishermen, there was no discrimination."[17] Whether Soviet fishermen were actually subject to the same restrictions as foreign ones is impossible to determine. Finally, the decree proclaimed that its provisions carried no restrictions on freedom of navigation in the waters involved. Thus, communist commentators were quick to note that the resolution "did not advance any claims of sovereignty at all over the areas named in the decree," and the new rights assumed there by the USSR were of a purely functional and organizational character.[18]

The substantive aspects of the Soviet plan are difficult to assess fully. That there was some need for early action at the state level to protect the fish reserves in question seems undeniable, Japanese contentions to the contrary notwithstanding. In fact, the Soviets have generally defended their initiative by referring to the International Technical Conference on the Protection of Fish and Other Marine Resources, sponsored by the United Nations in Rome in April 1955, which urged that steps be taken as soon as possible to bring some order into the chaotic and excessive exploitation of salmon reserves in the northwest Pacific. To that extent, Moscow's new policy appears to have been justified. However, the Soviet Union must itself have actively contributed to the salmon depletion, since, according to its own official production figures, the Soviet catch of Far Eastern salmon had been mounting steadily every year since 1951. Soviet fishing techniques should perhaps have been classified as no less "rapacious" than those of which the Japanese were accused. The Soviet answer to such a charge is that their fishing organizations increased their quotas at the expense of new reserves and only after the fish had spawned, to avoid long-range deleterious effects on the known reserves. The Soviets maintained that Japanese fishing was particularly harmful because it concentrated indiscriminately on schools of salmon on the high seas during their run and before the breeding cycle was completed, thus preventing reproduction and threatening to destroy the species.

The Soviet measure, while one may concede its economic rationale, was not devoid of political overtones. The timing of the move, coinciding with developments at the London conference, indicates that the political ingredient exercised the decisive

[17]V. S. Mikhailov, *op. cit.*, p. 195.
[18]Wojciech Góralczyk, *Szelf Kontynentalny, Studium prawnomiedzynarodowe* (Warsaw, 1957), p. 109.

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influence in the formulation of Soviet policy toward Japan in 1955-56 as it had since 1945. Why else, after so many years, would the Soviets invoke the principle of conservation? The economic objective—to repulse the Japanese challenge to the Soviet fishing industry—could surely have been achieved through more familiar measures, since the Soviets already exercised effective control over these waters and had long advanced far-reaching juridical claims purporting to give legal sanction to their imperious conduct in the northwest Pacific. The choice of the novel and untried device —fisheries conservation—can perhaps best be attributed to the emergence of certain new factors.

By the beginning of 1956, Soviet leaders must certainly have become convinced that Tokyo was not disposed to recognize the USSR's claims to territorial and special privileges in the Far East—especially the territory acquired as the price of Soviet intervention in the war against Japan and the privileges (exclusive local fishing rights among them) obtained through the skillful manipulation of a propitious postwar situation. In the face of determined Japanese refusal to accept the validity of the Soviet claims, an alternative position had to be devised to justify perpetuation of Soviet domination in the area and Moscow's nearly exclusive exploitation of its resources. The concept of biological conservation was convenient for this purpose. It did not win for the Soviets their maximum goal—Japanese acquiescence to Soviet title over wartime territorial gains; but it served to provide Moscow with a sufficient excuse and a ready instrument for uninterrupted exercise of decisive authority over local marine resources.

The decree of March 1956 reflected a combination of economic and political considerations. In that respect, it stands as a major landmark, for at last the economic side of the problem was promoted to a status of parity with its political dimensions. Between 1951 and 1956, Soviet policy on the Far Eastern fisheries had become more and more paradoxical. Prior to 1951, the situation was relatively simple: Soviet interests in the northwest Pacific were almost exclusively politically oriented. After 1951, the pattern became considerably more complex. The Japanese drive to reassert their fishing rights in these waters, together with the numerous restrictions imposed on them in other parts of the Pacific basin, gave Moscow an excellent opportunity to exert pressure against Japan and force Tokyo to grant political concessions. That tactic was repeatedly tried. It did not prove alto-

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gether successful for two main reasons: First, the Japanese showed unexpected resistance to this form of blackmail. Second, and in the long run perhaps more significant, the Soviets could not follow through on their political offensives and exploit them to the full because of the ever-increasing obtrusion of their own economic commitments. The Soviets might have won greater political gains from Japan during this period if they had been willing to make proportionate economic allowances. It soon became evident, however, that the growth of Soviet economic interests had become too important to permit a substantive cutback, even for a significant political cause. It would seem that Soviet politics and economics in this sphere were working at cross purposes.

IV

By 1956 the Soviets found themselves impaled on the horns of a dilemma. The local fisheries issue could still be, and was, invoked against the Japanese to wring a few diplomatic victories for Moscow on minor points of dispute. To force Japan to back down from an adverse stand on some issue, the Soviets would merely warn that Japanese fishing privileges off the Siberian seaboard would be further restricted unless the Japanese revised their attitude—a crude technique with limited and steadily diminishing usefulness. To obtain a major political advantage, the Soviets would have had to offer Tokyo a genuine economic *quid pro quo*. In view of their own constantly growing dependency on the Pacific's resources, they apparently were no longer able to do so.

Moreover, with each passing year, Moscow would seem to be less and less capable of making such an offer. Since shortly after 1945, the whole Soviet Far East has been experiencing an unprecedented boom. It has been the scene of a population explosion: in 1940, for instance, the Soviet Union's Sakhalin region had an estimated 18,000 inhabitants; on April 1, 1960, the number of residents in all of Sakhalin and the Kuriles was put at 649,405, declining slightly by January 1, 1962, to a total of 630,200.[19] On an area-wide scale, "since the end of World War II, a yearly average of 350,000 people have been moved into this region," so that "while the entire USSR was registering a population gain of

[19] *Politicheskii slovar* (Moscow, 1940), p. 499; *SSSR. Administrativno-territorialnoe delenie Soyuznykh Respublik na 1 aprelya 1960 goda* (10th ed.; Moscow, 1960), p. 166; *ibid., na 1 yanvarya 1962 goda* (11th ed.; Moscow, 1962), p. 180.

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but 16 per cent, its Far Eastern area gained 75 per cent."[20] Economic growth has proceeded at an impressive rate,[21] but the cost has been high. Much of it is expected to be paid for through the rapid development of local production, with the fishing industry heading the list: Soviet spokesmen have frequently pointed out that fishing still constitutes the Maritime Provinces' leading source of wealth and their inhabitants' chief means of livelihood. Moreover, if there is truth, as there seems to be, in the suggestion that "habitual failures in agricultural production have forced the Soviet Union to turn to the high seas as a source for needed protein,"[22] then the importance of the Siberian fisheries assumes national proportions.

It may be concluded that, on a number of diplomatic issues, economic forces have become at least as effective in dictating Soviet policies as political calculations. Moscow's policy on the Kuriles furnishes a good example of this trend. The USSR's consistent refusal to return these islands to Japan, except possibly for the Habomais and Shikotan, certainly is politically motivated. Possession of these territories immeasurably improves the Soviet Union's politico-military posture by projecting its power deep into the northwest Pacific, to the very shores of the Japanese archipelago. From that standpoint alone, the Kuriles may be too valuable for the USSR ever, for any reason, to surrender them. Even should Moscow be inclined—for crucial political and diplomatic reasons—to ease its stand on the yet unresolved problem of the international status of the Kuriles, the magnitude of the economic repercussions attendant on such a step would probably prevent Moscow from carrying out its political strategy. The Japanese have so far shown no inclination to alter their present political system or diplomatic posture in return for their lost territories. Probably nothing short of such a drastic shift in Japanese foreign policies would convince the Soviets to make a political deal involving the Kuriles.

V

The most important conclusion which can be drawn from the resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers concerning the protection of Far Eastern salmon is the recognition by the USSR that in certain cases the

[20]H. W. Edwards, "The Closed Ice Box of East Siberia," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,* July 1961, pp. 54-55. Briefly summarized in *Japan Times,* July 7, 1961.

[21]E.g., "Soviet Modernizes Harbor on Sakhalin," *New York Times,* November 28, 1962, p. 52.

[22]James H. Guill, *op. cit.,* p. 56.

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riparian state may implement—through unilateral acts—protective measures in off-shore fishing grounds adjacent to its seaboard, but located on the high seas.[23]

This, in essence, is the official Soviet view on the subject of fishery conservation—an interpretation which, incidentally, is at present almost universally accepted. Under this definition, the chief criterion for determining whether such extra-domestic regulation of maritime resources by a particular nation is legitimate is that country's physical status as the dominant riparian state vis-à-vis the waters in question. To this, however, Moscow has also sought to add a further requirement:

> . . . by itself, the geographical factor alone of proximity to these areas is not sufficient justification for the introduction of such measures, since that could lead to the violation of interests of other states on the open seas. It would be advisable to recognize that right only on the part of a coastal state which carries out large-scale endeavors for the re-stocking of marine organic resources.[24]

The Soviet Union naturally considers itself to be satisfying in full both the above conditions in the northwest Pacific. Its current policy is thus defended as absolutely valid from the standpoint of the latest pronouncements of international law on this explosive subject. The success of its claim remains dependent on the Soviet Union's proposition that it represents for local purposes the paramount, if not exactly the sole, riparian state—Japan's territorial contiguity to this zone through possession of Hokkaido now presumably being so limited that it is practically disqualified from acting in that capacity. It remains imperative for the USSR, in order to avoid imperiling its present plans, to prevent any broadening of Japan's land-base on the periphery of the northern basin which would elevate the latter to a rank of parity with the USSR as a coastal power there.

VI

Broader global issues also seem to have played a significant role in bringing about the Soviets' switch to the conservation argument in their sustained controversy with Japan over fisheries in the surrounding seas. It became quite clear, for instance, that from an international standpoint, the restrictive policy pursued by the Soviet Union against Japan would certainly be more readily accepted by other states as a responsible exercise of

[23]Wojciech Góralczyk, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
[24]V. S. Mikhailov, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-192.

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national power if it were presented under the guise of "protection of fish stocks." Since the new Soviet leadership was striving at the time to project a better image of itself to the outside world, such a move made good sense. Compared with past practices, the new policy was more respectable; theoretically, at least, it was fully consonant with the general international trend, as exemplified by the practices of several other countries—practices which were formally ratified by the 1958 Geneva conventions on the law of the sea.

Moreover, by 1956 the old approach had become untenable in the light of concurrent Soviet actions elsewhere. While striving to reduce to a minimum Japanese competition along its Far Eastern seaboard, the Soviet Union was simultaneously engaged in expanding as rapidly as possible its own fishing operations all over the world, including, of course, waters adjacent to foreign shores. To continue to exert overt political pressures against Japan might have placed the Soviet Union in an extremely vulnerable position by providing an example for other states to follow to the detriment of Soviet fishing activities. That the Soviets were acutely aware of this possibility is indicated by their efforts to justify, on conservation grounds alone, the measures taken against Japan, thereby greatly minimizing the danger to themselves. For, while Moscow dealt only with Japanese competition where "protective" regulations served its purpose well, Soviet fleets operated in zones frequented by fishermen from many countries, a factor which makes genuine policing by the local riparian nation difficult and a discriminatory policy almost impossible.

The same desire to avoid giving the impression that it ever practiced, or even countenanced the use of, politics in connection with fishery matters, motivated a second, more recent Soviet gesture. This was Moscow's virtual abandonment of the earlier favorite Soviet concept of a "closed" sea (once tentatively advocated by the Soviets in reference to both the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan) in favor of a more limited concept which would include only minimum safeguards for the riparian state, namely, the principle of "military neutralization," while eliminating its economic features. Thus, instead of describing such waters as maritime basins where non-riparian states enjoyed only the rights of free commercial navigation and civilian air passage, but not those of fishing, hunting and related occupations, the latest interpretation expressed the thoroughly revised view that,

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. . . in other respects, to these aqueous spaces can be extended the regime of open seas. Thus, specifically, is preserved therein on the same legal bases as in the open seas the freedom of commercial navigation *and peaceful industry for all nations,* for that does not encroach on the interests of riparian countries arising from their particular position. The preservation of this freedom corresponds to the principle of peaceful co-existence as well as to the interests of strengthening international cooperation and international economic ties.[25]

VII

A number of important developments in the Soviet-Japanese fishing dispute occurred in 1956, following the USSR's conservation decree of March 21. The most immediate consequence of that act was the final breakdown of the London conference, where talks were halted on March 29. Soviet warnings failed to deter the Japanese from their avowed intention to defy Moscow's latest orders. On April 1, "over 100 trawlers exited Hokkaido for the fishing grounds of the central and southern Kurile islands. On 3 April, thirteen Japanese crabbing fleets left for western Kamchatka waters. Two crabbing fleets left the port of Hakodate on 10 April and twenty boats sailed for Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea. It was clear that Moscow's threat of force was not sufficient to stay the Japanese fleets," even though their arrival at the fishing grounds at once triggered widespread Soviet seizure of boats and crews throughout the area. In part, this Soviet action was carried out in implementation of the new regulations; but in order to force the Japanese to come to terms the Soviet navy went far beyond the original directives—which had dealt only with salmon—and "from 15 March through 29 March . . . captured eight Japanese crabbing boats, a sizeable portion of the king-crab fishing fleet operating in Hokkaido-Southern Kurile waters."[26]

[25]S. V. Molodtsov, *Mezhdunarodno-pravovoi rezhim otkrytogo morya i kontinentalnogo shelfa* (Moscow, 1960), p. 49. (Italics added.) How much of a *volte-face* this represented may be gathered from a comparison with the same author's assertions, made jointly with V. N. Durdenevskii, in E. A. Korovin (ed.), *Mezhdunarodnoe pravo* (Moscow, 1951), p. 309, and then repeated almost verbatim on his own account in F. I. Kozhevnikov (ed.), *Mezhdunarodnoe pravo* (Moscow, 1957), p. 223, to the effect that: "As distinct from open seas, over which no single state has the right to exercise jurisdiction and which are free to navigation by military and commercial shipping of all countries, the establishment of the regime of the Black and Baltic Seas must be within the exclusive competence of the coastal states, and the freedom of entry into and exit from them, is granted only to the coastal states. However, in the interests of strengthening international cooperation and international trade relations, entry into these seas, exit from them and navigation there (outside of internal waters and prohibited zones) are free to the commercial vessels belonging to non-riparian powers."

[26]James H. Guill, *op. cit.,* p. 59.

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Accompanying this campaign of mounting repression, however, were Soviet overtures to resume negotiations on fisheries separately from other disputed issues. On April 20, fresh conversations started in Moscow. The Japanese representatives offered two draft treaties, one calling for joint regulation of fish resources in the north Pacific, if the Soviet Union could offer conclusive evidence of need for such measures; the other providing for mutual assistance to shipwrecked persons or vessels in the area. After much maneuvering and difficulty, agreements on both questions were signed May 14, with the reservation that they would come into effect only when a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty became effective or diplomatic relations between the two countries were fully re-established.[27]

In the final analysis, the 1956 fisheries convention made little change in the regime which the Soviets had unilaterally instituted earlier that year. However, in principle at least, it now associated Japan in the future elaboration of locally applicable regulations, theoretically withdrawing the matter from the strictly domestic competence of the USSR. Otherwise, Japan's situation remained much the same as before and, indeed, in one or two respects even deteriorated somewhat. For instance, the so-called "conventional area," i.e., the zone affected by the present agreement, became more extensive than the one described in Moscow's March edict—it now embraced the open waters of the Bering Sea and the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk. The sector within which salmon fishing would be jointly regulated was also enlarged, its easternmost boundary being drawn farther out, beginning at the more distant Cape Navarin instead of Cape Olyutorskii which lies toward the west. During the 1956 season, inside that line, fishing was altogether prohibited within forty miles of all land, except for small Japanese craft operating in the vicinity of northern Hokkaido. The crucial question of the width of the respective territorial waters remained unanswered.

Enforcement details of the agreement were left to be worked out later by a Soviet-Japanese commission, scheduled to meet at least once a year, and at any time upon the request of either party. All decisions of the commission were to be adopted only by unanimous vote. Since its first meeting was not to take place until 1957, existing Soviet-made rules were to obtain in the

[27]For the text of the fisheries convention, see *Sbornik deistvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglashenii i konventsii, zaklyuchennykh SSSR s inostrannymi gosudarstvami* (Moscow, 1960), Vyp. XVIII, pp. 312-318.

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meantime, as was Japan's meager quota for that year of 65,000 tons of salmon, also set by Moscow. Perhaps the only real improvement in the treaty, so far as Japan was concerned, was the clause acknowledging that henceforth both signatories could detain vessels and arrest crews on evidence of violation of the established norms; if they belonged to the other country, they were to be handed over as soon as possible to the authorities of that country, which alone would have the right to punish offenses committed by its nationals.

The net effect of these provisions was to turn the northwest Pacific literally into a "closed" sea, as far as fisheries were concerned. It was not the total mare clausum Moscow originally had in mind (at least for the Sea of Okhotsk), but in terms of the local fishing industry it amounted to the same thing. The agreement had been reached under the guise of regulation for the sake of conservation; thus, the uneven struggle between the USSR and Japan over these resources has continued to be waged over statistical data on fish stocks and the corresponding volume of each annual catch. The Soviets can derive added outside support for their viewpoint from Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam, with which the USSR concluded, on June 12, 1956, an agreement concerning collaboration in the field of research in fish economy, oceanology and limnology in the western parts of the Pacific Ocean.[28] Mongolia adhered to the agreement in 1958, but the Japanese, for obvious reasons, have shown no inclination to join, despite sundry pointed hints from the others that they should.

The signing of the fisheries convention wrought no immediate change for the better in Soviet-Japanese relations. Indeed, the Soviets intensified their practice of seizing Japanese boats, obviously to encourage the Japanese to bring the provisional May agreements into effect by concluding without delay the pending peace treaty or some other settlement. Such pressures soon proved successful, at least to the extent of helping to bring about the Joint Declaration of October 19, 1956.[29] This Declaration embodied a six-point peace formula which included: official recogni-

[28] *Izvestia,* June 13, 1956. In April 1955 informal fishing arrangements had been reached between the fishermen's organizations of Communist China and Japan, which had boosted the latter's quota of the catch in the Yellow Sea by 20 per cent. This arrangement was not implemented until October. *New York Times,* October 17, 1955.

[29] Text in *Sbornik deistvuyushchikh dogovorov . . . ,* op. cit., pp. 257-260; *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR,* 1956, No. 24, Art. 525; *New Times,* 1956, No. 44, pp. 35-36.

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tion of the end of a state of war; exchange of ambassadors and resumption of diplomatic ties; implementation of the details of the fishing agreement negotiated in May, conditional upon the establishment of diplomatic relations; Soviet support for Japan's admission to the UN; return of Japanese prisoners of war held in the Soviet Union; and postponement of discussion of the territorial problem until a later date.

On December 12, 1956, with the exchange of acts of ratification of the Moscow Declaration, the Soviet-Japanese fisheries convention itself came into force. The next day, a Soviet decree amnestied all Japanese citizens sentenced in the Soviet Union and directed that all such persons be freed and allowed to go home.[30] Concurrently, Japanese sources disclosed that between January and mid-November 1956, the Soviets had taken into custody 123 Japanese boats and 1,072 fishermen.[31]

The series of agreements concluded between the USSR and Japan throughout 1956 must be adjudged a victory for the Soviet Union. True, the Soviets did not obtain all they had sought, nor were their gains always couched in language as explicit as they would have liked, but neither did they surrender anything of value. The Japanese received nothing but a repeated promise of the eventual return of Shikotan and the Habomais and an ambiguous treaty on fisheries.

The signing of the October document reportedly led many segments of the Japanese fishing industry to expect that at once "peace would be breaking out all over the north Pacific."[32] If so, they were soon thoroughly disillusioned, for these agreements made remarkably little difference in practice, and after 1956 the former patterns still largely persisted. Thus, large numbers of Japanese boats were captured every year on grounds of violating fishing rules: in the first half of 1957, according to the Japanese maritime safety headquarters, 56 craft and 527 crewmen were arrested, of which 31 boats and 509 men were subsequently discharged. Tokyo claimed that between the end of the war and March 24, 1959, the Soviets had detained 744 fishing vessels,

[30] *Sbornik deistvuyushchikh dogovorov . . . , op. cit.*, p. 666; *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, 1956, No. 24, Art. 258.

[31] *New York Times*, November 11, 1956, p. 5. Of that number, 12 boats and 60 persons had been seized since the signing of the treaty and in the post-agreement period the Soviets had so far returned only 2 boats together with 7 fishermen.

[32] *Ibid.*

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failing to return 145 of them, as well as 67 of their personnel.[33] On October 2, 1960, Soviet authorities at last promised to refrain from further seizure of Japanese fishing vessels in the north Pacific, after having already seized 58 boats and 476 men that year. In spite of that pledge, however, the Soviets in 1961 detained another 89 craft, along with more than 500 Japanese serving aboard them.[34]

VIII

The fisheries issue continues to be an expedient form of leverage to which Moscow periodically resorts when seeking to pry some fresh political advantage from Japan. In 1957, for instance, Khrushchev openly warned the Japanese that the annual fishery talks, then in progress in Tokyo, would probably not bear fruit until a trade agreement more favorable to the USSR had also been concluded. In 1958, there was renewed Soviet pressure for a comprehensive peace treaty as a prerequisite to further negotiations on fishery matters, although nothing came of it. Similar tactics were used in 1959, and again in 1960, in conjunction with the Soviet campaign against the U.S.-Japanese mutual security pact. Once more, the regular annual sessions of the mixed commission were unduly prolonged because the Soviets reportedly "found it difficult to make concessions in view of the existing political situation." On the latter occasion, the negotiating techniques employed by the Soviets ran the gamut, including the familiar carrot-and-stick routine: The Soviets pledged that they would stop arresting Japanese boats, while concurrently imposing drastic new restrictions on Japanese fishing activities in the waters under the USSR's control. From a political standpoint, their maneuvering turned out to be in vain.[35]

More important, however, has been the Soviet government's introduction each year of progressively more severe limitations on

[33]Cf. H. W. Edwards, *op. cit.*, p. 57: "According to investigations of the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency, a total of 744 fishing vessels had been seized by the Soviets from the end of the war up to April of 1959. Captured fishermen totaled 6,502. Subsequently, some 586 ships and 6,424 fishermen were released. Of the 78 still in captivity, 11 have been confirmed as dead, and the remaining 67 are considered still detained. Of the 158 ships still not returned, 13 have been confirmed as sunk or greatly damaged, leaving 145 vessels still in the hands of the Soviets."

[34]*Japan Quarterly*, Vol. 9 (January-March 1962), p. 122; (April-June 1962), p. 251.

[35]*New York Times*, March 19, 1957, p. 11; February 13, 1958, p. 5; September 2, 1959, p. 4. See, too, J. Graham Parsons, "Australia and the United States: The Development of Our Common Interest in the Pacific," *Department of State Bulletin*, June 22, 1959, pp. 912-915.

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Japanese fishing rights in the "conventional zone," always in the name of conservation. At every meeting of the joint commission, the Soviet side accuses Japan of bad faith: in systematically failing to enforce respect among its nationals for the established rules, in still countenancing widespread resort by its fishermen to prohibited, "rapacious" fishing methods, and in completely failing to institute its own supplementary "protection" program in the regions adjacent to the regulated area.[36] Throughout the year, the official Soviet press wages a sustained campaign of similar criticism. The Japanese counter with claims of discrimination and political motivation in Soviet behavior and often call for a comprehensive revision of the entire fisheries convention. They challenge the veracity of the Soviet figures and demand a fairer share of the local catch; and at one point, they offered to take the whole question before the International Court of Justice—but the Soviets did not take up the offer.[37]

At each meeting of the joint commission, the Soviets usually have their way. At the commission's second session, in April 1958, they eventually agreed to open some areas of the northwest Pacific to Japanese fishing for a period of ten days, during which the Japanese would be allowed to harvest 110,000 tons of salmon, of which only 6,500 tons were to be taken from the Sea of Okhotsk. In exchange, the Japanese were forced to accept closure of the Sea of Okhotsk to all their fishing for eight years, beginning in 1959, as a conservation measure and, reportedly, also as a penalty against alleged violations of previous fishing regulations there. Next, in 1959, after months of bitter argument, the USSR set the quota of salmon the Japanese could harvest that year in the waters off the Siberian seaboard at 85,000 tons, 23 per cent lower than the 1958 quota; this dealt a heavy blow to the Japanese fishing industry which depends upon salmon as its top currency earner among marine products. In 1960, the Soviets proposed a complete ban on salmon fishing in one-half the area covered by preceding agreements, and a shorter fishing season in the other half. The Japanese insisted on at least an 85,000-ton catch of salmon, but eventually had to settle for a quota of 67,500 tons, plus the right to fish in certain previously restricted zones.[38]

[36] *Izvestia,* February 14, 1960, quotes Japanese sources to the effect that Japanese fishermen increased their catch of salmon in such areas, in addition to the established quotas, to 63,000 tons in 1957, 72,000 tons in 1958, 85,000 tons in 1959.

[37] *New York Times,* March 31, 1959, p. 3.

[38] *Ibid.,* April 22, 1958, p. 4; April 23, 1958, p. 17; April 25, 1958, p. 6; May 14, 1959, p. 3; May 19, 1960, p. 7; *Pravda* and *Izvestia,* May 19, 1960.

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In 1961, conditions seemed to improve somewhat, and that year's meeting maintained the annual Japanese quota at 65,000 tons, even if it did expand the area in which no fishing would be permitted. But in December, Japanese and Soviet fishery experts conferring in Moscow agreed that salmon resources in the north Pacific were still declining. Accordingly, in 1962 the mixed commission reduced to 55,000 tons for the coming season the total volume of the Japanese catch of salmon on the open seas; no fishing at all was allowed in the Sea of Japan north of the 45th Parallel or throughout the Sea of Okhotsk. Moreover, crab catching, already much reduced since 1960, was prohibited outright in 1962 along the coast of western Kamchatka. Similar restrictions on the local herring reserves may soon be forthcoming also because recently their "stocks have been drastically depleted."[39]

The 1962 Soviet-Japanese fishery talks were noteworthy also for an important decision concerning the competence of the joint agency and the scope of its future work. The 1956 treaty had defined the "conventional area" in such a manner as to encompass the open waters of the Bering Sea and the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan, but prior to 1962, the commission had in practice concerned itself only with fishing problems in the two former basins, and that minute section of the Sea of Japan which lay north of the 45th Parallel. There seems to have been a tacit understanding between Moscow and Tokyo that both parties would, on their own, implement such additional conservation measures as they deemed necessary in that portion of the Sea of Japan (its larger part) south of the 45th Parallel. That arrangement, judging from constant Soviet criticism of the Japanese performance in regard to conservation had apparently not functioned satisfactorily, so in 1962, the mixed body took the major step of establishing a 60,000-ton quota for Japanese salmon fishing there. As the Soviet chairman of the session observed on that occasion, this act

> . . . would undoubtedly enhance the commission's prestige and enable it to take up the question of controlling fishing in all areas covered by the convention. This decision would also make it easier to take the necessary measure for rational salmon fishing and speed up the restoration of stocks of this valuable fish.[40]

[39] *Japan Quarterly,* Vol. 8 (July-September 1961), p. 380; Vol. 9 (April-June 1962), p. 249; *Soviet News,* No. 4667, May 4, 1962, p. 103; No. 4673, May 15, 1962, p. 128.

[40] *Soviet News,* No. 4673, May 15, 1962, p. 128.

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Though probably justified by objective conditions, the new policy marked one more setback for Japan.[41]

IX

In summary, it is apparent that Soviet economic plans for the northwest Pacific have been crowned with success, the incipient Japanese challenge there thoroughly defeated. On the political front, the situation has remained unresolved, and Moscow still has not secured Japan's formal acceptance of the postwar territorial status quo. Paradoxically, the very thoroughness of the Soviet economic victory has endangered the Kremlin's political goals in the area. Indeed, in its present demilitarized condition, Japan has little strength with which to oppose effectively the Soviet Union's ambitious claims in the Far East. Japan's only recourse, perhaps, is symbolic resistance, i.e., refusal to endorse or in any way associate itself with those Soviet claims, economic ones included, which Moscow asserts arise from special local title or rights. This is a course Japan may be more willing to take as it discovers that it has almost nothing to lose, in an economic sense, by so doing. The political dimensions of the dispute would thus remain alive, and it is at this level that the USSR will find its case most vulnerable should the contending parties ever seek a future settlement under circumstances of greater equality.

Japan has already made a good beginning in reorienting its fishing fleets toward new grounds, a venture which, in spite of occasional difficulties and setbacks, seems headed in the right direction. This step has been facilitated by the fact that a number of barriers erected earlier to reduce or eliminate Japanese fishing operations in various outlying portions of the Pacific basin have since been lowered somewhat or are in the process of being

[41]One earlier Soviet move must also be noted. On July 21, 1957, the USSR had unilaterally declared Peter the Great Bay a part of Soviet internal waters. *Izvestia,* July 21, 1957. This action was strongly protested (unsuccessfully) by the U.S., the U.K. and Japan, the latter because, *inter alia,* it adversely affected Japanese fishing rights in that area, although, despite Tokyo's contentions to the contrary, they could not have been very extensive there. For text of the Soviet note of January 7, 1958, rejecting Japanese protests of July and August 1957, see *Pravda,* January 9, 1958; text in French in France de Hartingh, *op. cit.,* pp. 34-36, fn. 13. Similar notes were concurrently sent to the United States and United Kingdom. For unofficial Soviet commentary on the case, see A. Nikolayev, "Peter the Great Bay," *International Affairs,* 1958, No. 2, pp. 38-43, and V. A. Romanov, "Zaliv Petra Velikogo—vnutrennie vody Sovetskogo Soyuza," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo,* 1958, No. 5, pp. 47-55.

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revised,[42] helping materially to decrease the country's dependence on the catch in seas controlled by the USSR. Even if a more equitable allocation of the northwest Pacific's resources should come about, it is quite unlikely that it would reinstate Japan to its prewar position of economic domination of this region, a disproportionate pre-eminence achieved by military power which could only be won back in the same way. The present situation, in which the pendulum has swung wide in the opposite direction, is again dictated by the military factor. Japan, the world's leading fishing nation, must now compete for access to vital and limited marine resources with two close neighbors—the USSR and mainland China—who, in that same field, today hold fourth and third place, respectively, in the size of their annual catch.[43]

A bitter query which appeared in a Japanese press editorial, inspired by the outcome of the 1957 negotiations, remains valid today and for the foreseeable future: "What about next year's fishing season? And the next? The present agreement is only for 1957. And that is by no means the worst of it. Its terms imply that Japan will forever be in the position of a mendicant, subject to the Kremlin's political disposition for her livelihood."[44]

[42]In 1958, for example, the U.S. barred Japanese fishermen from an additional 648,000 square miles adjacent to Alaska, *New York Times,* October 2, 1958, p. 22. On the other hand, in 1962 it was announced that "Japan's request to fish for halibut east of 175 degrees west longitude was approved by the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission at the close of its six-day meeting here," *ibid.,* November 19, 1962, p. 2. See also, "Japanese Expand Search for Fish," *ibid.,* November 26, 1962, p. 11. In 1962, seizures by the U.S. of Japanese fishing craft were reported off Alaska and Bonin Island.

[43]*New York Times,* November 26, 1962, pp. 45, 47.

[44]James H. Guill, *op. cit.,* p. 59, citing *Japan Times.*

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LAND REFORM IN IRAN: A "REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE"

by John A. Hobbs

IN January 1962 Iran embarked on a land reform program which may hold important consequences for the entire world—Western, neutral and communist. During the succeeding twenty months, Iran demonstrated that major, even revolutionary, reforms can be instituted by a regime which it is fashionable to describe as outdated, medieval and authoritarian. There is considerable validity in these designations: few would contend that Iran is a bastion of democratic self-rule. Yet, however much we may dislike some aspects of Iran's political and social regime, the United States has been led, by Cold War circumstances, into a close partnership with it. Given Iran's common border with the Soviet Union, its strategic location, and its ample petroleum reserves, Washington has feared that any violent change in the Shah's regime would benefit the Soviets, as it would produce a neutral Iran at best and a pro-communist one at worst. Thus, the U.S. government has consistently supported the Shah's rule in the expectation that this pro-Western monarch would eventually push through a reform program and so preclude a more drastic solution of Iran's socio-economic problems.

Reform or revolution had become inevitable in Iran. The only question which remained at the beginning of the 1960's concerned its timing and its sponsorship—the presently entrenched conservative aristocracy or the more radical and rapidly growing middle class. Most pundits predicted the latter. In the long run their predictions may still prove correct. However, events of the last two years, particularly those surrounding the unprecedented land reforms, have given rise to second thoughts. Could it be that Iran is actually embarked on a "revolution from above?"

I

What is it that distinguishes a "revolution from above" from the more common variety? Many writers who use the term have failed to define it; others who have attempted a definition have not been sufficiently rigorous in their efforts. If one can find any consensus on this subject, it might be this: a "revolution from above" is a major alteration in economic and social relations

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brought about by at least some members of the most privileged social class without overwhelming opposition from other members of the same class.

This definition itself leads to a number of ambiguities, centering around the words "major alteration in economic and social relations," "at least some members," and "overwhelming opposition." What is a *major* alteration in economic and social relations? How many does the criterion "at least some" require? Only one? A handful? A hundred? A thousand? And what magnitude of opposition constitutes "overwhelming" opposition?

It is not the purpose of this article to seek to arrive at a precise definition of this term, however desirable this may be. For our purposes, a revolution shall be deemed to come from above if the immediate effector of the changes is a member of the most privileged class. If we state that a revolution from above is one in which social and economic reforms are sought and even demanded by all or most members of the most privileged group, we would find few examples in human history. Therefore, this article adopts the "immediate effector" criterion, and considers the current Iranian experiment with land reform as a "revolution from above" and examines it within that context.

II

The need for land reform in Iran was widely recognized before the end of the 1950's; the matter which remained unresolved was the choice between two alternative effectors of that reform. The ruling class could choose to ride the powder keg of discontent until it exploded into the more classic "revolution from below" or it could adopt the more positive alternative and instigate reform from above. The latter choice had obvious advantages for members of the most privileged class. Perhaps it was not as good from their point of view as no reform at all, but it was clearly better than a reform instigated and executed by those farther down the social scale. If reform came from the top, the elite stood a chance to control and direct its course. The logic of half a loaf or no bread at all is incontrovertible.

In spite of this logic, ruling classes have been notoriously slow to introduce reforms. It may be true—and history would seem to confirm this thesis—that a ruling or highly privileged class is not best qualified to determine what is in its own best long-term interest. Ruling classes often fail to notice or understand the simmering protest beneath them. Thus, historically, most revolu-

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tions have occurred *in spite of* the ruling class rather than with its guidance or tacit consent.

The Iranian ruling classes seemed, in the spring of 1961, also to have failed to perceive the probable course of the future. In April during a conversation with Walter Lippmann, a canny, albeit not impartial, observer by the name of Nikita Khrushchev had predicted the imminent collapse of the Iranian regime. The events of the following month led many to believe that Chairman Khrushchev's prediction had come true. Hope for responsible reform in Iran under the leadership of the Shah and the landowners dependent upon him for their position all but disappeared. The Tehran teachers' strike of May and the collapse of a gigantic land speculation boom brought pressures to the boiling point. In the midst of this tension violence erupted, and a demonstrating teacher was killed in what angry leftists quickly labeled an example of police brutality. Soon after the violence subsided, Iranian Premier Sharif Imami resigned and the Shah called on Dr. Ali Amini, a political independent, to stem the revolutionary tide.

The Amini appointment can be viewed now as a milestone on the road to reform. Even though Amini was a wealthy man and a member of his country's economic and social elite, he refused to accept the premiership unless the Iranian Parliament, the Majlis, was dissolved. Amini feared, with good reason, that a Majlis dominated by large landowners would not be receptive to the urgent reform measures he believed were necessary. On May 9, the Shah met Amini's condition by dissolving both houses of Parliament and by giving Amini temporary power to rule by decree. The institutionalized power locus of the Iranian aristocracy had been taken away and the path was now open for one aristocrat to lead his country into a "revolution from above."

III

Iran is primarily an agricultural country. Approximately four-fifths of its more than twenty million people live off the land. But this is not a land of sturdy yeoman farmers. It more closely resembles a land of propertyless, downtrodden peasants. As of January 1962, 90 per cent of the arable acreage in Iran was owned by less than 5 per cent of the population. A few leading families, such as the Alams, Madinis, Palisis, and Sulfugaris, owned one-half of the land upon which millions were dependent. Religious and charitable institutions controlled about a quarter of the

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land while the Shah's holdings—until very recently—totaled about one-tenth. Only in the more remote and generally less fertile areas was there substantial peasant land ownership.

In a more traditional age these facts would have disturbed very few people. This is not, however, an era when traditions are accepted passively in Iran or anywhere else in the developing regions. Once the common people or their spokesmen sense the possibilities of a better life, a seemingly irresistible process begins. In the face of this new force, interests rooted in tradition either bend with the times or break with the times. The land situation in Iran and the unyielding attitude of the landowners made it appear in May 1961 that a social fracture was close at hand. The growing tension—almost Marxian in a dialectical sense—between the propertyless, increasingly dissatisfied peasants and the entrenched landowners led Khrushchev to predict confidently the imminent collapse of the Shah's regime. Other issues in addition to land reform aggravated class tensions. Few Iranians could be totally ignorant of the widespread corruption in government or unmindful of the inefficient and unfair tax system under which the wealthy paid a ridiculously small share. Nevertheless, in a heavily agrarian society like that of Iran, land reform is the more popular reform, more readily communicated to the masses. Successful land reform would probably be sufficient to head off more radical solutions to Iran's problems.

Besides the factor of class tension there were several other compelling reasons, more narrowly economic, for reform. Expanded agricultural production is a prerequisite for the overall economic development of Iran. Growth of industries based on agricultural raw materials, such as the important but as yet small textile industry, are dependent upon a reliable and growing source of supply. Also, the purchasing power of the peasant masses must be increased in order to enlarge the market for goods produced in Iran. The internal market will not grow if three-quarters of the population remains at the subsistence level. The existing system of land ownership could not provide these economic benefits essential to the nation's development.

Land ownership aside, there are certain tenure practices in parts of Iran which tend to perpetuate poor farming practices and low capital formation in the agricultural sector of the economy. The most serious of these practices is rotating each year the plots of land cultivated by the tenants. The available plots of land are assigned annually among the peasants on the basis of lot. Super-

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ficially, this practice may appear desirable because of its equitable character. No tenant need suffer year after year from assignment to a poor piece of ground, and none will profit indefinitely from more favorable assignments. However, the value of the scheme's equitable character is more than offset by the poor soil conservation practices which ensue: the individual cultivator who assumes that he will never again farm this particular plot of land tends to follow methods which lead to immediate soil depletion. Under such a tenure practice the peasant does not and cannot build up or even maintain soil productivity. It is in his interest to maximize the depletion rate.

For all of these reasons land reform was perceived by the incoming Amini regime as the key to reform and development efforts. Work on a land reform program began immediately and was hurried to completion on an emergency basis. On January 15, 1962, these efforts bore fruit when the then Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Arsanjani, announced that the Shah had approved a far-reaching land reform measure. Under the proposed reform no landowner is allowed to own more than one village.[1] This provision was later changed to no more than 100 fertile acres or 300 to 400 dry acres—a much more restrictive provision. The land in excess of these amounts is to be purchased by the government and paid for in ten annual installments.[2] Since many Iranian landowners held a large number of villages—one held as many as 300—this announcement made it clear that the land reform program would be of major proportions. The law was applied initially only to the larger landholders, those owning more than five villages. Even with this stipulation, about 10,000 out of Iran's 45,500 villages are affected. Approximately 4,000,000 peasants, nearly 20 per cent of Iran's population, will benefit.

Compensation for these villages is made in the form of ten-year, low-interest government bonds. The value of the land is assessed on the basis of taxes collected from the landlord and the income derived by the landlord from his peasant-tenants over a ten-year period.[3] The precise figure is set by the Agrarian Reform Organi-

[1]In terms of the American historical experience an Iranian village can be compared to a plantation on which the agricultural laborers and their families live in a cluster of dwellings and move out each day into the owner's fields for work. But unlike the southern plantation of pre-Civil War America, there are few if any gang labor squads in Iranian fields. The plots are usually small and family operated.

[2]*New York Times*, April 26, 1963, p. 7.

[3]A difficulty here is that many, if not most, landlords submitted falsified tax returns through the years. Their bookkeeping in general is notoriously inexact.

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zation.[4] Landlords may appeal this assessment to a specially created Agrarian Reform Council composed of the Minister of Agriculture and four high officials of the Agricultural Ministry. The ruling of the Council is final.

When the land is put up for sale, the present residents of the villages are given first option. The amount of land a peasant may buy varies from place to place, depending upon the area's productivity. In the choice farming areas along the Caspian Sea, for example, the peasant is limited to purchases of from one to three acres. In rich irrigated areas such as Azerbaijan, purchases of from six to ten acres are allowed. Allowable peasant holdings increase as the soil's potential productivity decreases, so that in the drier and poorer central areas a peasant may buy from ten to twenty acres. Whatever the size of his purchase, the peasant pays for it over a fifteen-year period in installments which will be smaller than the annual rents formerly due his landlord. The total price paid by the peasant will equal the amount paid by the government to the landlord, plus a maximum charge of 10 per cent to help defray governmental expenses.

IV

This reform holds out for the first time in Iran's history the promise of widespread land ownership. But is this reform in itself evidence that a "revolution from above" has begun? There is no room for doubt that the effects of such a reform will be revolutionary in nature, and, similarly, that the government which initiated it was headed by a man belonging to Iran's most privileged class. Under the "immediate effector" criterion it would appear that this is at least the beginning of a "revolution from above." Let us now see whether the landowners have been able to muster "overwhelming opposition."

The extent and strength of the landowners' opposition is not easily measured. That opposition exists and that it has affected official policy is clear: the lamentations of the landowners and the government's maneuvers establish these facts. The landowners gave evidence that they perceived the seriousness of the reforms when they accused the Shah and Amini of being traitors to their class. In turn, the dissolution of the landowner-dominated Majlis

[4]The Organization, which is headed by the Minister of Agriculture, has primary responsibility for implementing the law. It determines the rate of compensation, parcels out the lands, and handles the daily administration. The chief policy-making body is the Agrarian Reform Council. Another agency in the reform machinery is the Agricultural Bank of Iran which is to receive payments from the peasants and compensate the landlords.

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was a move to outflank the landowner opposition. If "overwhelming opposition" is defined as simply the strength needed to modify severely the reform program, then it is unlikely that the opposition of the landed class can be labeled "overwhelming." Indeed, the landowners, if they want to minimize their losses, will probably have to accept gracefully the land reform program.

The politics of land reform in Iran is not simple. It is curious, though by no means inexplicable when one considers the character of the Iranian Parliament, that a reform of such a strong democratic character could be initiated only in the absence of representative institutions.[5] Democratic procedure might have required the Iranian government to call new elections in which the land reform program would be a major issue. In September 1963, elections for a new Majlis were held, but the government made certain that this election would not alter the course of land reform. The September elections were not entirely free: only officially-sanctiond parties appeared on the ballot, so as to assure a victory for the Shah's reformist movement.

An election open to all parties would not have endangered the *idea* of reform, but it might have altered drastically the *means* and the *spirit* of reform. There might well have been an acceleration of the reform program because the winner of a free election might have been the National Front Party, founded over a decade ago by Mohammed Mossadegh. This party's program is ambiguous, but one can assume that it would undertake a far more radical reform program than the one now in effect.

The National Front is composed mainly of students, urban workers and middle class elements who are not likely to champion the landowners' cause. This is true even though a number of landowners have since May 1961 switched their support to the National Front as a protest against the import restrictions, tax reforms and general austerity measures of the new regime. These landowners apparently prefer to take the calculated risk that by supporting the largest organized political opposition they may be able to topple the reform government and then somehow reassert their control. The result is that the National Front is a heterogeneous party. It is difficult to see how any programmatic unity can be achieved among the disparate elements. Such an uneasy partnership of urban workers, students, middle class elements and land-

[5]Former Premier Amini is supposed to have asserted privately that he was in office to institute reforms, not to establish democracy.

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owners could not possibly survive the divisive pressures of a parliamentary session.

The best way to prevent a National Front victory at the polls was to exclude that party from participation. The National Front today finds its leadership in prison or under surveillance, its activities curbed and its spokesmen silenced. The opposition landowners were permitted to run as independents, but were not permitted to organize parties. With the National Front and other opposition thus under wraps and the Communist Party (Tudeh) outlawed, the pro-Shah parties, which shortly before the election formed the Congress of Free Women and Free Men, were assured of an easy victory. When the new Parliament of 200 deputies and 30 elected Senators meets this fall, it will be at least 90 per cent pro-Shah. In the future, the Shah will be able to count on large majorities to provide formal legislative authority for reform measures, and the measures adopted during the previous twenty months by imperial decree will no doubt receive formal parliamentary approval.

Given the political configuration in the Majlis and the Shah's enhanced prestige, both domestic and international, the more perceptive landowners will surely realize that while the present reform is not to their liking it has been imposed by a government headed by men of their own class and is, therefore, the mildest and fairest of any that could have been forced upon them. It is probably for this reason that the opposition of the landowners has not been more violent. The Iranian landowner has for the first time been maneuvered into an impotent position. The only hope which some landowners still cling to is based on a change of heart by the pre-eminent member of their own class—the Shah—backed by his 200,000-man army. Such a hope is obviously forlorn. The Shah has given full evidence that he is supporting land reform all the way. Even more importantly, he appears to be in complete control of his military. In Iran, as in so many countries, control of the army is the ultimate factor in any domestic power calculus.[6]

[6]The communists have been rather subdued in their reaction to the reform movement. As one would expect, the communists do not and could not oppose the humanitarian aims of land reform. On the other hand, they feel the reform has not gone far enough. They tend to view the reform as merely a way station en route to ultimate socialization—the aristocracy's last hope to salvage some remnant of their leadership at the expense of the masses. Placation of the masses is merely a ruse designed to perpetuate the traditional hegemony. Ultimately, the communists assert, this attempt will fail because it runs counter to the inexorable dialectic of history. In the meantime it appears that the communists are resigned to waiting out a very unfavorable situation. To the degree that the peasants approve of land reform, the communists find it difficult to oppose it openly.

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V

The government's original plan, as expressed by the former Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Arsanjani, was to complete land reform throughout the whole of Iran within two years. This would include all villages in excess of the allowable 100 to 400 acre holdings, not just those villages owned by large landlords holding five or more villages. It is clear that the original prediction was overly optimistic, as there were many severe difficulties which were bound to retard land reform. In the first place, the total reform program required at a minimum the surveying and redistricting of an estimated quarter to a half of the country's agricultural land. Difficulties were bound to arise also from the fact that Iran is a country with no land registration system and no standard way of establishing title. Without proper safeguards and procedures, the brave reform effort might drown in a sea of litigation.

Other difficulties in the way of a two-year completion of the program are more narrowly political. There is always the possibility that the opposition of the landowners may stiffen. There is already evidence that landowners, with the aid of sympathetic provincial officials, have falsified ownership records and forged ballots in local elections. Other landlords have not been content with nonviolent opposition. There were some in the province of Fars who apparently hired assassins for the purpose of murdering a young land-reform agent. When the agent was murdered, the government took action by placing the province under martial law. Instead of halting land reform in Fars the government was actually spurred on to greater determination: Arsanjani ordered local officials to finish the job within forty-five days. There have been numerous other examples of violence but they have in no sense presaged a general resort to violent opposition to land reform.

The landlords have won powerful allies in some Moslem mullahs (who are landlords in their own right and consequently afraid that land reform will decrease their income). The mullahs have used their pulpits to frighten illiterate peasants away from demanding their legal rights. The Tehran riots of June 5, 1963, which resulted in considerable destruction and death, were believed by many to have been incited by the mullahs. The peasants, however, do not appear greatly impressed by the arguments of economic and religious leaders. Fragmentary evidence concerning the attitude of the peasants indicates that they are cooperating in the program and are optimistic about the future. The government

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reported in April 1963 that peasants were rapidly investing in the rural cooperatives set up under the reform program.

Thus, despite the factors working against land reform, optimism is still warranted. However, it would be a mistake to suppose that once land reform is achieved Iran will have found a panacea for all her problems. Even in terms of agricultural yield there is no assurance that land reform will be an unmixed blessing. The already low yields of Iranian agriculture may fall still lower after the peasants acquire control over the land they work. If one were to judge from the case histories of some of the plots distributed by the Shah prior to the present reform program, one might well be pessimistic. In the Qazvin area, for example, where large tracts of crown lands have been distributed, farming is very inefficient. Since bread is a staple, wheat must be grown no matter how small the holding. Even on those holdings where necessity does not dictate which crop must be grown, there is always the danger that illiterate peasants, totally unfamiliar with the methods of modern agriculture, will continue the soil-depleting practices of the past. In short, landownership by itself has done little to improve the lot of the peasant.

An additional problem is the inability of a peasant to mechanize his farming. In some areas of Iran mechanization is necessary if there are to be substantial increases in annual production. Time is an important factor in Iranian agriculture. The time required to harvest grain by traditional methods is so great that it precludes the growing of a second annual crop even in those areas where the climate would permit. Mechanization would, in effect, nearly double the acreage which could be planted without actually adding to the cultivable area. No peasant, of course, can afford the capital outlay involved in such mechanization.

The Iranian government, fully aware of these problems, has advanced the idea of peasant cooperatives. As a prior condition of landownership the peasant is required to join a cooperative. These cooperatives are loose associations of villagers under the control of what might be called a "reeve" or overseer. Financing of cooperatives is done by the peasants with government assistance. Planning for agricultural development, including the purchase of mechanized equipment, will depend on the initiative of the peasants forming the cooperative. Special projects, such as expanded irrigation, are to be drawn up by the villagers and presented to the government for approval. The government will supply up to two-thirds of the capital needed for approved projects.

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Local administrative subdivisions of the Agrarian Reform Council provide the link between government and the cooperatives. They provide the peasants in the cooperatives with seeds, purebred stock, fertilizers, credit, marketing facilities, and other forms of assistance. Precisely how much technical assistance the government will be able to give the cooperatives is not as yet clear. Arsanjani claimed that some 200 agronomists and other technicians would be available initially. The Israelis have sent several teams to help, and some Iranians have gone to Israel for training. And U.S. technical assistance teams are playing an important role. Even before the onset of the current reform efforts, the U.S. technical assistance programs in Iran were revamped to place greater stress on the agricultural sector.

A system of cooperatives has obvious advantages. While individual fields will not be pooled into one common farm, the cooperatives will purchase equipment and embark on irrigation and other projects—activities previously controlled by the landlords. In this sense the cooperatives can be looked upon as the institutionalization of a surrogate landlord.

The meager evidence we have on the operation of cooperatives indicates they can be highly successful. One area where reforms have been in progress long enough to permit of a reliable assessment is northern Iran (especially in Bandar-Shah and Gorgan). Here a marked increase in peasant income has taken place. These lands were among the crown lands distributed during the 1950's. This early reform was marked by the creation of some 800 cooperatives which now provide the model for the present system. Peasant income in these areas doubled from 1955 to 1960, and in some cases incomes increased fourfold.[7] It should be pointed out, however, that large amounts of financial and technical assistance were poured into the area.

The major problems surrounding the cooperative program are economic in nature. These problems concern the ability of the government to establish cooperatives and to proceed with the internal financing once they are established. In May 1963 the government stated that it had enough money to finance the 2,000 cooperatives which have already been set up. It is estimated, however, that some 20,000 cooperatives will be required before the program is complete. Since this would cost an estimated $200,000,000, it is obvious that the government cannot do the job

[7]United Nations, Report of the Economic and Social Council, *Progress in Land Reform*, Third Report, April 5, 1962, pp. 124-125.

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in the near future. Allocating a sum of that size to land reform would further unbalance the national budget, a step the government is not willing to take. Instead, the government hopes it will be able to establish cooperatives at the rate of 5,000 a year; nearly five years would be needed to complete the job. Furthermore, while the peasant is expected to finance mechanization through investment in the cooperatives, it is unlikely that he will have sufficient personal capital for this purpose. The magnitude of this effort to mechanize farming is underscored by the number of tractors which Iran currently possesses—approximately 6,000.

To meet these capital needs the peasant has only his present meager income plus whatever money he may realize from government loans or higher productivity. By making smaller payments to the government than he was formerly paying to the landlords, the peasant may be able to increase his rate of saving. There is little hope, however, for a marked increase in income from any of these three sources since each has its limitations. In the case of lower payments to the government, a saving will materialize only if the Agrarian Reform Organization administers the law in such a way that inflated land assessments are avoided. Productivity could be raised by such simple devices as better utilization of fallow land and by utilization of potentially cultivable land areas. In view of the fact that as much as three-fourths of the total cultivated land areas (10 per cent of the total land area) lies fallow and that an estimated 20 per cent of the total land area is potentially cultivable, proper utilization of cultivated land could provide peasants with increased incomes. But improved utilization depends upon mechanization and technical assistance, which the peasants are unable to afford until they can produce more. Thus, the peasant confronts the old, familiar vicious circle.

So long as the peasant is unable to finance mechanization he will be almost totally dependent upon government assistance of one kind or another. Given the state of the Iranian budget, only a small proportion of this aid will be available from the Ministry of Agriculture. Where will the money come from? Some government officials, including former Minister Arsanjani, have suggested diverting almost all of the $300,000,000 annual oil revenue to the establishment of cooperatives. This would appear to be the simplest solution, but it probably could not be done. First of all, oil revenues are currently budgeted to finance the Plan Organization, the body responsible for the general economic development of Iran. While a certain proportion of the Plan's finances go to

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agriculture, a large sum is committed to the advancement of industry. Secondly, even though all oil revenues are supposed to go to the Plan, a large percentage of the revenues has always been siphoned off to meet the operating expenses of other ministries not directly concerned with development. It would seem, then, that short of a complete review of expenditures which would involve such things as reduced military expenditures, the overall reform program will advance more slowly with foreign aid the major source of technical assistance. More particularly this means continued reliance on U.S. aid, since this is the primary source of Iran's foreign aid. Fortunately, the United States is now directing more of its aid to the agricultural sector of the economy.

VI

One final problem confronts the land reformers in Iran. Suppose there were a change in government leadership: what would then happen to the program? That this is not an imaginary problem is borne out by the fact that reform optimism was noticeably dampened on July 18, 1962 when, in the face of a severe budgetary crisis, Dr. Amini resigned as Premier. The immediate concern was whether his successor would be sympathetic to the reform. Within twenty-four hours Assadollah Alam was appointed. The fact that Alam is a personal friend of the Shah and a wealthy landlord in his own right did little to settle the misgivings of many observers. In an attempt to allay these forebodings the new Premier announced immediately at a news conference that the land reform program would be continued. After a few weeks virtually all observers acknowledged Alam's sincerity.

Nevertheless, there is still some reason to fear that the reform is no more secure than the tenure of the men who hold the premiership or who head the Ministry of Agriculture. The resignation early in 1963 of Arsanjani and his replacement by a former General of the Army, Ismail Riahi, caused some concern in reform circles. Riahi, more conservative than Arsanjani, has moved more slowly toward ultimate reform objectives. Offsetting this is the fact that Arsanjani was extremely unpopular among the landlords and his removal could be construed as an act which will in the long run enhance reform efforts. Furthermore, the appointment of the Premier and the Minister of Agriculture is in the hands of the Shah, whose own commitment to the reform now seems irreversible. Behind the façade of changing ministers and premiers lies the fact that the Shah no longer merely reigns—he rules.

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VII

There is no question that reform of a magnitude unprecedented in Iranian history is taking place—with the consent of significant sectors of the most privileged social and economic class. If successful—and there is reason for optimism—it points the way to a long-term solution of Iran's problems which is not in accord with Khrushchev's prediction of April 1961. The alternative to a successful reform could well be revolution from below. Such a revolution would in all probability bear a Moscow imprint. For that reason alone, even if there were no other, the Shah has embarked on reform supported by an army which shows every sign of remaining loyal to him.

In the first six months of the new land reform program no less than 1,000,000 acres were redistributed. By April 1963 the figure had risen to more than 2,000,000 acres. Three-quarters of the land still remains under big landowner control, but this represents considerable progress when compared to the better than 90 per cent when the program was inaugurated.

Americans are likely to be encouraged by these developments and willing to support them, for they materially reduce the danger of communist penetration into Iran. But the significance of Iranian land reform may be more far-reaching. Despite cultural dissimilarities, Iran may serve as a model to other nations in Africa, Asia and Latin America which are in need of similar reforms. We cannot foresee the impact which the Iranian reform movement will have on other countries; we cannot even predict its course of development within Iran or its likely consequences for that nation, its people and its leaders. We can discern, however, that Iran's land reform program, sponsored as it is by a limited portion of the country's social and economic elite, is one of the most important experiments now being carried on in the less developed regions of the world. It remains to be seen whether a "revolution from above" can create the requisite conditions for social stability and modern nationhood in a troubled world.

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THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DISARMAMENT

by Francis P. Hoeber

IF the recent Test Ban Treaty proves indeed to be the "first step" away from the brink of nuclear war on which the world has teetered for a decade, it behooves us to examine carefully where this step and succeeding ones will take us. The avowed goal is disarmament—general and complete disarmament (GCD). For those concerned primarily with national strategy and security, GCD poses many problems of a military nature. For economists, businessmen, labor leaders and Congressmen, the hope of disarmament often becomes a fear of depression. In the current U.S. setting of prosperity-without-full-employment, the promise of peace becomes a specter of defeat by other means.

In recent years several efforts have been made to assess the economic implications of disarmament. The best known and in many ways the most valuable of these is the Report of the Panel on Economic Impacts of Disarmament, the so-called "Benoit Panel." The Benoit Panel, a group of nine economists from government, industry and labor unions working under the chairmanship of Professor Emile Benoit of Columbia University, was organized at the request of John J. McCloy while he was Adviser on Disarmament to President Eisenhower. The report of the panel received wide publicity in the press in December 1961 and has been widely circulated since its publication by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (USACDA) in January 1962. As a result of its dissemination and the prestige of its authors, the report has tended to shape much of the popular discussion on the subject in the United States. For this reason, it is important to evaluate its arguments and conclusions and attempt to put them in perspective.

The Benoit Panel addressed itself in effect to the question of whether or not disarmament would create a serious depression in the United States. Evaluation of the report will be made here at two levels. First, does it adequately answer this question? Second, has the panel asked—or was it asked—the right question?

The Panel's Conclusions

A reading of the 28-page report makes it clear that the panel —presumably by assignment—interpreted the word "disarma-

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ment" to mean "general and complete disarmament." A specific model (hereinafter called "The Model") is set up for testing: a four-stage, 12-year reduction in U.S. security expenditures of some 32 billion dollars, or somewhat more than 50 per cent, starting from an assumed level of 60 billion dollars in 1965, and completing the programmed reductions by 1977. Actual defense expenditures in The Model would decrease from 56 to 10 billion dollars, but this would be offset in part by an increase of 7 billion dollars in U.S. contributions to international forces and inspection teams and an increase of from 4 to 11 billion dollars in "associated" space and peaceful atomic activities.[1]

Assuming The Model, the panel reached eight conclusions which appear, on their face, to be reasonable. Paraphrasing, for brevity, these are:

(a) that such disarmament "should create small danger of provoking immediate depression . . . assuming sensible adjustment policies and vigorous government leadership to dispel various effects on business and consumer anticipations and to provide reassurance that aggregate demand will not be allowed to decline precipitantly";

(b) that such a steady decline in defense spending "may prove a significant drag on the economy and pose serious problems for policymakers which can be mastered and the chief obstacles to which would be political resistance rather than deficiencies in our economic knowledge";

(c) "that structural problems in particular industries or areas are unavoidable and could be serious . . .";

(d) "that the alleviation of these structural difficulties may require a variety of adjustment programs . . .";

(e) that such programs might include research and development on bottlenecks "impeding international economic development," thus making "a significant contribution to one of our major foreign policy objectives";

(f) "that the impact of disarmament would only accentuate structural problems which already exist and which will have to be solved anyhow . . .";

(g) "that if these problems are overcome, adjustment of major national goals will be greatly facilitated by use of the . . . resources released from the defense program";

(h) "that within wide limits the nation can afford to have as high a level of defense expenditure as is deemed politically desirable. . . . However, advance planning . . . is required. . . ."

[1]This Model was set up by the panel in terms of estimated dollar expenditures on the basis of the official U.S. position on disarmament which was submitted to the United Nations on November 25, 1961, and entitled "U.S. Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World."

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If we read these conclusions with emphasis on the stated qualifications, they seem reasonable. If we assume, as does the panel, (1) that there will be "sensible adjustment policies and vigorous government leadership to dispel adverse effects on public and consumer and to provide that aggregate demand will not be allowed to decline precipitantly"; (2) that "these problems can be mastered by the application of appropriate policies, the chief obstacles to which would be political resistance rather than deficiencies in our economic knowledge," and that there will in fact be "a variety of adjustment programs"; and (3) that there will be "advance planning by government at all levels and by public firms, labor unions and other private organizations," then we may indeed share the quiet optimism of the Benoit Panel—and of many others who seem to feel that Americans must not be caught admitting that the U.S. economy might be adversely affected by disarmament. Is this approach by autosuggestion likely to succeed, or would a 12-year, 32-billion-dollar cut actually precipitate a "depression to curl your hair?"

The Key Role of "Political Obstacles"

The key to answering this question is not the economic analysis in the report. The key is summed up by the panelists themselves when they speak of "the chief obstacles . . . which would be political resistance rather than deficiencies in our economic knowledge." Have these political obstacles been adequately considered and evaluated by the panel or by USACDA? Some of the panel members, in conversations with the writer, have stressed the necessity for educating the public, for initiating as soon as possible a campaign for the prompt enactment of the adequate program that lies within the capabilities of our economic knowledge. The panelists seem to be as optimistic about the task of educating the public as they are about the feasibility of coming through the postulated experience by a comfortable margin of economic safety. The panel implicitly assumed that only three or four years were needed for the educational process, from 1962, when the report was published by the Disarmament Agency, to 1965, by which time The Model assumes an agreement has been reached and by which time U.S. leadership would have to act to avert deflation.

The widespread intuitive pessimism about economic impacts which the report is seeking to offset is based not only upon an

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economic analysis of employment changes and multiplier effects but also upon a rather fundamental understanding of the American democratic process. Indeed, a common formulation of the problem is one which assumes that the totalitarian states would not share our problems because they would not suffer the political obstacles to the enactment of plans.

If we accept the adequacy of contemporary economic policy formulations, we must still recognize the critical element of timing involved. The panel was aware that if we are to offset deflationary multiplier effects with governmental and private adjustment programs and thus to substitute components of aggregate demand, we must provide enough leadtime for the new policies and programs to take effect before the cutbacks start their multiplier effects. Once the downward spiral is allowed to begin, the required programs must not only be able to offset the impact but they must also be large and effective enough to reverse the momentum of the trend. As the report recognized, business and consumer anticipations insure that, in the absence of offsets, the downward spiral would start before the actual cuts in arms expenditures.

The Role of the Congress

What are the mechanisms by which such leadtimes can be achieved in implementing new economic programs in the United States? While the panel report is careful to mention the need for economic planning by business firms, labor unions and other private organizations, as well as by government agencies at all levels, the principal burden of planning and decision-making would fall on the federal government. This means that the bolstering of aggregate demand and the enactment of adjustment programs would have to be approved by the U.S. Congress.

Let us assume that the Executive Branch does its homework early and well, so that effective plans are ready for transmittal to the Hill at the very moment of success in disarmament negotiations. (This is a very optimistic assumption, in the light of previous attempts by the Executive at anticipatory planning for national emergencies.) In view of the above-noted tendency toward anticipatory economic actions by consumers and businessmen, it would seem that the most rapid conceivable enactment of these programs would be needed to prevent the economic toboggan from slipping over the edge of the slope; or, at a

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minimum, there would be a need for such strong assurance to the public of the eventual passage of the proposed adjustment programs as to cause offsetting anticipatory business and consumption decisions.

Such business and consumer anticipations are, of course, not without precedent. They have occurred in the past whenever war has broken out or even when one seemed likely. They have also occurred in peacetime, as, for example, in the speculation on the highway program of the first Eisenhower Administration. But it should be noted that, except in the case of war, the private American decision-maker has usually tended to wait for the actual passage of bills before rushing to the bank. The rapid expansion of the earth-moving and road-building industry occurred after the highway bill was passed; and in view of the aftermath of overproduction and overcapacity, which brought on a private recession in the industry while the rest of the economy was enjoying the 1955-1957 boom, the experience—if it had any lasting effect—must have reinforced caution.

There would undoubtedly be considerable political wrangling before the enactment of programs, and thus a curtailment of administrative leadtimes. Loud voices would be raised in protest against hastily contrived New Deal-type programs. There would be advocates of deep tax cuts, despite the near certainty that drastic tax cuts could not sustain aggregate demand as rapidly as substitute spending programs could. There would be fewer but loud and insistent voices raised in behalf of debt reduction—and Dr. Benoit, as well as, presumably, most of the panel members, agrees that debt reduction would be one of the surest ways to compound, not offset, the deflationary effects of security spending cuts.[2] Even assuming that the major dissonances from the extremes in both parties were quickly muted, is it not probable that considerable time would be lost in debate on the details of alternative programs for particular combinations of tax reduction, increased spending and adjustment programs, and on the best ways and means of formulating each?

We have not even considered the problems of timing related to a disarmament agreement. There are uncertainties at every stage. It would make a difference, for example, whether a disarmament agreement was reached early or late in a Presidential

[2]See Emile Benoit, "The Propensity to Reduce the National Debt Out of Defense Savings," in a special symposium on Economics and National Security, *American Economic Review*, May 1961.

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administration. Perhaps a President might obtain an agreement near the end of his second term, as the crowning achievement of his career—but could a "lame duck" get major domestic programs enacted? Would there not be a tendency for Congress—and even for the Chief Executive himself—to feel that the new Congress and the new administration should be given a voice? In such an event, would the new administration and legislature act promptly on the proposals inherited from the retiring administration? It would make a difference if the new administration were of the same or the opposing party. Or, if the former administration had secured a disarmament agreement early enough so that it also had sufficient time to gain enactment of the domestic program, would not the new administration be obligated at least to take a fresh look? Would it not make a difference whether Congress were in session or not, whether a special session had to be called, whether an election were pending or just completed?

Without mentioning the committee procedures by which legislation is handled, or the cloakroom processes whereby pressures are brought to bear by special interests, or the role of certain Congressional leaders who may be hostile to the Executive, it seems clear that U.S. political institutions are so constituted as to make inevitable a considerable loss of time in the enactment of the program, or rather the many programs, necessary to offset the economic impact of disarmament.[3] These institutions would seem also to insure the ultimate passage of something less than the "ideal" programs that might be devised by executive planning agencies.

Facing Risks Instead of Denying Them

One of the conclusions of the panel, in fact, seems to substantiate these fears: "(f) . . . the impact of disarmament would only accentuate structural problems which already exist and which will have to be solved anyhow if the nation is to produce up to its full potentialities." Speedy and complete solution of these structural problems has already proved beyond the capabilities of our body-politic, and for this and other reasons the country is producing far below its potential. Will a disarmament agreement really inspire the country to do so much better?

Conceivably, effective leadership, by warning of the dangers of further unemployment which would result from disarma-

[3]Note for example, the length and uncertainty of the current debate on tax reduction.

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ment, might be able to generate the Congressional and popular support needed to deal effectively with the problems caused by automation and similar contemporary structural factors. This would mean beneficial fall-out for the American economy, whether or not disarmament followed. Its effectiveness, however, would be a function of the public's expectation that a future GCD agreement will be reached. Moreover, continued progress toward the solution of structural problems, once these have been accentuated by an actual disarmament agreement, would be contingent upon the confidence of both government and the public in the agreement, at the outset, before good faith had been demonstrated in the first stages. All of these political questions certainly give rise to very real doubts about the optimism of the panel's conclusion "f."

It is therefore difficult to accept the casual remark of the panel that the fear of disarmament engendering a severe depression "seems thus a rather improbable contingency."[4] Given The Model, it seems to be a most likely contingency. Does this mean that the United States must oppose disarmament? And does it mean that the U.S. is at a disadvantage, or "unfavorable asymmetry," vis-à-vis the Soviet Union with respect to the economic consequences of disarmament? The first question may be rejected out-of-hand. If the motives for seeking disarmament are economic, the whole subject is unworthy of discussion. If the motive is to increase the security of the United States and of the world, then economic consequences are a minor consideration, a problem to be studied but not a basis for deciding whether to negotiate a disarmament agreement.

The Myth About the Other Side

The second question, whether the United States alone might suffer unfavorable impacts, is a more difficult one.[5] It is a com-

[4]See page 8 of the panel's report.

[5]The report is concerned only with the United States, and the U.S.-Soviet comparison is still the key one in matters of both defense expenditures and disarmament proposals. It is of interest, however, to note a recent study in England, *The Economic Effects of Disarmament,* by The Economist Intelligence Unit, sponsored by the United World Trust (London, January 1963). This study, concerned with the probable economic impacts in England, is similarly optimistic in tone. There are of course good grounds for this. First, the share of GNP devoted to defense expenditures in the United Kingdom is only about three-quarters of that in the U.S. Unemployment is also somewhat lower than in this country. The most important difference concerns political factors; the only reference to political factors in the whole 220-page volume is the remark in the preface that "in the current political and economic situation it would undoubtedly be the policy of the government of the day to keep any industrial dislocation and unemployment arising

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monplace view that the monolithic decision-making structure of the Soviet Union makes it easy for Soviet planners to contemplate disarmament and the opportunity to beat swords into plowshares. It is in fact not so clear that the Soviet decision-making process is so monolithic—or so omnipotent.

There is, on the contrary, much evidence that communist governments in general and the Soviet Union's in particular are considerably less than efficient in their socialist planning and their ability to implement plans. One need only cite the long-standing difficulties in rationalizing agricultural institutions and production, and the communist inefficiency in the use of inventories.[6] And a communist economy is no more immune than ours to the many kinds of disequilibria that such a major shift as the beating of swords into plowshares can cause throughout the labor force and the industrial base, even when it can be "better," i.e., more centrally, directed.[7] Perhaps the most fundamental disequilibrium would be the sudden and complete reorientation of the political incentives in a system dedicated to the overthrow of imperialistic capitalism. Such an upheaval in the communist system—assuming the communists could ever agree to general and complete disarmament—would probably have far-reaching economic as well as political effects, as communist theoreticians and planners struggled to reach agreement on new patterns of resource-use and incentives for the populace.

In any event, the United States should welcome an indication that the Soviet Union is less upset than we about the economic problems of waging peace and therefore more willing to negotiate disarmament. Assuming that the West will negotiate a secure agreement not inimical to Free World interests, would this not mean that the threat of the communist bloc to the Free World was lessened, not merely in a military sense but also in terms of a reduction in the ideological and political pressures of the communist world against the capitalist?

from the ending of defence expenditure to a minimum. . . ." The political constraints in Great Britain would undoubtedly be less than those in the U.S.

[6]See Robert W. Campbell, "A Comparison of Soviet and American Inventory-Output Ratios," *American Economic Review,* September 1958, p. 703.

[7]The Communist Chinese "Great Leap Forward" involved planning errors that were more responsible than "natural disasters" for the subsequent economic crisis —a crisis at least comparable in relative terms to our depression of the 1930's. The Soviet Union has had no comparable crisis since World War II but has made many lesser errors and is currently facing "slowdown" problems. Moreover, since the death of Stalin, communists in power have been removed or demoted on economic issues, which are debated as heatedly within communist regimes as they are in Western administrations.

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Is the Model Realistic?

The foregoing discussion suggests that the panel has failed to provide a definitive answer to the question of the economic impact of disarmament in the United States. Perhaps the question was incorrectly posed. Was the U.S. position of September 1961 on the manner of achieving disarmament realistic? If so, were the panel's estimates of expenditure reductions realistic? And, if not, what figures would be realistic? In short, has the panel asked—or been asked—the right question?

We may waive the issue of the reasonableness and desirability of the objective of general and complete disarmament as against more modest arms control objectives and still ask whether the four-stage, 12-year, 32-billion-dollar-reduction Model is acceptable. In asking this question, we are not being deliberately contentious and seeking to throw up roadblocks in the way of a successful agreement. Rather, we are saying that, if GCD should be achieved, there are good reasons for believing that the profile of national security expenditures thereunder might be very different from that postulated by the panel.

First, the length of time which we assume will be required to achieve the goal of GCD is of the utmost importance. The very concept of "the length of time to reach GCD" may be ambiguous. In a sense, the long period of negotiations preceding a satisfactory agreement may be regarded as part of "the length of time to reach GCD," because it serves as a period of education for the public and for government officials some of whom will be concerned with conversion planning.

Recent history demonstrates that, while for some time extensive disarmament negotiations have been taking place (focusing primarily but not exclusively on the nuclear testing issue), the level of defense expenditures on both sides of the Iron Curtain have *increased*. Thus, it is entirely possible for an eventual disarmament agreement to be preceded by expenditure increases rather than cuts. One may even question whether the prospects for GCD in the present environment are particularly bright and thus question the assumption of the panel study that the first stage of disarmament might begin in 1965. The year 1965 may have been a valid hypothetical date for the panel to use in 1961, but it does make a difference if we push the starting date back by several years, leaving more time for both the development of plans and planning techniques by the Executive branch of the

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government and for the general process of education in both the Executive and Legislative branches and among the general public.[8]

Given additional time, the panel's optimism may seem justifiable to those who are sanguine about the prospects of interim planning and education. However, anyone who is familiar with the planning process in the U.S. government between wars and crises realizes that this country behaves much like the farmer with the leaky barn roof, who could not repair it during the rain and did not need to when the sun was shining. The postwar National Security Resources Board (NSRB), established to operate as a planning agency to meet future crises with shorter leadtimes, was never very successful. After the outbreak of the Korean crisis, it was superseded by the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) and Defense Production Agency (DPA). Following the Korean emergency, heightened cold-war tensions led to a series of unprecedented peacetime military budgets, and the maintenance of standby legislation (the renewal of the Defense Production Act) and continuing planning organizations.[9] But these agencies have never possessed the vigor of "emergency" agencies and have not been able to maintain the high quality of staffing and administrative leadership, or the Executive and Congressional support, required to keep standby regulations and planning activities at a high state of readiness. Much of the energy of these agencies has been siphoned off into politically motivated current activities, such as adjustment procedures under the tariff escape clauses of the Defense Production Act.

The High Costs of Disarming

Is it reasonable to postulate, as the panel does, a 25 per cent decline in the annual rate of defense expenditures in the first three years (Stage I) of disarmament, with lesser percentage declines in the next three three-year stages? No one can answer this question with full assurance that he has the truth, for the simple reason that GCD has never been tried; but an examination

[8]This is not to say that arms expenditures will continue indefinitely to increase. On the contrary, it is likely that during the next few years there will be a moderate decline, due to the optimism engendered by the test ban agreement and to the failure of any major new weapons systems to reach the near-procurement stage. But such developments do not amount to GCD; they are not necessarily permanent or even long-term in nature; and they are unlikely to occur without a deflationary effect on the economy.

[9]ODM has had three successors, including the present Office of Emergency Planning (OEP).

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of certain aspects of various GCD proposals may provide us with a reasonable answer.

The most likely assumption is that the first arms to be reduced will be the nuclear warheads and delivery systems. The opposite assumption, i.e., that Stage I reductions will concentrate on conventional arms, would not seem to hold out the promise of the lessening of tension that seems to be one of the primary objectives of disarmament. The prior reduction of conventional arms would mean that the nuclear powers would place even greater reliance on their nuclear deterrents, thus heightening world tension and the likelihood of nuclear holocaust—the very event which the campaign for disarmament has sought to prevent.

If, then, the initial reductions affect nuclear weapons, may we not expect that the major powers will tend to seek interim security in increased conventional forces? Conventional forces are far more expensive to train, equip and maintain than nuclear forces, which came into being in large measure because they were cheap. Larger conventional forces would compensate not only for the security gap left by the cut in annual expenditures for nuclear weapons but presumably also for the reduction of nuclear stockpiles. In short, it is quite possible that conventional force expenditures will rise sufficiently to offset, and probably more than offset, the expenditure cuts of first-phase nuclear disarmament. There may well be a bulge in the expenditure curve, or at best no decline.

Security during the first phase, however, will depend to a greater extent on assurances that the other side is actually carrying out planned nuclear disarmament than on the substitution of conventional forces. Any agreement signed by U.S. leaders must provide this assurance during the actual process of disarming. In short, inspection systems, including surveillance, detection and verification, must be brought into being initially, not afterward. Although we do not yet know what the inspection system will be like, it will have to be elaborate and expensive if it is to provide adequate security. Again, the first phase appears to involve additional, not reduced, costs; but The Model mentions only a $3.5 billion contribution to international inspection costs *during Stage II* of the U.S. Plan.

An essential ingredient of the panel's disarmament Model, and indeed of most GCD models, is an international police force. Obviously, the United States would be expected to contribute heavily to this force—as it has to the limited international police forces

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of the recent past and to most international organizations. But when would such a force be organized? Only after the disarmament process is completed? If so, the police force would not be ready when it is really essential—during the period when nations are dismantling their military establishments and need, therefore, gradually to shift reliance for their security from national forces to an international force. Since it will require considerable time to build an adequate international force in which nations can repose their trust, the initial organization and build-up of force should be considered an urgent first-phase requirement.[10]

Disarmament thus becomes a rather expensive undertaking—which is not to imply that it is not worth the cost, if it works. But what of subsequent phases, after nuclear disarmament has been successfully accomplished, conventional disarmament is proceeding apace, and inspection systems and international police forces have been deployed and found to be effective? Can we not expect, under these conditions, to enjoy the great economies of a disarmed world, policed by an international force?

Probably not. Even then it is unlikely that the economies hoped for can be achieved, for the attainment of GCD will not automatically bring about a stable world. Since, presumably, nation-states will outlast armaments, security will dictate that the United States—and many other nations, including the Soviet Union—remain cautious and suspicious with regard to the intentions of other states, at least to the extent of insuring that inspection systems not only are operating but remain adequate to detect any and all violations. Presumably, the Free World and the communist bloc will continue to make advances in the fields of science and technology, including new techniques of evasion. These techniques will have to be matched by new techniques of detection. Again, the expense involved cannot be precisely measured, but the enormous complexity and subtlety at the margins of contemporary and foreseeable technology suggest strongly that the evasion-detection game in a disarmed world would be very expensive. The implicit assumption of The Model, as in the models of many writers on disarmament, seems to be that the evasion-detection game can be played with small economic inputs.

The odds thus favor a cost curve that rises before it falls, that

[10]We are concerned here with the likely costs of disarmament, not with the techniques thereof. Otherwise, we would have to remark on the inauspicious start provided by early experiments with the deployment, control and funding of international police forces, as for example in the case of the UN Congo operation.

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falls neither precipitously nor gradually over a long period of time, and that may even start to rise again if there is considerable competition in the evasion-detection game. Such developments obviously would greatly affect the assessment of the economic impact of GCD. The chances of avoiding an economic crisis would be substantially increased under these conditions. First, the cutbacks, instead of coming suddenly, would follow a period in which higher defense expenditures stimulated the economy. Secondly, since these higher expenditures would be tied directly to the GCD program and to the establishment of an inspection system which the general public and its elected representatives felt provided adequately for their security, the political prospects for enactment of successful programs to counter the effects of eventual cutbacks would be much more favorable.

Local Impacts

In one respect, the kind of model outlined above would have something in common with the panel's Model. Both imply important structural changes in the economy—shifts from one kind of production to another, from one industry to another, from one region of the country to another. These structural changes would be costly, both to the entire country, which must help to finance the process of socio-economic adjustment, and to the individual person, company or area adversely affected by the adjustment process.

These localized impacts cannot be ignored: the body-politic will have to find ways of spreading the costs, of insuring that individuals are not forced to carry undue shares of the collective burden. Additional study is needed to provide an adequate understanding of this problem and the methodology to meet it.

In undertaking further study, two points should be considered: First, the model suggested here as being more realistic than that postulated by the panel indicates that the structural difficulties and local impacts are likely to be less serious than those implied by the panel report. The worst fears are always linked to the electronics and aerospace industries. But these are precisely the industries that may be expected to play the largest role in the design and construction of inspection systems, not to mention the potential expansion of peaceful space programs. Therefore, this concern would seem to be misplaced.

Secondly, and more importantly, structural problems—which

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exist today without benefit of disarmament—are most readily solved in an environment of high aggregate demand. The panel, of course, recognized this and pointed out that the deferred demands and high liquidity of the post-World War II and (to a lesser extent) post-Korean periods made the accomplishment of conversion (or reconversion) to peacetime production patterns much easier than had been anticipated. The panel also correctly pointed out that those who cite these two postwar analogies as proof of the ease of meeting the structural problems resulting from disarmament argue in a fallacious manner because, at least in their Model, the existence of deferred or "pent up" demand and high liquidity cannot be anticipated as a condition precedent. In the absence of high aggregate demand, the local impact problems will tend to be onerous.

We have argued, however, that the panel has used a Model which exaggerates the decline in aggregate demand. It remains true that any substantial degree of disarmament will involve structural adjustments. If these are to be planned adjustments—the object of which is to minimize and equitably distribute the burdens rather than to permit the harsh and haphazard adjustments of the marketplace to operate freely—then more research into the probable nature of the local impacts and more planning for orderly adjustments are required along with political education and preparation.

Other-Country Problems

There are other economic problems that will also require continuing study and planning if a disarmament agreement is to be achieved with a minimum of deleterious side effects. One of these problems arises from the fact that current thinking on this subject tends to emphasize the roles of the chief protagonists, the United States and the Soviet Union. Whatever steps may or may not be taken to bring other nations into a disarmament agreement, the substantial disarming of the two largest military powers and the creation of an international security force will clearly create a different world environment for all other nations. This shift will definitely have economic implications for the United States. Any viable disarmament agreement must include other NATO nations and Communist China, since the two superpowers will not disarm for the purpose of passing on preponderant power to their allies.

A sudden change in the defense burdens of our NATO part-

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ners would have serious economic repercussions for all nations, including the United States. The NATO allies are not as heavily committed, proportionately, to military expenditures as the U.S., and most of them currently employ more fully their manpower and capital resources. Thus, arms reduction would have less impact on their economies than it would on the American, *ceteris paribus*. It is possible that reductions might have a stimulating effect on some of these European economies (and the Canadian economy) and particularly on regional economic groups such as the Common Market. Much depends, of course, on the timing of cuts, as it does in the U.S. case.

A reasonable analysis of these possibilities would require a model of a second order of complexity (the panel's Model or the alternative suggested in this article would be of the first order), because one would have to make assumptions as to the sharing of the burdens of inspection and international policing within the NATO alliance—or rather among the alliance countries, since a disarmament agreement strongly implies a dissolution of NATO. Special assumptions must also be made regarding the impact of the phasing of the disarmament agreement on military establishments devoted primarily or entirely to conventional defense, since the burden of nuclear deterrence in NATO will continue for the foreseeable future to fall primarily on the United States. Of particular impact on this country—in a favorable direction—would be the withdrawal, under a disarmament scheme, of U.S. forces from Europe, for the maintenance of these forces overseas contributes heavily to the current unfavorable U.S. balance of payments.

Communist China presents a case of special interest. Relief from the burdens of creating a modern military establishment may have a considerable effect on the Chinese economy, perhaps enabling the Chinese to surmount their current serious economic problems and eventually to catch up with the West. On the other hand, these possible benefits might be more than offset by the political difficulties of sustaining a high level of forced savings and a high degree of unity of purpose in the absence of an external threat. There might even be problems for the regime in maintaining physical control without a large standing army.

And what of the small nations? Few of these maintain significant arms establishments, although many receive military aid that has a significant impact on their economies. Questions of policy

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with respect to the conversion of such aid will be raised for the United States (and the Soviet Union). Moreover, the impact of a changed world on their prospects for successful economic development may have major implications for our economy as well as theirs.

Conclusions

Almost certainly, the very real problems of economic adjustment in the face of GCD will turn out to be primarily political rather than economic. But it is essential to give due regard to their economic aspect in order to assist in reaching political solutions. One object of the panel's exercise was to anticipate and to counter the political argument that economic considerations would prevent sincere negotiation of a GCD agreement by the United States. It is unfortunate that the panel's report was rendered less convincing becaused it failed to make a realistic case on the economic issues. Perhaps the panel erred most egregiously in minimizing those political difficulties which are an integral part of the economic problems themselves.

Indeed, educating the Congress and the public to the need for sustaining aggregate demand and for the prompt adjustment of structural impacts of disarmament may not be the most difficult or immediately most important political problem. In the face of the euphoria which will almost inevitably surround the negotiation and implementation of GCD, it may prove even more difficult to educate Americans and other Free World peoples to a realization that disarmament does not automatically eliminate the causes of conflict in the world, nor all the manifestations thereof. If disarmament is to be successful in enhancing the security of the Free World, it will be necessary to arouse the American public to the need for high expenditures for (1) increased interim conventional forces; (2) extensive and elaborate surveillance, verification and control programs to guard against "cheating"; (3) sustained research and development to prevent obsolescence of such programs; (4) support of international police forces; and (5) continued resistance to nonmilitary pressures by the Soviet Union, Communist China and other closed societies (e.g., propaganda, economic aid and support for "revolutionary wars of national liberation").

The achievement of a general disarmament agreement may convey to the public the feeling that the conflict between East and West—between open and closed societies—has been adjourned,

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when in fact the closed societies keep on waging it. This nation may forget that it takes two—or more—to terminate the conflict as well as to sign a GCD agreement, and that there will be a continuing need for vigilance to defend our freedom and representative institutions. We will have to guard against the notion in the public mind that disarmament means peace and that therefore further investment in, or commitment to, national security is unwarranted. The relatively high expenditures that might very well be required to preserve a disarmed status *and* the security of the Free World may become more and more difficult to sustain the longer this disarmed status endures—just as it may become increasingly difficult under the Test Ban Treaty to maintain the necessary state of readiness in nuclear research that President Kennedy has promised.

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Reviews

The Transformation of France*

by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

Because of France's pivotal position, a united Europe, a militarily strengthened NATO and the development of an Atlantic Partnership require French support. In the estimation of many policymakers in the United States, as well as in Europe, France has posed the most formidable obstacles to the realization of European integration and closer links within the Atlantic world. Successive U.S. administrations have seen their plans for European unity disrupted by France. Although Frenchmen spearheaded the postwar movements toward unity in Europe, French policy allegedly prevented the creation of a European Defense Community, a free trade area embracing the Common Market members and other countries in Europe, and, in January 1963, the accession of Britain to the European Economic Community.

Just as it is fashionable today to criticize French policy with respect to European integration and NATO, the commentaries of many observers of France a decade ago decried the laggard performance of the French economy, the inability of Paris to withdraw with grace from such overseas territories as Indochina, and the political instability of the Fourth Republic with its rapid succession of premiers. France seemed doomed to an existence marked by internecine political strife and stagnation in an economy whose chief characteristic was the protection of inefficiency from foreign competition and domestic innovation. Today, however, even those who disagree fundamentally with President de Gaulle and his foreign policy acknowledge that France no longer merits the epithet "the sick man of Europe." In a recent book, *In Search of France,* six authorities on French government and society interpret, for the interested layman and public official, the causes of this fundamental transformation in French life during the last decade.

Increasingly, studies of political systems produced by American scholars have had as their objective to assess the impact of a total society upon the institutions of government. Such investigations utilize skills of the historian, economist, and sociologist, as well as the student of politics. This volume represents an effort of this kind. It has the merits of an anthology, in which the reader is exposed to a variety of scholarly analyses all centered upon one country. Yet such efforts are sometimes marred by unevenness of style and treatment among authors. The authors of this study, however, despite their varied backgrounds and approaches, have succeeded in avoiding such pitfalls by close collaboration and the ex-

**In Search of France.* By Stanley Hoffmann, Charles P. Kindleberger, Laurence Wylie, Jesse R. Pitts, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle and François Goguel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 443 pp. $8.95.

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change of ideas and viewpoints over a two-year period prior to the volume's publication.

All contributors find themselves in accord with the notion that the French resurgence of the last decade is related to basic changes in the structure and values of society in France. Such changes are evident in Professor Hoffmann's analysis of the breakdown of what he terms the "Republican synthesis," which emerged gradually during the century after the French Revolution and flourished in the years between 1878 and 1934. The "Republican synthesis," according to Hoffmann, was based upon a stalemate society, in which there existed "a very broad consensus on the form of 'equilibrium' which accepted social mobility and evolution toward a more industrialized order, but only within sharp limits and along well-defined channels." (p. 4.) It is Hoffmann's contention that Frenchmen, by and large, welcomed economic changes only if they did not affect greatly the traditional way of life. Both the peasantry and the bourgeoisie were participants in this consensus. The bourgeoisie succeeded in identifying itself with French society as a whole and thus imposed upon France its values of "stability, harmony, permanence—rather than competition, which means both mobility and elimination." (p. 6.)

The political institutions of the Third Republic reflected the dominance of such values. The organization of the state did not facilitate the development of clear-cut economic or social alternatives in a strong party system. Elections resulted regularly in the perpetuation of rule by parties of the Center, rather than the election in turn of the Left and Right. As many observers have suggested with respect to the Fourth Republic, elected officials during the period of the 'Republican synthesis" provided the façade behind which the bureaucracy made decisions. France, moreover, never succeeded in reconciling representative government with effective executive leadership. Representation superseded leadership not only in the Third Republic, but also in the Fourth Republic which, as all authors stress, mirrored in many respects its predecessor.

This system of middle class predominance was unable to integrate into the French social fabric the industrial proletariat, whose numbers grew gradually as industrialization proceeded, although at a rate below that of neighboring Britain and Germany. In fact, the slowness of economic progress in France during the Third Republic may have alienated many in the working class from an apparently unproductive and unremunerative capitalism. As a result, relations between workers and the consensus groups (peasantry and bourgeoisie) were characterized by high tensions and a minimum of cooperation.

As some contributors suggest, changes in French life which have become apparent only recently have their roots in the decade preceding the Second World War as well as in that conflict itself and its aftermath. The stalemate society which the "Republican syn-

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thesis" represented was not only unable to provide a solution to the pressing economic problems of the 1930's, but failed to spur Frenchmen to the efforts necessary to defend themselves against Hitler's onslaught.

The defeat of France in 1940 led Frenchmen to reassess their attitudes toward each other and toward the world beyond their borders. Common suffering did much to bridge fissures in the social fabric. According to Professor Hoffmann, the myth that nearly everyone in France was *résistante* contributed to the healing both of wartime wounds and of the divisions which had marred French life during and before the Third Republic. As Professor Pitts indicates, Catholicism regained a stature which it had not enjoyed for generations as a result of its impressive role in the resistance. No longer could the Church be identified exclusively with the Right.

Certain features of the occupation accelerated trends toward modernization. For example, many Frenchmen, drafted to work in German factories or exposed in other ways to the modern techniques of their conquerers and later to those of the liberating allies, thought anew about adaptations which might be made in postwar France. Even the Vichy regime, according to Hoffmann, contributed to the transformation of France. Petain established organizations of businessmen and civil servants whose objective was to guide production. Such attempts at cooperation, without precedent in modern France, provided experience which successive postwar regimes have drawn upon in formulating joint efforts by business and government for economic expansion. The war, in short, not only taught Frenchmen that they could not return to the *status quo ante,* but provided a greater understanding of techniques by which France might achieve rejuvenation.

The inability of France between the wars to match industrial countries in economic growth has been widely attributed to the staggering French military losses of World War I. No comparable attrition of French manpower occurred during World War II. Moreover, the rise in the French birth rate, which began at the close of the war, has injected a new dynamism into French life. This development in itself undoubtedly accounts in part for France's economic growth in the postwar period. It is Professor Kindleberger's contention, however, that French economic growth after World War II was the result of the restaffing of the economy with new and younger men and the replacement of new attitudes for old. In the thirties a generation of Frenchmen retained power which they might otherwise have relinquished to their sons and nephews if World War I had not decimated France's male population. In the postwar period the mantle of economic leadership passed to men much younger than would have been the case if much of the preceding generation had not lost their lives between 1914 and 1918. Thus, the growth of population and the expansion of

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industrial output reflected a shift in French attitudes.

Similar changes are noted with respect to consumption in the last decade. Whereas Frenchmen traditionally avoided living up to their neighbors and insisted upon product differentiation, the techniques of mass consumption which have characterized American life have taken hold in France. Such changes are paced by the gradual acceptance of installment buying among classes of Frenchmen who hitherto could afford few of the conveniences of an industrial society. As Professor Wylie suggests, the new values which have wrought such great changes in France have not been confined in their impact to Paris or other large cities. Basing his findings upon extensive research conducted in two small towns, Wylie contrasts the innovations in rural life in the sixties with those which he observed a decade ago. The electrification of farms, the use of gas for cooking and heating, refrigeration, the mechanization of farming, and the diminished importance of family life reveal that rural areas have shared in the recent changes in French life. Radio and television have made their appearance in farming regions, thus broadening the horizons of groups whose existence traditionally did not transcend the narrow bounds of their commune or department.

In the last decade regional differences have been reduced by nationalizing tendencies. Such developments are the product of economic and social change. The mass media of communication serve to lessen differences between city and village both in consumption and culture. The availability of rapid transportation, for example, has altered farmers' marketing patterns. New techniques of merchandising have made available to rural populations a variety of products formerly restricted to urban areas. Finally, the cities have had a magnetic attraction for youth because of greater possibilities for advancement. Efforts by the French government to attract industry to regions outside Paris have not halted the trend toward urban concentrations of population, especially around the capital. The movement from rural to urban areas is likely to continue in the next decade.

If one projects the integrative trends examined in this volume, it is possible to predict the emergence of a consensus which bodes well for the development of political stability in France. There may well be a reduction in the divisive tendencies which have caused Frenchmen to disagree upon governmental organization and upon the powers to be exercised respectively by executive and legislature. Nevertheless, the changes examined in this study have stopped short of a basic transformation in political attitudes. Political change has lagged behind alterations in the social and economic structure.

This is not to suggest that the political institutions of France have not undergone a fundamental change in recent years. The differences between the Fourth and Fifth Republics are substantial. Yet they are not of a nature simi-

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lar to those which, if the contributors to this volume are correct, have transformed the economic and social values of Frenchmen. Apparently, the conflict between strong executive authority and legislative predominance, which plagued France in the nineteenth century, remains unresolved in the France of the sixties. While the economic organization does not depend for its *raison d'être* upon the existence of one man, such cannot be said about the political structure of contemporary France.

It is not certain that France's political institutions can survive a change in leadership. Although the "Republican synthesis" of the Third Republic has ceased to exist, a new consensus has not developed in its place. According to François Goguel, "public opinion in general, whatever its continuing attachment to General de Gaulle and the authority it acknowledges in him, shows no confidence in the regime aside from the person of its leader." (p. 390.) France will lack the "stability" associated with representative governments in Scandinavia and the Anglo-Saxon countries so long as a given set of political institutions does not command the acceptance of most Frenchmen.

Several contributors have addressed themselves to the nature of France's foreign policy. With considerable persuasiveness, Professor Duroselle, in particular, maintains that since 1815 French public opinion has not approved a foreign policy which was "aggressive or extroversive." Frenchmen, by and large, have not urged their government to undertake bold action in foreign affairs. There are, as Professor Duroselle acknowledges, exceptions: public opinion at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, during the initial stages of the First World War, and at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956. Frenchmen have avoided extroversion in foreign affairs, according to Duroselle, because they were satisfied with the frontiers established in 1815 and were not sufficiently tempted, therefore, even after the loss of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, to risk war in order to extend their boundaries in Europe. Nevertheless, France had embarked in the Napoleonic period upon an expansive policy of dimensions not again equaled by any nation until the rise of Hitler. The Napoleonic legend lived on in France long after the demise of its hero. Moreover, the interest of Frenchmen in expansion after 1870 may have been dampened by the presence to the east of a unified Germany whose industry and manpower exceeded those of France.

French territorial satisfaction did not prevent a drive for colonies which gained for France an empire second only to that of Great Britain. France, heeding Bismarck's counsel, sought compensation for losses in Europe by turning to Asia and Africa. Later the loss of her overseas possessions provided a traumatic experience in France. Not without reason, Frenchmen in considerable numbers felt a personal involvement in the painful

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process of retreat and withdrawal from such territories as Indochina and Algeria. In contrast with British experience in colonial devolution, France engaged in protracted military action to retain her overseas possessions. Thus, the French colonial experience provides another important exception to Professor Duroselle's thesis about introversion and French foreign policy.

It is appropriate that the authors emphasize the impact of World War II and its aftermath upon French attitudes toward foreign policy. It was impossible in foreign affairs, as in economic life, for France to "return to normal" after her defeat in 1940. According to Duroselle, the failures in Indochina and Egypt provided striking demonstrations—even if the implications of defeat in World War II had eluded some Frenchmen—of the limitations of France's power. Britain's process of decolonization was less painful. Britain possessed a tradition which accepted the theory, if not always the practice, of eventual self-government for overseas possessions. Furthermore, despite the problems of multiracial territories in East Africa, Britain never faced a situation so complex as that of Algeria with its substantial population of French settlers. For France, decolonization came as yet another manifestation of national tragedy and retreat, whereas for Britain the granting of self-government was viewed as the logical culmination of the British colonial experience in which, supposedly, governmental practices developed in Westminster were transplanted to new environments.

The French experience may yet prove to have been more salutary in effect than the relatively peaceful British transfer of power. After World War II, France was compelled to reorient her foreign policy or face the grim prospect of a drastic reduction in her international status beyond that resulting from European and colonial wars. Britain, in contrast, could retain the self-image of a nation whose power was augmented by a Commonwealth, by a "special relationship" with the United States, and by the knowledge that she had been one of the victors in the Second World War. Such a national image, however illusory, was not conducive to a reshaping by Britons of their country's role in world affairs. France's experience undoubtedly imparted, not least to President de Gaulle, a realization that France must seek new friends and policies.

This reasoning led Frenchmen to an acceptance of Europe. According to Professor Duroselle, the European idea has gained adherents increasingly in France, although Frenchmen, like other Europeans, remain divided about the form which unity should assume. This development has coincided with another important change: the disappearance of the French inferiority complex vis-à-vis Germany. Frenchmen, for the first time in generations, are able to work with Germans with the realization that France in many respects is at least Germany's equal. Such a change in attitude, which

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had not occurred even as recently as 1954, as illustrated in the EDC debates of that year, undoubtedly has given impetus to the Franco-German *rapprochement.*

The value of this volume would have been enhanced by greater analysis of the policies of the Fifth Republic with respect to European unity and NATO. In a chapter entitled "Changes in French Foreign Policy since 1945," Professor Duroselle devotes considerably more space to a treatment of developments in the previous 150 years than to an examination of the last decade and a half. Unfortunately, after setting forth in summary fashion the principal Gaullist foreign policies, he confines himself to a review of arguments offered by those who oppose De Gaulle's conception of *grandeur.* In place of such manifestations of *grandeur* as the creation of a nuclear *force de dissuasion,* Frenchmen are offered "a greater share in the profits of expansion for the working class; strong measures in underdeveloped rural areas, and in many French provinces; and, most worthy task of all, the safeguarding of democracy threatened by extremists." (p. 354.) The author might have probed more deeply into President de Gaulle's motivations for the creation of a nuclear *force de dissuasion,* his conception of a united Europe, and his views of *les Anglo-Saxons.*

Despite such omissions, this study will retain its value not only as a penetrating analysis of political, social and economic developments in modern France, but as a model for interdisciplinary research about other countries. The authors have produced a volume which is both comprehensive and unique, and thus of immense value to all who continue "in search of France."

Latin America's Bitter Wine*

by Sig Synnestvedt

When President Eisenhower took office in 1953, he hoped to travel at an early date through most of Latin America. Pressures in other parts of the world, however, soon forced him to postpone his trip indefinitely. Instead, he asked his brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, who had first become interested in Latin America in 1946 when he attended a UNESCO conference in Mexico, to act as the President's personal representative in Latin America and to review the overall situation as well as U.S. policies in Latin America. During the eight years of the Eisenhower Administration, Dr. Eisenhower handled this assignment on a part-time basis, in addition to his responsibilities as President of Pennsylvania State University and later Johns Hopkins University.

When he accepted this appointment, Milton Eisenhower was not widely considered to be an expert on Latin America. But his tact, diligence and sympathy won him many friends throughout the hemisphere and the respect of many U.S. statesmen and scholars. It is

**The Wine Is Bitter.* By Milton Eisenhower. New York: Doubleday, 1963. 342 pp. $4.95.

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a pity that American political tradition often removes, when a new government is formed, such men from policymaking and even advisory roles. Milton Eisenhower's views are not at sharp variance with those of the Kennedy Administration, and his understanding of U.S.-Latin American issues might have been of considerable value to the new team of U.S. policymakers. Fortunately, his views, recently set forth in a new book, *The Wine Is Bitter,* are now available to officials in Washington and to the general public.

In his assessment of Latin America, Eisenhower finds major weaknesses in the social structure. He states that living conditions for the mass of the people are already intolerable and the population explosion is making them worse; that the agricultural sector is burdened by the maldistribution of land, unwise choice of crops and archaic farming methods; and that Latin Americans are, by and large, unproductive and prefer to substitute for increased productivity a variety of socialist "solutions" which have proved to be no solution at all. He is convinced that Latin America's tendency to try to overcome backwardness through rapid industrialization has unbalanced the economies of some nations and encouraged inflation everywhere; and that the Latin American educational system is inadequate to the task at hand, particularly in the rural areas. The human equation is judged to be the vital factor in the entire situation. Symbols, statistics, economic theories, military policies, political solutions—none of these is the answer to the Latin American riddle. Rather, it is the will, emotions and aspirations of the people. And in Latin America the will of the people is fiercely independent. Eisenhower finds nationalism to be such a strong emotional force in Latin America as to inhibit constructive self-criticism and invite self-destruction. Indeed, he takes the title of his book from the words of the Cuban poetic revolutionary, José Martí, "Nuestro vino es agrio, pero es nuestro vino."

Many Latin Americans will take offense at some of the criticisms leveled by the author. Yet, throughout the book his warm affection and admiration for Latin America and Latin Americans is evident. Moreover, he finds equal fault on the side of the United States. He divides U.S. policy into five main eras. The first he calls the "big brother" era, beginning with the Latin American wars of independence and ending with the close of the nineteenth century. During this period the United States usually ignored and occasionally attacked (e.g., the Mexican War, 1846-1848) our Latin American neighbors. Our manner was almost always condescending. The second era covered the first thirty years of the twentieth century. Eisenhower calls this the period of the "meddling uncle," Repeated interventions, especially in the Caribbean republics, earned for the United States a "lasting resentment on the part of Latin American leaders and intellectuals." During the third period the "meddling uncle" changed his ways and became the

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"good neighbor." The result was beneficial for both North and South America. However, U.S. policy-makers largely ignored the pressures for domestic socio-economic change which followed World War II. The author frankly admits that the Eisenhower Administration was partly at fault for allowing the fourth era, that of "business as usual," to extend too far into the 1950's. The fifth era began about 1958 and continues to the present time. During this period the Alliance for Progress was designed in response to the need for rapid economic development.

Milton Eisenhower goes to some length to demonstrate that the concept of an Alliance for Progress dates back farther than 1961. He does so partly to give due credit to the Eisenhower Administration, but more importantly to undercut the Castro-fostered myth that the program is merely a belated response to communist "reform" in Cuba. As early as 1956, Milton Eisenhower favored U.S. acceptance of the Latin-sponsored Inter-American Bank, and his report to the President in 1958 urged support of broad reforms throughout the area, promotion of a Latin American common market and creation of a high-ranking National Advisory Committee on Inter-American Affairs. In February 1959, one month after Castro came to power and while he was still immensely popular throughout the hemisphere, the United States urged the Organization of American States to adopt proposals which "called for an increased flow of credit, better development planning, increased trade, intensified efforts to promote common markets, and *the beginning of social change through the financing of low-cost housing.*" (p. 231.) In September 1960 the Act of Bogota embodied these and other proposals.

Milton Eisenhower firmly supports the Alliance for Progress, launched by President Kennedy in the spring of 1961 and formally signed that summer at the Punta del Este Conference in Uruguay. He is convinced that revolutions are inevitable in Latin America; he believes that the Alliance is our only chance to keep Castro-type upheavals from "wrecking" country after country. He is equally convinced that the Alliance will fail to stem the revolutionary tide if reform does not go forward at once. The ruling groups in Latin America must give up some of their privileges to retain the rest. Eisenhower is hopeful that this hard choice will be made, but he is not confident.

The author proposes several measures to help overcome the tragic misunderstandings which debilitate hemisphere programs. While he was responsible for policy he urged the establishment of national commissions to build "intellectual solidarity" in the Americas. He also favors the expansion of scholarships, fellowships and exchanges of students, teachers and others, more bi-national centers, an Inter-American Conference on Information Media, and public and private information programs of all types. He believes that the

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United States is ignorant about Latin America and that Latin America, although better informed about the United States, misinterprets much of its information.

On one occasion the author relates that he was "stunned" by the views of a Christian anti-communist who told him that the United States was "to blame for the rise of Castroism in Cuba and its acceptance by many others in this hemisphere. You seized the island from Spain and opened it to your robber barons who plundered most of its basic resources. You forced the Cuban workers to produce a single crop so that, in turn, they could get industrial products only from you. You allied yourself with the Cuban leaders who crushed the common people under their boots." (p. 53.) Eisenhower asserts that many Latin American intellectuals believe the United States is still imperialistic, helps other areas of the world but not Latin America, has unlimited wealth, fixes world prices to its advantage, assists dictators, and supports Latin American oligarchs in order to exploit the area through them. He was appalled at the "monotonous uniformity" of these misconceptions.

Those who believe Latin America's problems to be largely the work of the communist bloc will be disappointed in Eisenhower's book. The Soviets do not receive two dozen pages of analysis. Of course, he considers Castro's Cuba to be a trouble center and cites Soviet propaganda and trade manipulations as illustrations of communist intentions and policies toward Latin America. But Eisenhower seems to believe that if the communists were removed entirely from the scene, the problems would be almost as great and the need for the Alliance for Progress nearly as urgent.

The author's personal accounts of certain well-publicized events enliven the book. For example, he tells of his experience on the Tractors for Prisoners Committee. President Kennedy personally asked him to serve and Eisenhower, believing that the committee's efforts would receive official White House support, accepted the invitation. This endorsement never came. After the committee became embroiled in public controversy, the author concluded with a feeling of "chilling clarity" that the President intended to "maintain the fiction" that the committee was entirely private. He was convinced that the group's activities violated the Logan Act, passed in 1799, which prohibits unauthorized negotiations by private individuals with foreign governments, but thought that he should not resign so long as there was a chance to make the exchange on the terms originally proposed by Castro. Eisenhower felt that Kennedy had double-crossed him, and sent the President the "bitterest letter" he had ever written. (p. 287.)

In his account of the committee, the author does not restrict criticism to the President. He asserts that Senator Goldwater and other Republicans erred in criticizing the committee after it became apparent that Castro, in equating lives with

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machines, had blundered. When Castro's attempt to embarrass the U.S. had thus backfired throughout Latin America, the U.S. gained a propaganda victory. But Eisenhower feels that this victory was blunted by Goldwater's implication that the entire effort was a sell-out to the communist dictator. "The Latin American reaction was nearly lost in domestic frothing." (p. 283.)

The author offers a balanced assessment of the Kennedy Administration's record in Latin America. He concludes that the "terrible mistakes" of the Bay of Pigs and the "clumsy fumbling" in the Tractors for Prisoners exchange have not been characteristic of Kennedy's efforts. Eisenhower praises the President's earnest endeavors to place the power of the United States on the side of democratic reform in Latin America.

The Wine Is Bitter is filled with many important statistics and quotable passages. For example: 85 per cent of all Latin American students who study abroad go to the United States. There are nearly eight thousand from Venezuela alone. Latin America contains eight million square miles of land, but less than 5 per cent is under cultivation. When Castro destroyed all trade with the United States the average per capita income in Cuba dropped from $380 to $190. Impatient young Latin Americans must learn that "they cannot seize freedom and prosperity; they must build it." (p. 84.) "There is clearly no substitute for efficient production. It is fun to play poker, but no one should confuse a card game with the creation of real wealth." (p. 123.) "As things stand at present, most Latin Americans would rather socialize poverty than perpetuate the inequities of their country's own private enterprise." (p. 69.) Unless average Latin Americans can be brought to realize the importance of the Alliance for Progress in reducing poverty they "will finally choke on their bitter wine and seize the future angrily." (p. 126.)

Milton Eisenhower has woven much of his personal philosophy into this book. He demonstrates his strong opposition to dictatorial government, his warm sympathy for needy people, his realistic internationalism, and his dedication to maintaining a world in which each individual may determine his own allegiance to nation, community and family. There is a certain nostalgia for the simpler world of his Abilene, Kansas childhood, but he insists that the "essence of nostalgia is an awareness that what has been will never be again." He calls for action, not despair.

Unfortunately, *The Wine Is Bitter* is probably too ponderous a volume to attract the wide readership it deserves. It has some shortcomings in organization, mainly because the same topic is taken up in several different places, and occasionally the author's personal narrative gets in the way of a systematic analysis of the issues. Yet this is surely one of the most comprehensive, balanced and valuable books to appear on Latin America in recent years.

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Theory Building in International Relations*

by Ross K. Baker

The product of a symposium of The Center of International Studies at Princeton University, *The International System* is a collection of essays which aim at the building of theories of international relations. The contributors are, for the most part, younger men in the field, but the frequent allusions to Hans Morgenthau, Quincy Wright and other mature scholars suggest their reliance upon these veterans of the profession.

Most of the contributors couch their hopes for systematic theory in rather modest terms. Each writer seems aware of the fact that he is merely advancing a suggestion rather than expounding a truth. Much of what is said in their essays is intriguing and worth pondering, but after reading several of the pieces one begins to long for the intellectual candor and perspicuity of a Morgenthau.

The introduction states that the individual articles were selected because they represented random samples of theory building, rather than because they had any particular relation to one another. From the point of view of the student, a different ordering of the articles in the book would have been helpful. For example, an article such as David Singer's "Level of Analysis Problem" might well have been accorded the lead-off spot since it goes to the heart of the process of theorizing. Thomas Schelling's piece on "Games and Bargaining Theory" might have been placed at the end as an example of a fairly well-developed theoretical model.

Perhaps the most ambitious of all of the essays is the one by Fred W. Riggs, "International Relations as a Prismatic System." In his efforts to construct a model to clarify interstate relations, he presents us with an extensive and revolutionary vocabulary. This sort of project was undertaken, with indifferent success, by Almond and Coleman in their *Politics of the Developing Areas*. The appealing part of Riggs' lexicon is that it is applicable to all areas at all times. If Riggs' vocabulary were to gain currency it would remedy much of the imprecise writing found in the literature of the field today.

Charles A. McClelland's essay is an attempt to discern patterns in the periodic convulsions of the Cold War for the purpose of enhancing our understanding of past crises and of gaining insights for the resolution of later ones. He does not identify nations as actors, and looks instead to the individual decision-makers involved in the various confrontations. His condemnation of the policy-oriented works of Robert Strausz-Hupé and the so-called "single-factor analysis" of Hans Morgenthau seems somewhat premature in view of the fact that McClelland's theory thus far is unsuited to the task of providing practical policy alternatives.

Perhaps the most incisive analy-

**The International System: Theoretical Essays.* Edited by Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. 237 pp. $5.00.

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sis of the problems and promise of theory-building is provided in Morton Kaplan's "Problems of Theory Building." The quandary he presents is puzzling indeed. He sees the need for general theories about high policy but recognizes that on this level there is a lack of specific data and useful variables which can be employed. On a lower level, the specificity and number of employable variables rises, but the ability to achieve useful generality falls proportionately. He acknowledges the limited applicability of theoretical models to real situations and compares the state of theorizing in international relations to that which prevails in the physical sciences and economics. Since two international systems cannot exist coevally and side-by-side like two economic systems, Kaplan sees no chance to obtain comparative data. He agrees with the positivistic notion of the hierarchy of the sciences and the placing of the social sciences on the highest rung of sophistication and difficulty. And this is about where we came in before.

It is precisely on the usage of the term "international system" that none of the contributors seems really clear. Had the use of the term "system" been defined with more exactness, the studies themselves would have had more meaning. A system, to some, implies far more than the highly chaotic and unorganized congeries of nation-states which currently dominates the globe. To most people the term "system" appears to connote physical boundaries, a common system of laws, central authority and even a common language. The so-called "international system," in reality, embodies none of these. This regrettable error in nomenclature, however, does not vitiate the high quality of most of these essays.

If this series of essays does nothing else, it certainly refutes, by its very publication, the contention of many offended theorists that the systematic behavioral approach spells the end of political theorizing. The anthology clearly indicates that behavioralistic techniques do not merely amount to a sterile process of head-counting or a gauging of stimulus and response. The normative import of most of these writings cannot be gainsaid. The contributors are not merely concerned with charting tensions and threats, but display a desire to attenuate them. They do not merely build theories in a vacuum but rather they strive to make them applicable tools for understanding a world in revolution. Most of these attempts at useful theory-construction remain in the trial-and-error stage, but this is not to say that the writers have not come up with valuable new tools and ideas. This collection of essays is one more contribution to a continuing effort — which has been going on since Aristotle—to bring order out of chaos.

Not all of the attempts at theorizing in this collection are of uniform value. Sidney Verba's paper on the rationality or non-rationality of decision-makers reads in part like an updated version of some of Geoffrey Gorer's work. The idea of

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childhood-engendered hostility being projected into the international sphere seems to be an unfortunate excursion into psychological reductionism. Verba does not construct a convincing link between early life-experience and non-rationality on the international policy level.

The previously-mentioned piece by David Singer on the "Level of Analysis Problem" sets forth many basic methodological truths. In places, it is sadly marred by substantive superficiality. To dismiss Morgenthau's concept of "interest defined as power" as "a simplistic image comparable to economic or sexual man," is slighting a man who, Singer himself admits, "is one of the very few text writers focusing on the international system." Morgenthau's *real-politik* is by no means the mechanistic theory that Singer describes. In *Politics Among Nations,* Morgenthau deals extensively with the components of national power such as natural resources, morale and diplomatic skill, and adduces convincing evidence that the lack of such requisite strengths may compel a state to shrink from the exercise of power or to act out of weakness. Further, Morgenthau clearly asserts that the so-called "international system" is merely a creature of its constituent units (the nation-states). This idea alone refutes directly the charge of system-dominance.

To sum up briefly the remaining three essays: George Modelski's penetrating analysis of the impact of industrialization on international relations is both theoretically sound and stylistically palatable. Arthur Lee Burns' discussion of the problems inherent in Game Theory and the extension of this approach to Bargaining Theory is a capable critical essay on a complex subject. The concluding work on a functional theory of international law by Stanley Hoffmann delves deeply into the stability and moderation of the nineteenth-century balance of power system. Hoffmann here displays the lucid style and incisive commentary that have characterized so much of his work.

The International System is a stylistic and methodological potpourri. It is recommended reading as a provocative and stimulating collection of novel and not-so-novel theorizings about problems which are as old as the history of human society.

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Books Received

I. Politics, History, Economics

Class Structure in the Social Consciousness. By Stanislaw Ossowski. Translated from the Polish by Sheila Patterson. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. 202 pp. $5.00.

Professor Ossowski, who holds the Chair of Sociology at Warsaw University, examines the various ways of interpreting class structure used in European social thought. In his final chapter the author discusses the relationship between types of interpretation and types of class structure, thereby providing a confrontation of Marxist and Western views on this subject.

Classics in Political Science. Edited by Joseph S. Roucek. New York: Philosophical Library, 1963. 378 pp. $6.00.

A collection of the writings of the world's leading political thinkers. The editor's selections are not only representative of the thought of the individual theorist, but are illustrative of principal trends in political theory from Plato to Spengler.

The Coming World Transformation. By Ferdinand Lundberg. New York: Doubleday, 1963. 395 pp. $5.75.

In this challenging and controversial book, Dr. Lundberg, Professor of Social Philosophy at New York University, makes a number of predictions about the future of human institutions during the next 150 years. After showing how and why predictions can be made, the author examines such broad topics as the population explosion, world economic relationships, the increasing role of government and the future of education. He predicts, for example, that Afro-Asia will remain relatively backward; that government in the U.S. will become highly centralized, thus destroying the federal system; that racism will largely disappear and intermarriage will increasingly occur; and that a major nuclear war is highly unlikely.

The Hidden Force. Edited by Francis W. Godwin, Richard N. Goodwin and William F. Haddad. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 203 pp. $3.95.

An anthology setting forth the results of a symposium conducted by the Peace Corps in San Juan to examine the needs of underdeveloped countries for trained manpower. The conferees concluded that the success of economic assistance depended to a considerable extent upon the development of middle level manpower, the group placed halfway between the unskilled and the highly skilled workers.

International Politics. By Norman L. Hill. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 458 pp. $7.00.

A new undergraduate text in international relations. Part one treats the community of states, diplomatic practices and a brief history of international relations. Part two discusses foreign policymaking in the U.S., U.K. and USSR; traditional Western concepts such as the national interest, isolationism, neutrality, the use of force, and ethics; and communist concepts of international relations. Part three deals with the background and major issues of the Cold War. Part four considers "influences on conduct": domestic affairs, nationalism, imperialism, population explosion, geography, economics, components of power and the balance of power.

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Part five examines efforts to control conduct, such as international law, regional and world organizations, and functional approaches.

Law and Organization in World Society. By Kenneth S. Carlston. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962. 356 pp. $6.50.

The author analyzes law and organization in world society in terms of social, political and legal theory. He includes a study of nationalization to illustrate the basic principles and propositions which, he maintains, are interdependent and determine the functioning of international relations and world organization.

Parliaments. Introduction by Giuseppe Codacci-Pisanelli. New York: Praeger, for the Interparliamentary Union, 1962. 321 pp. $7.00.

A comparative study of parliamentary institutions in forty-one countries which examines the structures and organizations, the legislative functions and the financial powers of national assemblies.

Political Geography. By Norman J. G. Pounds. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963. 422 pp. $9.50.

This undergraduate text adopts a functional and state-oriented approach designed to assist the student to analyze the effect of geographical variations on the policies of nation-states. The author analyzes the nation-state and its functions, location, frontiers, territorial sea, population and resources; discusses the geographical aspects of interstate relations and the political geography of foreign trade, rivers and international organizations; and examines the global problems resulting from the demise of colonialism and the political independence of underdeveloped areas.

Those Days. By Hamilton Fish Armstrong. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 151 pp. $4.00.

The Editor of *Foreign Affairs,* reminiscing about his childhood in New York at the turn of the century, has set down what he calls a rough inventory of remembrance: his "unreal estate."

World Without Want. By Paul G. Hoffman. New York: Harper & Bros., 1962. 144 pp. $3.50.

A plan, endorsed by former Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower, for the international economic and social betterment of that two-thirds of the world's population crippled by problems of poverty, hunger, illiteracy and disease.

II. Military Affairs, Arms Control, Technology

America Armed: Essays on United States Military Policy. Edited by Robert A. Goldwin. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963. 140 pp. $1.25 (paper).

Essays on U.S. military policy by six authors who hold widely differing points of view—Robert E. Osgood, Walter Millis, Herman Kahn, Joseph Cropsey, David R. Inglis and Mulford Q. Sibley.

Communist Guerrilla Warfare. By C. Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn. New York: Praeger, 1962. 229 pp. $4.95.

A thorough, systematic analysis of guerrilla warfare as employed by the Soviets.

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in World War II against the Nazis. Although guerrilla warfare is treated in an unfamiliar setting, urbanized Europe instead of the jungles of Southeast Asia, the authors present a timely study of military science which includes counter-guerrilla tactics, sketch maps and general rules of operation.

NATO and the Defense of the West. By Hubertus Prince zu Löwenstein and Volkmar von Zuhlsdorff. New York: Praeger, 1962. 383 pp. $7.50.

This study of NATO discusses the reasons for its establishment and the obstacles which had to be overcome before all fourteen original signatories would give their approval to its formation. The authors examine the rapid emergence of NATO as a cornerstone of Free World security and the many debates over NATO's proper military posture and strategy. They seek to provide answers to NATO's future in the Atlantic world, and supplement their text with seven charts and appendices.

War and the Soviet Union. (Revised edition.) By H. S. Dinerstein. New York: Praeger, 1962. 268 pp. $5.50.

A revised edition of this valuable book, first published in 1959, on nuclear weapons and the revolution in Soviet military and political strategy. Dr. Dinerstein provides a new introduction that examines post-1959 developments in Soviet military doctrine and places his earlier analysis within the context of events up to September 1962.

III. United States

The American Foreign Policy. Edited by Ernest R. May. New York: George Braziller, 1963. 248 pp. $5.00.

This book of readings on the history and traditions of U.S. foreign policy is designed, like the other three volumes in this series on The American Image, for readers who have no specialized background in the subject, particularly the foreign student. All of the materials are taken from the speeches, state papers and writings of U.S. Presidents, Senators and statesmen.

Black Nationalism: A Search for Identity in America. By E. U. Essien-Udom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. 367 pp. $6.95.

An American-trained Nigerian examines the origins, organization, philosophy, practices and objectives of the Black Muslim Movement among Negroes in the United States.

Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives. By Neil MacNeil. New York: David McKay, 1963. 496 pp. $6.75.

An absorbing and readable account of the functions, organization and inner workings of the House of Representatives. Mr. MacNeil, *Time's* chief Congressional correspondent, also explains the decisive influence which the House has on American affairs, shows how the House has challenged every President since 1789, and provides numerous vignettes on the leading members of the House, past and present, the memorable votes and debates, the role of lobbyists, and behind-the-scenes struggles.

A History of American Foreign Policy. By Alexander DeConde. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963. 914 pp. $12.00.

An important new text on the history of U.S. foreign policy. Professor DeConde discusses the development of various U.S. foreign policies in the context of

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domestic and foreign political, social, economic and military factors. The last 200 pages are devoted to a survey of U.S. policies in the post-World War II period. The appendix contains very useful materials: extracts from the Constitution relating to foreign affairs, a list of Presidents and Secretaries of State; and information on treaty-making, classifications of diplomats, and the organization of the State Department and a typical U.S. diplomatic mission.

National Leadership and Foreign Policy: A Case Study in the Mobilization of Public Support. By James N. Rosenau. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. 400 pp. $8.50.

An effort to determine whether or not it is possible to develop a foreign policy consensus among the various leadership groups in the United States. Professor Rosenau has examined data accumulated concerning 1,067 national leaders who attended a White House Conference on behalf of the 1958 foreign aid program and has attempted to quantify differences in such factors as social backgrounds, political behavior, and opinion-making activities.

No Substitute for Victory. By Frank J. Johnson. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962. 230 pp. $5.00.

A critique of American foreign policy. The author deplores what he perceives to be a tendency for American policymakers to subordinate U.S. interests to allied, neutral and world opinion, especially as expressed in the United Nations. Such policies, it is suggested, should be replaced by a "will to win" the Cold War.

The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years. By Emmet John Hughes. New York: Atheneum, 1963. 372 pp. $5.95.

An important and controversial interpretation of the Eisenhower Administration. The author, a former adviser and speechwriter to President Eisenhower and a distinguished journalist and author, portrays the men who advised the President—in particular, John Foster Dulles; sheds light on a number of critical events of these eight years; and describes the ordeal which the awesome responsibility of the Presidency imposes on the incumbent and his closest advisers.

The Politics of Hope. By Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963. 298 pp. $5.00.

A collection of the author's essays on such topics as the writing of history, the differences between liberal and conservative politics, the role of the intellectual in American life, and relationships between government and the arts. Although writings about earlier periods in U.S. history are included, the volume contains for the most part Professor Schlesinger's critique of the Eisenhower years.

Professional Staffs of Congress. By Kenneth Kofmehl. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Studies, 1962. 282 pp. $6.00.

A study of the professional staffs of Congress—committees, individual members, legislative counsel—their organization, recruitment, qualification, tenure, size and work, and their relation to one another and to other governmental agencies.

IV. Western Europe

The Action Francaise. By Edward R. Tannenbaum. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. 316 pp. $7.50.

An examination of the principal French reactionary movement of the twentieth century. The author traces first the origins of the counter-revolutionary tradition

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in France and then investigates relationships between *Action Francaise* and the church, the labor movement, and major nationalist and fascist leagues. The study contains an evaluation of the social composition, the tactics and ideology of the movement.

Algeria and France: From Colonialism to Cooperation. By Dorothy Pickles. New York: Praeger, 1963. 216 pp. $5.00.

An analysis of one of the most crucial issues of postwar French politics—the Algerian war which toppled several French governments and eventually the Fourth Republic. The author, who teaches at the London School of Economics and has written several studies of French politics and government, shows how the minor rebellion of 1954 became a major war and why the Fourth Republic failed to solve the Algerian problem; describes the events which brought General de Gaulle to power; analyzes the aims and methods of De Gaulle's policy toward the Algerian revolutionaries; shows how this policy helped to gain for him unassailable authority within France; and assesses his statesmanship, style and political philosophy.

The Anschluss. By Gordon Brook-Shepherd. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1963. 223 pp. $4.95.

In a detailed study of the German annexation of Austria the author describes the historic Berchtesgaden encounter between Hitler and Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg and relates, in an hour-by-hour account, how the Nazis, on the weekend of March 11-13, 1938, seized power in Vienna. Much of the research is the product of interviews with leading personalities, including Schuschnigg, and of documents from the British and German foreign offices and the Nuremberg trials.

City on Leave: A History of Berlin, 1945-1962. By Philip Windsor. New York: Praeger, 1963. 276 pp. $6.50.

Mr. Windsor, a Research Associate at the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, writes a comprehensive history of the Berlin problem from the Yalta and Potsdam conferences to the events in August 1961 and the altered situation in Berlin after the erection of "the wall." He analyzes the postwar relations among the Four Powers in Berlin; distinguishes between the different crises that have arisen over Berlin's status; relates these crises to other international events; and describes the rise of political leaders Ernst Reuter and Willy Brandt.

The Defense of Berlin. By Jean Edward Smith. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963. 430 pp. $6.95.

The author, Faculty Scholar of Public Law and Government at Columbia, has written an authoritative history of Berlin from World War II to the present, utilizing knowledge from his experiences as an Army officer in that city as well as many personal interviews with Mayor Willy Brandt, General Lucius D. Clay, and others who have taken part in the defense of Berlin.

Documents on European Government. Edited by Steven Muller. New York: Macmillan, 1963. 266 pp. $2.25 (paper).

A collection of public documents on the governments of Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union. The volume provides a useful supplement to introductory texts in comparative European government.

Indivisible Germany: Illusion or Reality? By James H. Wolfe. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963. 130 pp. Glds. 15.30 (paper).

The author, Assistant Professor of International Studies at the University of South Carolina, recounts the origins and development of the German problem in

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the context of the Cold War and domestic German politics. He also examines the various solutions proposed for a settlement in Central Europe, the various Soviet and Western positions on German reunification and Berlin, the possibility of a Russo-German *rapprochement,* and Germany's role in the Atlantic Community and European unity movement.

The Italian Labor Movement. By Daniel L. Horowitz. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 356 pp. $7.50.

A timely history of the Italian labor movement, including Italian trade unionism today, and its relation to and integration with Italian politics, social structure and economy.

The Memoirs of Lord Chandos. By Lord Chandos (Oliver Lyttelton). New York: New American Library, 1963. 448 pp. $7.50.

A member of Churchill's Wartime Cabinet, a British business leader, and Chairman of England's National Theatre offers his reflections on Britain's foreign policy, economic affairs and major developments in the twentieth century. The author presents incisive portraits of leading statesmen with whom he has had contact in Britain and the United States.

The Politics of Italian Foreign Policy. By Norman Kogan. New York: Praeger, 1963. 156 pp. $5.00.

In this study of Italian foreign policy, Kogan argues that domestic considerations such as the society's value system, its attitudes toward politics and its expectations, affect both the motives and operational methods of political decision-makers. He asserts that "the key objective of Italian foreign policy is to protect the domestic social structure from external dangers." This orientation provides the determining factor for Italian policy toward NATO, the Atlantic Community and other international issues.

Sixty Days that Shook the West: The Fall of France: 1940. By Jacques Benoist-Méhin. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963. 538 pp. $7.95.

A translation and condensation of a French military historian's three-volume study of the Fall of France in the summer of 1940. This volume treats in detail the military and political events of the sixty days of this fateful period of the Second World War.

Winston Churchill: The Yankee Marlborough. By R. W. Thompson. New York: Doubleday, 1963. 342 pp. $5.95.

The author traces Churchill's Anglo-American ancestry and examines with objectivity his achievements and failures in political and strategic affairs over more than half a century of public service.

V. Soviet Bloc

Albania—China's Beachhead in Europe. By Harry Hamm. New York: Praeger, 1963. 176 pp. $4.95.

Mr. Hamm examines the factors and events which led to the Moscow-Tirana split and to the Peking-Tirana alliance, and describes the attack by the Albanian Communist Party on the CPSU at the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961. The author was one of four West German journalists permitted in August 1961 to enter and travel in Albania—the first Westerners so honored since 1957.

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Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift. By William E. Griffith. Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1963. 423 pp. $7.95.

A carefully documented analysis of Albania's break with the Kremlin and alliance with distant China. Dr. Griffith, Research Associate of the M.I.T. Center for International Studies, draws upon a large number of Albanian documents for his study and includes many of them in the appendix.

The Bolshevik Tradition: Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev. By Robert H. McNeal. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963. 181 pp. $1.95 (paper).

Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev: Voices of Bolshevism. Edited by Robert H. McNeal. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963. 180 pp. $1.95 (paper).

The first of these companion volumes is an interpretation of the history of the CPSU, based on the careers of Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev. The other volume is a collection of the writings, speeches and other documents of the three leading Bolsheviks.

Bolshevism: An Introduction to Soviet Communism. By Waldemar Gurian. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963. 189 pp. $1.95 (paper).

A brief interpretive account of Bolshevism as a socio-political religion and historical force, as a dogmatic doctrine and a flexible political instrument. In a useful appendix, the author has colletced some 50 pages of quotations taken from important Soviet documents on a variety of subjects, such as dialectical materialism, the historical process, tactics, the Party, relations with the noncommunist world, cultural and educational policies, and Russian nationalism.

Diversity in International Communism: A Documentary Record, 1961-1963. Edited by Alexander Dallin. New York: Columbia University Press, for the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, 1963. 867 pp. $10.00 ($3.60, paper).

A documentary record of the issues that have endangered the unity of the world communist movement since the 22nd Congress of the CPSU of October 1961. The 120 documents are chiefly from the October 1961-April 1962 period, with sections devoted to the communist parties of the Soviet Union, Albania, China, Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, Western Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Latin and North America. The editor also provides a section on the period—of the "escalation of crisis" within world communism—from April 1962 to April 1963 and an appendix of documents from the Conference of 81 Communist and Workers Parties of November 1960.

The Economic Integration of Hungary into the Soviet Bloc. By Laszlo Zsoldos. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963. 149 pp. $5.00.

A comprehensive study of the economy of Hungary. The author examines such topics as Hungary's foreign trade, domestic economic growth, commodity patterns of trade, and problems arising from central planning.

How Russia Is Ruled. (Revised edition.) By Merle Fainsod. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 684 pp. $8.95.

Originally published in 1953, this study on the government of the Soviet Union has now been revised to include material up to the end of 1962. The basic scheme

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of organization has been retained: an historical analysis of the forces and factors that produced the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and influenced the early development of the Soviet Union; a comprehensive treatment of the role of the Party; a description of the Constitution, government bureaucracy, terror as a weapon and the armed forces; and the problems of management, labor and agriculture in the Soviet system.

The Making of Modern Russia. By Lionel Kochan. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963. 335 pp. $1.25 (paper).

The author traces the development of the Kiev state of the tenth century to the Soviet Union of today. His account focuses upon political, social and economic changes, rather than upon foreign policy, literary affairs or cultural life.

Plekhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism. By Samuel H. Baron. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963. 400 pp. $8.50.

The first biography of F. V. Plekhanov in a Western language traces the life of this Russian revolutionary from his youthful activities in exile to his death in Finland after the Bolshevik Revolution. The author examines in detail Plekhanov's theories of Marxism and his studies in philosophy, history and art.

Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia. By Theodore H. Von Laue. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. 360 pp. $7.50.

A study of Russian economic development from 1892 to 1903. The author ascribes Russia's impressive rate of industrialization under Tsarist rule to the ability of Sergei Witte, Russian Minister of Finance. Moreover, the study contains a detailed examination of the political, social and economic forces operative in Russia during Witte's tenure.

The Soviet Crucible. (Second edition.) Edited by Samuel Hendel. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1963. 706 pp. $7.50.

The second edition, revised and enlarged, of a book of readings on Soviet communist theory, political and economic institutions and the prospects for the future development of the Soviet system. New sections in this edition treat the motivations for and nature of social welfare measures, Soviet nationality policies, and the contents of and prospects for the New Party Program. The materials include selections from Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders as well as analyses of the Soviet system by leading noncommunist authorities. No readings on Soviet foreign policy are presented.

The Soviet Union at the United Nations. By Alexander Dallin. New York: Praeger, 1962. 244 pp. $5.75.

An eminent Sovietologist traces the evolution of Soviet attitudes and policy toward international law and organization. Professor Dallin contrasts the objectives of the UN with the communist vision of world order and sets forth in detail Soviet policies in the UN's major organs. Special emphasis is placed upon Soviet conduct in the UN during such crises as Korea, Suez and the Congo. The author assesses the impact of the UN upon Soviet foreign policy.

VI. Middle East and Africa

African Affairs No. 2 (St. Anthony's Papers No. 15). Edited by Kenneth Kirkwood. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963. 129 pp. $4.25.

A series of essays on problems of current and historical interest. The volume contains articles on such topics as Negritude and African socialism, democracy in

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Africa, the Makombe Rising of 1917 in Portuguese East Africa, the Anglo-Congolese Agreement of 1894, and the contribution of Christian missionaries to the emergence of Northern Rhodesia. Contributors include Leopold Senghor as well as eminent American students of African affairs.

Cecil Rhodes: The Colossus of Southern Africa. By J. G. Lockhart and The Hon. C. M. Woodhouse. New York: Macmillan, 1963. 525 pp. $12.50.

In this detailed biography of Cecil Rhodes, the authors have made substantial use of the Rhodes Papers in Oxford in order to present material which some of his previous biographers had either overlooked or withheld from publication for reasons of discretion. The book focuses primarily on the complex events of Rhodes' later years. Particularly interesting is the account of his part in the famous Jameson Raid, the incident which helped to precipitate the Boer War.

The Egyptian Peasant. By Henry Habib Ayrout. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963. 167 pp. $3.95.

An Egyptian social scientist and a renowned educator, Jesuit Father Ayrout, analyzes the life and environment of the Egyptian peasant, the fellah, who remains bound by ignorance and poverty despite welfare efforts by the Egyptian government.

In the Fiery Continent. By Tom Hopkinson. New York: Doubleday, 1963. 367 pp. $4.95.

The former editor of *Drum,* a widely read African magazine, describes his travels in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanganyika and the Republic of South Africa.

'Mau Mau' Detainee. By Josiah Mwangi Kariuki. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. 184 pp. $4.75.

The account by a Kenyan of his experiences while a prisoner of the British in detention camps between 1953 and 1960.

Middle Eastern Affairs No. 3 (St. Anthony's Papers No. 16). Edited by Albert Hourani. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963. 184 pp. $4.25.

This collection contains articles on democracy in the Arab world, Persian political societies in the early years of this century, the Salafiyya Movement in Morocco, the land system of Lower Iraq, and the activities of American missionaries in Beirut and Butrus Al-Bustani.

Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa. By Max Gluckman. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. 261 pp. $6.00.

This volume of essays contains the author's reflections on the theories of fellow anthropologists who have studied and written on African tribal societies. It also includes his own views on the functioning of African governments and on the contributions of Malinowski to a more complete understanding of the African personality.

The Political Development of Tanganyika. By J. Clagett Taylor. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963. 242 pp. $6.00.

The author, an educational missionary in Southern Rhodesia, traces the history of Tanganyika's political development from 1880 through 1961. He emphasizes

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the part played by racial cooperation and the United Nations in the territory's recent development.

The Politics of Partnership: The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. By Patrick Keatley. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963. 507 pp. $1.95 (paper).

A Canadian political journalist now writing for the *Manchester Guardian,* Mr. Keatley not only condemns the white settlers' policies in the Federation as unenlightened "white supremacy" but also criticizes the vacillations and inaction of the British government in carrying out its responsibilities as a "political tutor" for the Africans. In a postscript which analyzes the importance of the Federation's elections of December 1962, the author recommends firm steps on the part of the British government—possibly even including massive military intervention—to meet the crisis likely to unfold if African demands for self-determination continue to be frustrated.

The Problem of the Southern Sudan. By Joseph Oduho and William Deng. London: Oxford University Press, for the Institute of Race Relations, 1963. 60 pp. $1.50 (paper).

Two political leaders in exile from the Southern Sudan set forth the southern region's case for self-determination against the North.

South West Africa. By Ruth First. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963. 249 pp. $1.25 (paper).

The author, a well-known South African journalist now under house arrest for her writings, traces the course of over eighty years' economic and political exploitation of South West Africa. She gives a comprehensive survey of the reasons for this region's strategic importance for the continent of Africa.

The Turkish Revolution, 1960-1961. By Walter F. Weiker. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963. 172 pp. $2.50 (paper).

An examination of the 17-month period in 1960-1961 during which the Turkish armed forces ruled Turkey before restoring democratic government. The author traces the background of the revolution, especially the increasingly repressive rule of the Menderes regime preceding the revolution; discusses the legal and political aspects of the trials of Menderes and his aides, the drafting of a new Constitution, the problems of academic freedom, and the Turkish political parties; evaluates the governing record of the Turkish army generals; and suggests the implications of the Turkish experience for U.S. policymakers dealing with developing nations.

VII. East Asia

America's Failure in China, 1941-1950. By Tang Tsou. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963. 614 pp. $12.50.

A scholarly examination of the reasons for the failure of U.S. policy toward China from Pearl Harbor to December 1950. Dr. Tsou, Research Associate in the Center for the Study of American Foreign and Military Policy at the University of Chicago, concludes that the decisive factor in U.S. China policy—from 1899 to 1950—was the imbalance between end and means. ". . . this imbalance takes the form of an unwillingness and, at times, an inability to use military power purposefully to achieve political objectives [and] as an unwillingness and inability to abandon unattainable goals in order to avoid entanglement in a hopeless cause."

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Ceylon: A Divided Nation. By B. H. Farmer. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. 74 pp. $1.75 (paper).

A brief introduction to the current communal tensions and divisions in Ceylon. The author briefly sketches the geographic features of the island nation, relates the history of the origins and movements of the various peoples and communities of Ceylon, traces the development of communal disharmony from ancient times through 450 years of colonial rule, describes the present ethnic divisions in Ceylonese society and examines the interaction between the communal problem and the politics of governing Ceylon.

China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey 1839-1923. By Ssu-Yu Teng, John K. Fairbank and others. New York: Atheneum, 1963. 296 pp. $1.65 (paper).

The authors' purpose in this volume is "to mark some of the broad outlines and trace some of the main patterns in the intellectual history of modern China's attempt to comprehend the West and adjust to it." They provide brief introductions to the translations of many Chinese documents and the works of Chinese intellectuals.

Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh. By Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose and Robert A. Huttenback. New York: Praeger, 1963. 205 pp. $6.00.

In this scholarly study, the authors explore the history of the key Ladakh area, emphasizing the strategic factors that have caused this region to be fought over since the dawn of history. In the concluding chapters they examine conflicting Indian and Chinese border claims in the area, clarifying the points at issue and showing how the Chinese communists approach negotiations and the tactics they use.

India: A World in Transition. By Beatrice Pitney Lamb. New York: Praeger, 1963. 374 pp. $6.50.

A broad survey of virtually every aspect of modern India, including Hinduism, caste and social change, language barriers, government and politics, village life, economic development, foreign policy, the Chinese threat and the Indian armed forces.

Mao Tse-tung: Emperor of the Blue Ants. By George Paloczi-Horvath. New York: Doubleday, 1963. 393 pp. $5.75.

A fascinating, documented biography of Mao Tse-tung, based largely on Soviet, Chinese and other communist sources. The author, a Hungarian historian and journalist who fled to the West after the Hungarian uprising, devotes more than one-half of his book to Mao's thirty-year struggle to gain power in China and the remainder to a broad survey of Mao's policies since 1949. He asserts that Mao was never Stalin's puppet; that the Soviets repeatedly tried to oust him from power; that Mao can remain in power only through the use of terror; and that a general nuclear war might very well produce a Chinese-dominated globe.

Primer for Revolt: The Communist Takeover in Viet-Nam. By Truong Chinh. New York: Praeger, 1963. 213 pp. $5.00.

The author, former Secretary General of the Vietnamese Communist Party and Vice-Premier of North Vietnam, sets forth the strategies, history and causes for

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success of the communists' campaign to oust their opponents from North Vietnam. This volume provides an important addition to the literature of communist political and military strategy for revolutionary warfare.

Ta Ta, Tan Tan ("Fight fight, talk talk . . ."): The Inside Story of Communist China. By Valentin Chu. New York: W. W. Norton, 1963. 306 pp. $4.95.

Using Chinese communist sources and interviews with over 600 Chinese—escapees, fellow-travelers and communists—the author attempts to interpret Communist China for the Western reader. He examines Chinese communist policies and the problems which have developed when these policies strike at the deep roots of Chinese culture. In his final chapter, Chu assesses the difficulties China faces in adapting to her particular culture those foreign institutions and traditions which seem best suited to the building of a modern Chinese nation.

Workers, Factories and Social Change in India. By Richard D. Lambert. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. 247 pp. $5.50.

After analyzing the social characteristics, employment histories, levels of aspiration, and the attitudes toward work and management of 821 workers in five privately-owned factories in Central India, the author offers evidence that industrialization has not produced in India patterns of change similar to those of the West.

VIII. Latin America

Brazil on the Move. By John Dos Passos. New York: Doubleday, 1963. 205 pp. $3.95.

A personalized view of recent Brazilian history based on visits made in 1948, 1956 and 1962. Dos Passos, of Portuguese descent, speaks both Portuguese and Spanish and knows many of the key political figures in present-day Brazil. The book begins with a brief sketch of Brazilian history in which the author details some of the differences between the Spanish and the Portuguese traditions in the New World. Governor Carlos Lacerda is a major figure in the later chapters which deal with economic and political developments in several important areas of the country.

Christianity and Revolution: The Lesson of Cuba. By Leslie Dewart. New York: Herder and Herder, 1963. 320 pp. $5.50.

The author sees the Castro revolution and its aftermath as a microcosm of the world struggle between communism and religion and criticizes the way in which many Churchmen identify their religious tenets with anti-communism. Cuban Catholics, according to Dewart, lost out in the revolution because they allowed themselves to be caught up in anti-communist activities and failed to keep sight of the importance of social reform in Cuba.

Evolution or Chaos: Dynamics of Latin American Government and Politics. By Karl M. Schmitt and David D. Burks. New York: Praeger, 1963. 308 pp. $6.50 ($2.50, paper).

The authors attempt to assess the chances of the Alliance for Progress. Without the Alliance, social upheaval is a foregone conclusion in most countries of Latin America, but the program faces formidable obstacles. Attitudes, social conditions, institutions, and interest groups contribute to a complicated pattern of interacting political forces. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico receive major attention, but all the nations are treated individually.

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Invisible Latin America. By Samuel Shapiro. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963. 180 pp. $3.95.

The author views the Latin American scene (the title refers to the mass of the people of Latin America who are pictured in revolutionary ferment against poverty and backwardness) through the situation in five countries: Guatemala's *caudillo* government, Peru's conservative democracy, Venezuela's liberal democracy, Cuba's revolutionary regime, and Mexico's post-revolutionary administration. He concludes with a look at Bolivia as a test case for the Alliance for Progress.

The Morning After. By Victor Franco. New York: Praeger, 1963. 248 pp. $6.00.

A French journalist's impressions of Cuba under Castro, originally published in French in 1962. The author went to Cuba in 1961 to interview Cubans from all walks of life. Although initially favorable toward Castro's attempts to remake Cuba, he returned from Cuba thoroughly disillusioned because of the communist tactics which Castro employs.

The Political Economy of Mexico. By William P. Glade, Jr. and Charles W. Anderson. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963. 242 pp. $5.00.

Two studies on the common theme of the progress of the Mexican Revolution. Glade, under the subtitle "Revolution and Economic Development," looks at the Mexican Revolution as an intricately woven tapestry of many strands, including the philosophical and artistic as well as the political and economic. He attempts to reproduce something of the design which suggests the progress of the Revolution. Anderson concerns himself with one important economic institution in Mexico: the development banks. Under the subtitle "Bankers as Revolutionaries," he finds a lesson for other underdeveloped nations in the economic impetus provided by Mexico's politically oriented banks.

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